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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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21 AUGUST 1987

## EAST EUROPE

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## STROUGAL SPEAKS AT OPENING OF HISTORICAL EXHIBITION

AU091316 [Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 8 July 1987 carries on page 2 an approximately 1,900-word text of the speech delivered by CSSR Premier Lubomir Strougal at the opening of the permanent historical exhibition of the National Museum, entitled "Monuments of the National Past," in the renovated Lobkowitz Palace at the Prague Castle on 7 July.

Strougal began by noting that the exhibition is meant to show the development and transformations of Czech statehood through the ages; that its exhibits should not only be viewed, but also pondered in their historical linkage; and that a better tomorrow can be created only by learning from the progressive legacy of past struggles in the heart of Europe. He then dealt with the history of the Prague Castle, which "embodies the historical destinies, upsurges and downfalls, and patriotic and social ideals of the Czech nation in many historical periods, and particularly in the latest epoch, as well as those of the Slovak nation." It also knew great personalities, he said, who "were great because they had grasped the call and the needs of the times and also knew how to free the way for the forces that moved the times." Underscoring that the nation's history was determined by its people, who had fought for Czech statehood since the great Moravian empire, Strougal noted that "at the time when the groupings of Slav tribes were being destroyed by fire and sword, our ancestors succeeded in defending the westernmost Slav island against German supremacy. They even succeeded in building a powerful Premyslide kingdom, which momentarily influenced the fate of Europe and, after centuries of separate histories, even brought the Slovak nation for a short time into a joint state." After dealing with the Czechs' high cultural standards, he stated he recalled the peace project of George of Podebrad, who proposed to his neighbors in 1464 to maintain a mutual, pure and sincere brotherhood without the use of arms. "This idea is still alive today," Strougal added, "and that is why we received with deep understanding the recent Prague appeal of Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, who called upon the nations of Europe to finally learn how to administer our common home in peace and understanding." After expounding the ideas of Jan Hus, which had spread despite the anger of the Catholic Church and feudal lords, and which heralded "the storms, uprisings, and revolutions on which our present and more just order has drawn," Strougal stated, "On a hundred, even thousand occasions the Czech, but also the Slovak nations were denied their right of existence, statehood, and mother tongue,



and not only verbally, but also with the use of arms and military aggression. After all, even today one can hear the echoes of these endeavors in certain places, from time to time. But we must never forget the years of national degradation and oppression, which we are so loath to remember, for the 3 centuries of bondage have forged our people's defiance and their love for freedom, progress, and truth."

Strougal concluded by noting that, after many "centuries, many attempts at unification, and a lasting mutual influence," the "fates of the fraternal nations of Czechs and Slovaks have met for all times." He reviewed the role played by the workers class; noted that the viability of Czechoslovak statehood became a certainty after the country's liberation by the Soviet Army and the "triumph of the will of our working people to take the road of socialism"; stated that socialism and alliance with the USSR guarantee the nation's firm and irrefutable place in Europe and in the world; invoked the words of Czech scientist-politician Nejedly and the first socialist president Gottwald on the need to be aware of national roots in building socialism; underscored the uniqueness of the exhibition and the lessons it can teach; and wished every visitor to cement his love for truth, human dignity, freedom, faith in social progress, justice, and a creative nationalism which naturally leads to internationalism and to the awareness of responsibility for the fate of the fatherland, of socialism, and of the earth.

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## STEFANAK ON RELATIONS WITH SPANISH COMMUNISTS

AU070918 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 1 Jul 87 p 6

[Interview with Michal Stefanak, head of a CPCZ Central Committee department, on his recent visit to Spain, by RUDE PRAVO staff journalist Miroslav Courton: "Intensifying Knowledge About Each Other"--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] A CPCZ delegation, headed by Comrade Michal Stefanak, member of the CPCZ Central Committee and head of the CPCZ Central Committee's International Affairs Department, recently paid a visit to Spain at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party [PCE]. On this opportunity we asked him for an interview.

[Courton] What was the aim of the journey?

[Stefanak] There had been 18 years without any contacts and any cooperation between the CPCZ and the PCE.

Last October, an official delegation of the PCE Central Committee paid a visit to the CSSR at the invitation of the CPCZ Central Committee. On that occasion, at the request of the Spanish comrades, the relations between the CPCZ and the PCE--interrupted by the PCE leadership after 1969--were resumed. This has created prerequisites for an all-round development of cooperation between our parties. Thus the journey of the CPCZ delegation has been another step in the process of the exchange of views on bilateral relations, on international problems, and the revolutionary movement in general. What is involved is simply the full normalization of relations between two fraternal parties.

[Courton] A less than 1 year has elapsed since the resumption of relations between the CPCZ and the PCE. What are the prospects for the further expansion of relations?

[Stefanak] The past year showed that both sides are sincerely interested in expanding relations on the platform of independence and sovereignty, while respecting the views and approaches of the other side. In the course of the CPCZ delegation's visit a protocol on cooperation was signed which determines the direction of the further development of mutual contacts. We envisage a broad exchange of information between the two parties and a

more frequent exchange of information between the two parties and a more frequent exchange of lecturers, study delegations, a more extensive cooperation between our press organs, and such like. All this is to contribute to overcoming the consequences of the preceding period, when PCE members had no objective information about the policy of the CPCZ and about what has been going on in the CSSR. Our parties mutually getting to know each other's work also creates prerequisites for a more extensive development of relations--also in the future.

[Courton] And what about relations between the CPCZ and the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain [CPPS]?

[Stefanak] The CPCZ has had good relations with the CPPS since its foundation. A CPCZ delegation attended the CPPS's constituent congress in 1984. Since then our relations have been comprehensively developing and have reached a high level. We regularly exchange materials on the two parties' activities, and exchange study delegations and lecturers. We want to continue this practice and help to overcome the differences [rozpory] between the CPPS and the PCE in the interest of strengthening the unity of the communist movement in Spain.

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## BRIEFS

NEW ELECTRONICS MONTHLY--Next week a new monthly entitled ELECTRONICS [ELEKTRONIKA] will appear on the news stands. The magazine is aimed at a wide range of readers with a professional or layman's interest in the subject. The magazine will concentrate mainly on the application of components, the hardware and software of small computers, and the use of electronics in both production and non-production branches of the national economy. [Text] [Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0400 GMT 13 Jun 87] /9604

TRADE WITH HUNGARY--According to Josef Kropacek, director of the CSSR exposition at the 20-28 May Budapest Spring Fair, the turnover in bilateral CSSR-Hungarian goods exchange will reach Kcs16.270 billion in 1987, with engineering products accounting for 50 percent of the volume. According to Motokov's Vera Struncova, the CSSR will deliver to Hungary this year 150 Tatra T-815 heavy trucks, at least 150 LIAZ vehicles for long distance transportation, 200 Avia light trucks, and 10,000 Skoda passenger cars, "although the Hungarians would like to import some tens of thousands more annually" along with other utility vehicles, trailers, and the like. During the fair the CSSR signed a contract on the importation from Hungary in 1988 of 130 articulated Ikarus buses worth almost Kcs100 million, and of telecommunications instruments worth Kcs30 million. [Summary] [Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech 28 May 87 p 3] /9604

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION WITH CANADA--Miroslav Toman, CSSR deputy premier and minister of agriculture and food, on 23 June signed with his Canadian counterpart John Wise an agreement on cooperation between the two countries' Ministries of Agriculture. "The document creates a suitable framework for deepening bilateral relations and the exchange of agricultural produce." At the end of his visit to Canada, Toman was received by Senate Chairman G. Charboneau. Toman left for home after this meeting. [Summary] [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 25 Jun 87 p 7] /9604

CSO: 2400/375

## 'NOWE DROGI' ARTICLES EYE PAPAL VISIT

Hopes for Church-State Rapprochement Aired

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 5, May 87 pp 5-11

[Editorial: "Poland Is One"]

[Text] For the third time since his election to the papacy, John Paul II will soon arrive in Poland. It is thus timely to consider the relations between the state and the church, and more broadly, between socialism and Catholicism, in our country.

In this respect our country is the site of a historical experiment. Catholicism in Poland has a millenium-long tradition reaching the beginnings of our statehood. It is the predominant religion in this country. It has markedly influenced national history, customs, mentality, and culture. In various periods it has variously been part of the drama of Polish destiny. On the one hand, there were priests and bishops sacrificing themselves as Polish patriots, and on the other, traitors in cassocks punished by the people of Warsaw during the Insurrections. On the one hand, there were clergymen who took part in armed struggle during the uprisings, and on the other, there were clergymen who said prayers for the success of the Partitioning Powers [Austria, Russia, Germany]. The involvement of the church's history in the history of the state requires intensified research and exploration based on sources that often are relatively inaccessible.

The tradition, scope, role, and influence of Catholicism on social and national life are a major historically conditioned factor in the specific national development of Poland. The complexity of the related problems has been perceived by successive generations of activists and parties of the Polish worker movement.

During World War II and the bloody Hitlerite Occupation the Roman Catholic Church shared the fate of the fighting and martyred Nation. The invader placed in concentration camps several thousand priests and murdered some 20 percent of their total number. In no other European country did the Roman Catholic Church incur such losses. The Catholic clergy, monastic orders, and activists took a significant part in underground struggle, self-help actions, and rescue of Jews.



During the same time in Germany, Slovakia, Croatia, Hungary, and France, the main forces of the hierarchy and clergy of the Roman Catholic Church sided with fascism, and the position taken toward Hitler for many years by the then pope prompted the Italian people to call him "Il Papa tedesco" (the German pope).

The new reality [postwar Poland] was conceived under the sign of a good cooperation between believers and nonbelievers in reconstructing Poland and laying the foundations of social justice. This was explicitly reflected in the Manifesto of the PKWN [Polish Committee for National Liberation]. It underlay the strategy of the Bloc of Democratic Parties and the state's policy on religion, and it was confirmed by the operating practice of social forces.

Suffice it to recall the fact of the assistance of the nascent government in the reconstruction and opening of church buildings and its extensive participation in restoring the assets of religious institutions plundered by the Occupier. A shining page in the annals of state-church cooperation is the pioneering effort invested in establishing pastoral centers in the western and northern territories and the church's contribution to their utilization and integration with the Heartland. The chronicle of the first years of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] contains names of priests who were active in civic deeds and supported the cause of just reforms, but it unfortunately also includes names of priests who had opposed them.

Thus, the picture of attitudes is complex and sometimes conflicting. Every positive fact took place arduously and required courageous choices and the overcoming of many obstacles and, above all, it required deep thought and reappraisal.

In an overwhelmingly Catholic society there was no easy answer to the fundamental question: how to translate revolutionary transformations into reality and build socialism -- a system of society based on the ideological and theoretical premises of dialectical and historical materialism that is philosophically opposed to idealism and fideism? And how to find a place in this qualitatively new situation for a church that has been for centuries affirming a system of social injustice?

The past was a burden, for in the past the church took the side of the propertied classes. Entering upon the path of transformations leading toward socialism, Poland had to accomplish "en route," as it were, many progressive and democratic tasks that had not been accomplished in the previous periods. Unlike in a majority of Western European countries and the United States, no separation of church and state had been introduced in this country in the past. Accomplishing this change was a progressive measure that at the same time relieved the church of interfering in political issues.

Side by side with domains in which adaptation of the Catholic Church and clergy to the new reality was possible, there existed fronts of struggle, including instances of cooperation between priests and the reactionary underground. Mistakes were committed by the authorities as well. From the vantage point of 40 years it can be clearly seen, however, that a positive



evolution has taken place and positive solutions meeting both national and state interests, the Polish *raison d'etat*, and those of the Roman Catholic Church have predominated.

In all domains of life mutual trust, ties, and cooperation among people of differing attitudes toward religious beliefs and practices have become a fact. Socialist Poland was not built by Marxists alone. On the contrary, all that time, believing and nonbelieving citizens worked arm in arm. In the family albums of many veterans of the People's Army photographs of First Communion adjoin photographs of regimental ceremonies. In the dwellings of millions of workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia, religious symbols hang on the walls next to decorations awarded for civic activism in building socialism.

Millions of Catholics have been and are participating in everything that defines contemporary life and the prospects for the future, the form and content of Polish transformations. They took part in the fighting against the invader, in defending people's rule, on the scaffolds of the reconstruction and industrialization of this country, in the processes of the agrarian reform and nationalization of industry, and in the educational and cultural revolution. They are among Builders of People's Poland, and some of the greatest accomplishments and services are to their credit. Many have taken direct part in governing the country. Nowadays they are taking an active and creative part in socialist renewal and in overcoming the difficulties of our battered economy and restoring its normal growth.

The daily cooperation among citizens of differing world outlook ensues from an evolutionary process which confirms the truth of the memorable words of Vladimir Lenin that what unites working people in their striving to make life on earth better is much stronger than their differences on matters concerning heaven. During the last 40 years we have experienced social shocks and conflicts. The class struggle has been continuing with a varying intensity and in various forms. Manifold differences and contradictions exist in the society. But, contrary to the expectations of the enemies of socialism, the line of political divisions has never converged with the line of differences in attitude toward religion. In this place mention can be made of recent experience. When in August 1980 the Primate Stefan Wyszynski appealed in Janna Gora for peace, work, and respect for the state, some ardent atheists distributed flyers calling for turning the workers' protest into counter-revolutionary action.

Our party, the allied political parties, and the people's rule, exercised in a coalition-like manner with the substantial participation of Catholic activists, are positively and openly disposed toward believers. Any other attitude is to be ruled out. Poland is one -- we are building it together. The broader the front of reconciliation and cooperation becomes, regardless of differences in world outlook, the greater the cohesion of all in solid work and the better for all it is. This elementary truth is confirmed by the entire collective experience of the period of People's Poland. Patriotism bids uniting national energy in the service of the Fatherland rather than dividing and scattering it.

The model which we created jointly is not perfect; at times it sputters and makes a grinding noise, owing to the complexity of the issue. But it would be no exaggeration to state that in the already nearly 43 years of existence of socialist Poland, constitutional principles and practical solutions serving to combine the aspirations of the Marxist-Leninist party and rationales of the socialist state with the unrestricted satisfaction of the religious needs of believers and the completeness of their social and civil rights have evolved and passed the test of time.

The Roman Catholic Church and other churches and religious associations are separated from the state. At the same time, they have complete freedom and favorable conditions for exercising their religious functions. What constitutes the domain of the state and determines its functions and obligations is, as in all modern countries, of a secular nature and not subject to ecclesiastical interference. At the same time, freedom of conscience and religion, and freedom of choice and change of world outlook as well as of expression of thoughts arising on the soil of religious convictions and motivations, are fully assured. In this field the principle of mutual respect and tolerance, which we all should follow, is being strengthened.

In sum, this is a great, lasting, and inviolable accomplishment of People's Poland, construed as the common cause and common good of our nation in the entire diversity of its beliefs and varieties of world outlook. This is promoted by, e.g., the admirable activities of the associations of Catholics and secular Christians. Their growing contribution to national reconciliation and to the growth of the ideas and activism of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, their lively and independent presence in political life, and the participation of their representatives in governing bodies and in the entire system of democracy constitute an important and precious value to Poland and a creative contribution to our reformed socialist reality.

There exist three determinants in the party's attitude toward the church: coexistence in the political plane, cooperation in improving interpersonal relations, overcoming asocial attitudes, and promoting human virtues, and the dispute in the philosophical-ideological plane.

But we place stress on unity, on the presence of diversity in the system of organizations united by common aspirations regarding the most important issues. This is the requirement that the whole effectively pursue the agreed-upon goal, that it effectively accomplish the tasks of the socialist development of Poland. We all should strive toward this goal, on making sure that the mechanisms of democracy and self-government being expanded would be not just words but also and above all deeds and effects.

Another inseparable part of the ongoing transformations is the striving to relax the policy on staffing executive posts so as to accept greater numbers of nonparty people, including believers. The possibility of advancement on merit is a right of which valuable citizens should avail themselves regardless of their world outlook. It also is regardless of their world outlook that they should be evaluated according to such criteria as quality of performance, results, and responsible attitude.

Most Catholic clergymen perform their pastoral duties in accordance with the laws of the socialist state. The civic commitment of many priests promotes the common good and contributes to a successful development of church-state relations.

The period of normalization and renewal promotes in this field positive facts which, in their turn, strengthen favorable trends. The positive attitude of the heads of the Episcopate to the initiative of forming the Advisory Council to the Chairman of the Council of State is worth noting. The *raison d'etat* of the PRL, its image in the international community, and the cause of peace were indisputably promoted by the travels of the Primate Jozef Glemp to various countries and by his comments on these occasions. Recently also there has been no shortage of realistic and responsible aspects in the comments of the Episcopate on the solution of our internal problems.

However, reaching new frontiers in state-church relations also encounters difficulties which, despite the inevitable complexity of this process, could have been avoided. Now and then comments whose political edge is directed against the system of society in the Polish People's Republic, and against the interests of normalization and reconciliation, comments which at the same time harm the church itself, are proclaimed from the pulpit. The facility and oversimplified manner in which the difficulties and problems inherited from the past or arisen in the course of the new period during which the church is playing so significant a role, are ascribed solely to our system of society, to people's rule and the party, also are bound to be disturbing.

The fervent antisocialist clericalism of part of the clergy conflicts with the claim that the church does not pretend to political functions, and it casts a shadow on the declarations of the Episcopate. The desirable process of improvement in relations with the state is also obstructed by discrete attempts to undermine not only by word but also by deed the secular character of state institutions. The scope of these and similar manifestations has declined. Their total disappearance would be useful to both the state and the church as well as to the entire Polish society.

The claim that the Roman Catholic Church is being persecuted by the "communist regime" should be relegated to gloomy fairy tales. For when compared with the facts, this imputation conflicts the church's doctrinal principle of proclaiming truth. In this connection, the church in this country is more well-off than in many countries with an equally long Catholic tradition, even in countries that are much more wealthy than Poland. It operates a dense and rapidly expanding network of facilities of worship and owns considerable and steadily growing assets. It operates an extensive system for the education of clergymen and theologians. Directly or indirectly, it publishes many periodicals and publications. In sum, it is a richer church now than it had been in the sometimes nostalgically recalled prewar period. Its institutional and material persecution is non-existent, and no one is desirous of it.

On the contrary. The PZPR Program adopted by the 10th Congress confirms the constitutional principles of state-church relations and the historic significance of the common participation of all working people, regardless of attitude to religious belief and practices, in building the socialist



fatherland. That historic longrange document declares, "The experience of People's Poland confirms the main line of the state's policy on religion. Its inviolable foundation is the freedom of conscience and creed as well as the separation of churches and religious associations from the state and their operation within the binding legal and constitutional system. These principles represent achievements of progressive and democratic world thought. Their implementation assures a secular nature of the state and its institutions, including educational institutions, and the unrestricted exercise of religious functions by churches and religious associations. We shall continue this policy, because it ensues from the unity of the basic interests of working people, from the desire that what promotes this unity be definitely in the ascendancy."

This reflects the longrange, strategic position of the Marxist-Leninist party rather than some temporary and tactical position. For the party, as stated in the same Program, "guides itself by and propagates the principles of a scientific world outlook. At the same time, it believes that differences in world outlook and the attendant disputes and polemics should not lead to political conflicts and harm the cause of stable relations between the people's state and churches and religious associations -- relations based on the principle of dialogue and rule of law."

The 10th Congress viewed as an important task, which must be accomplished on a broader scale and at a higher level than previously, the dissemination within party ranks of the scientific Marxist-Leninist world outlook, of dialectical historical materialism. We also proclaim with total openness that differences in world outlook inevitably result in discussions and polemics. This is natural and useful to many sides. A honestly conducted debate promotes philosophical inquiry, enriches knowledge, and enhances the humanist content of thought and action. Polish communists rely on the growth of knowledge and the force of scientific arguments, expecting of their ideological adversaries, whom we desire at the same time to view as partners in civic and social affairs, to renounce, on their part, oversimplifications, epithets, conjurations, and exorcisms.

A major field for discussion is national history, the Polish historical process. One people has one history. The party's position is that the Nation's health requires an honest, deep, objective, and critical inquiry into the past, an inquiry free of both nihilism and nationalism, and, on this basis, an honest process of historical education without glossing over anything, without "white spots on the map." We are not avoiding principled criticism of the mistakes and failures in the history of worker movement in Poland. Interpretations of history made in explicitly false and reactionary spirit, and attempts at an uncritical praise, and sometimes even apotheosis, of negative facts in the church's history in Poland cannot be disregarded either. The cost of manipulations of this kind is always very high. They deprecate the role of history as a "teacher of life" and, by deforming negatively the awareness of younger generations, their influence reaches into the distant future.

We are convinced that, at present and in the entire coming period, tasks relating to the expansion of the constructive political and social-moral cooperation between the state and the church will prove more important than

polemics and disputes over world outlook. A natural domain in this respect is actions that promote peace and combat [international] tension, the arms race, and all manifestations and relics of the "cold war" in thinking, propaganda, and political and economic practice, including the condemnation of the resurgence of German revisionist forces.

An increasingly important domain of common concern is the protection of natural environment and cultural relics and the efforts to maintain the patriotic bonds between the Polonia and the Motherland.

The possibilities for broad cooperation in promoting the work ethic and thrift, in combatting social pathology, and in the struggle for the moral health of the Nation and the cohesion of the family are far from exhausted. Unfortunately, religiosity is often not applied to daily life, to the social ethic.

It is not without the influence of the church doctrine that for years now Poland has been breaking the record for natural population increase in Europe. This is a positive fact which, though, imposes the burden of difficult and costly tasks. In such a situation, the responsibility for multiplying national wealth and income, for streamlining and modernizing the economy, for watching over public property, and for other factors influencing the social and material conditions of life of families should not be left exclusively to the state.

At the 10th Congress First PZPR Central Committee Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski declared, "We thus support broader cooperation along with narrowing the domain of contradictions and misunderstandings. We respect the identity and persona of the church. At the same time we expect and shall demand respect for the Constitution and laws of the PRL and for the *raison d'etat* of the socialist state."

Dialogue in this direction is continuing, and has become more intense in recent months. Of great importance, in particular, was the visit of the Chairman of the Council of State to the Vatican and his conversation with the pope. Positive options are open. The work of the Joint Commission of representative differing interest to both the state and the church is continuing. There should be no lack of goodwill and responsibility for utilizing the existing opportunities. The current time of renewal in Poland and the time of deep changes occurring throughout real socialism, and also the current time of post-Council [following the Second Vatican Council] changes going on in the Roman Catholic Church and of the tireless efforts of John Paul II on behalf of peace afford the right climate for this.

The third trip of the pope-Pole to his native country is happening at a time that is unusually important to Poland, Europe, and the world. Nothing should prevent this event from benefiting the cause of the reconciliation and cooperation of Poles in the matter of reforms and overcoming obstacles on the country's path of development. May this event become an important step on the

road toward the formation and perpetuation of good relations between the state and the church. May it promote the cause of the defense and strengthening of peace. Such are the expectations with which we shall greet, fittingly and cordially, John Paul II in the Fatherland.

#### Reflections on Previous Visits, Effects

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 5, May 87 pp 12-21

[Article by Marian Stepien: "Reflections Before the Visit"]

[Text] The dramatic events of the last few years, which were and are being accompanied by authentic human reactions throwing off the guise of appearances, are becoming covered by an unremittingly and patiently built connective tissue, so frivolously torn in the past, without which there can be no mention of a social organism. The points of support needed to construct further cells of this tissue are people, both groups and individuals, who display several traits that have been particularly valued in recent years. These traits include the ability to see clearly the situation in which our society, our nation, our country, exists; the ability to grasp the causes of disturbing phenomena in their actual complexity, so that they would not be simplistically attributed to a single ideological and political adversary; the readiness to cooperate and work together with persons of different world outlook and different political views in for the sake of suprapersonal common goals and values which not only can but must unite all Poles desiring to live in their own normally developing state; and lastly flexibility of view, the ability to perceive the short and the long term, as Zofia Nalkowska put it.

Short-term perception uncovers, in this case, the differences and serves to define them accurately. Long-term perception encompasses in thought the entire national community, discerns the historical conditions of its development, and serves to understand that the differences resulting in disputes are paralleled by lines reaching far back into the past that unite the entire national community and are hallmarked by its successes and failures. In long-term perception, these accomplishments and failures, victories and defeats, are seen by us as the yardstick of our possibilities. Short-term perception dictates disputes over rationales. Long-term perception serves to understand that, although there is a place for these disputes, it should also be realized that everything -- the various constituencies, political organizations, state structures, and elements of economic life -- is a yardstick of the possibilities of our nation. Both the Polish United Workers' Party and the Catholic Church, the Parliament, the Government, the social structures, and the machinery of state, are, in good and in bad, various forms of our national manifestation. For it is untrue, and this subject has still to be reverted to, that the non-Catholic, secular aspects linked to the history of socialist thought have not grown out of authentically Polish soil, contrary to the arguments presented, especially to the younger, disoriented generation, by the anti-socialist propaganda falsifying the history of thought.

It is precisely in the light of the experience of the last few years that it has become distinctly clear that there is no dividing line between white and black, between wisdom and stupidity. There exist various forms and aspects of



the emanation of our Nation that represent the yardstick of its possibilities in long-term perception, and in them all there coexist major values with useless chaff, deliberation with failure to understand, far-reaching sagacity with greatly harmful shortsightedness. And these features correspond to neither educational background, nor academic degree, nor popularity.

The torn tissue of social bonds is being reconstructed under real and difficult circumstances, by the efforts of people whose feeling of responsibility is stronger than discouragement, in whom the ability to resume working from the scratch overcomes exhaustion and bitterness, and whose driving imperative to act for the common goods does not match the popular idea of the political map of our country.

Two conclusions ensue from this statement. They are fairly obvious, but they are worth stating, the more so considering that it is often the obvious truths that are in the greatest trouble. The first, and more broadly realized, conclusion is that socialist values and their bearers can also exist outside the party. And contrariwise, within the party itself there may exist domains and individuals distant from these values, as we had experienced on our own skin not so long ago. The life of the society, which is a never-ending process, provides no guarantees that we have eliminated such phenomena once and for all. This is simply impossible in a real society.

The other conclusion, less well understood by the general public but equally obvious, can also be deduced by those who do not share religious mentality but can conceive the horizon of thought of believers. Namely, in adopting their point of view, an analogous reasoning can be followed: the values linked to the religious outlook are present not only in the church. They also exist outside it, because the syncretic morality of the church also relies on values acquired by mankind over the centuries outside the church and at times even in opposition to it, this being another subject which has to be reverted to. And contrariwise, not everything inside the church is consonant with the values linked to religion.

For this reason, too, the delicate but unusually important construction of the tissue of social bonds sometimes finds the points of support needed for its growth in unexpected places, and contrariwise, it finds no support where it should be naturally expected.

The reasoning employed so far above is not concerned with obliterating political and world-outlook differences. It is exactly a more precise definition of these differences that makes possible cooperation, because the dialectics of what unites and what divides is the impetus behind our actions. Differences in the levels of the attendant complexities also should be perceived.

The world is separated into two hostile camps, but at the same time it is united by the common fate of all inhabitants of our globe, which causes otherwise opposed forces to organize themselves in a mutual struggle to defend it. Recent years are a source of many observations in this respect.

Europe is crossed by a boundary dividing it into eastern and western parts, into two different military pacts which view each other suspiciously and without friendship. At the same time, though, the European awareness of the necessity of joint action in the defense of our entire Continent, of its traditions and culture, of a continent that as a whole is especially threatened by eventual nuclear war, is growing. And not infrequently it can be noticed that the differences in views, intentions, and interests are not consonant with the fundamental political division into two mutually hostile camps.

Recently in Poland (that is, in the early 1980's) there arose deep differences dividing circles of recent friends as well as families. At the same time, however, these divisions have been assuaged by reasonable persons cognizant of the overriding interests of the national community.

The point is not, we repeat, to blur the differences dividing Poles of differing world outlook and political convictions. Besides, such blurring would produce no results in a somewhat longer time frame. The point is to grasp the fundamental antinomies in their entire complexity in which the dividing factors are constantly intermingled with the uniting factors. An earnest game for their coexistence and interdependence is continually in progress.

What is more, following the political and social shocks of the years 1980-1981, and owing to them as well, Poland is becoming a more credible state, a more authentic one than in the 1970's, in the sense that it admits with total candor and accepts the difficult consequences of... social tensions and conflicts [as published, line missing]. It does not conceal them, unlike in the past. This is a major manifestation of the normalization of our life. Because contradictions and sometimes also tensions are a normal aspect of a society such as ours (with such a history, social complexity, manifold traditions, and size).

So far, that is, since the early 1980's we have employed two ways of counteracting them. The first, ineffective in the long run, consisted in concealing and veiling the existing conflicts and, worse even, acting as if they were nonexistent. The second was the confrontational approach, so widely employed in 1981, along with subsequent, and fortunately diminishing, attempts to continue it. The method of striving for the rights of the individual and of social groups is glaringly anachronistic given the degree of development achieved by our society and culture.

The tranquilizing therapy of the martial-law era was followed by an extensive exploration of new systemic solutions to the management of the economy, the administration of the country, and ordering and updating of legislation. In this great and difficult effort there is room for everyone who comes bringing not just negative criticism but also valuable ideas or deeds promoting the efforts to turn socialist Poland into an authentically democratic and modern state that provides its citizens with proper conditions for development. There is room in this effort for every one whose thought and action strengthen the building of that connective tissue without which society ceases to be society.

The foregoing reflections also are due to cogitations on the pope's visits to Poland and on their course and fruits, on the eve of his third visit in a row. This is a time which bids pondering his previous visits, because both the hopes and the anxiety ensuing from the waiting for the coming June visit prompt reminiscences of the previous visits.

The church is not in the habit of discussing its internal problems publicly. Its self-appraisal is performed in the absence of general witnesses. We can conclude about its course only indirectly, by comparing comments and decisions dating from different periods. Their mutual comparison provides even a nonprofessional observer with a basis for visualizing the direction of thoughts within the church and the controversies bound to occur there. In this course of events whose next link will be the pope's third visit to Poland a comparison of his two previous visits is noteworthy. And from that comparison ensue hopes for the consequences of the expected third visit.

When the course of the second visit is compared with that of the first, it is readily seen that the intervening period had been filled by revisions and reappraisals, because these two visits differed greatly despite many similarities in their ceremonial aspects and style of meetings. The Polish experience has become, particularly after 13 December 1981 [Date of imposition of martial law], a subject of analyses and discussions not only in this country but wherever Poles live, in the Vatican also, although not everywhere the same conclusions were reached.

In the presence of a crisis situation and a public mood that harbored the menace of social conflict, the pope's first visit was an important causative factor in the events of 1980. It emboldened and encouraged social protest, whose consequences proved to be quite complex -- more than had been anticipated by its spokesmen and prime movers. The achievements of the protest proved to be considerable in the sphere of civic imponderabilia and tangible but still scanty in the political domain, but they also entailed substantial losses, which are being repaired with difficulty to this day, in the form of economic losses and torn social bonds.

When the Polish August of 1980 and its manifold consequences are pondered, its indubitable accomplishments cannot be separated from the responsibility for the attendant damage and losses. For a protest against an unbearable situation is one thing, but influencing that protest, especially through the action of enlightened and responsible persons, in the direction of minimizing losses, preventing the destruction of existing accomplishments, and preserving the vital fabric of societal life from being torn, even if this involves assuming part of the responsibility for the entirety of Polish issues and risking one's personal popularity, is another thing.

The causes and sources of these losses and this damage were varied. It is highly important to identify them clearly. Would everyone be capable of examining his conscience not only for his merits but also for his faults? The difference in opinions on these questions is a highly emotional issue. Yet,



slowly, these problems are becoming history, becoming the subject of reflections by historians. As for us, regardless of the conclusions to be reached by historians, we face difficult problems on which depends Poland's future.

The pope's visit to Poland in 1983, especially during its second part, offered testimony that a responsible stance based on the rethinking of the Polish events and all their aspects and consequences, was gaining ascendancy to a greater extent than previously. Nowadays, after so many travels of the pope throughout the world, the moral and political risk of such travels in general is becoming clearer. For example, observers of the papal visit to Chile were, irrespective of their views and outlook, bound to experience substantial doubts of a moral nature when they witnessed the police's actions against the faithful during the crowded prayer ceremonies -- doubts as to the right choice of the site, time, and form of the admonition in behalf of the rights of the Chilean people, considering that during the ceremonies accompanying this visit many people were injured, insulted, and humiliated.

The feeling of responsibility for one's own country is the common denominator linking patriotically thinking and valuable Polish citizens in the face of the difficulties confronting the society. The significance of this responsibility increased after all the aspects of our societal life, all the attendant disturbing trends, were revealed. It turned out that there exists an extensive range of trends which must disturb greatly both the state and the church. For in essence the illusory nature of not only state-organized but also religious education revealed itself.

It is true that nowadays the Catholic Church in Poland is living in a period of efflorescence, if measured by the scope of the construction of places of worship, the political importance of the church and its influence on people whom disappointment with the state inclines toward oppositionist stances of varying intensity, or whose doubts in the meaningfulness of social activism prompt them to turn their back on common causes and focus on parochial personal and family affairs. Moreover, the demoralization of substantial segments of the society, the decline in the work ethic, the atrophy of receptivity to public causes, the decline in work discipline, and also alcoholism and drug abuse, all are proof of defeats sustained not only by the state but also by the church. The church's present-day successes, undoubtedly substantial as they are, materialize in the form of spectacular manifestations rather than in the form of a deepened religiosity.

Many people, including Catholics, perceive that the religiosity of Poles is shallow, their knowledge of the principles of the faith inadequate, the decline in their moral virtues considerable, and the diminution in their civic virtues evident. The arrogance characterizing certain representatives of the church and of Polish Catholicism is not only repellent and reprehensible but essentially also unjustified.

On the eve of the pope's visit it is worthwhile to consider a few major mystifications which, unfortunately, are strengthened by these circumstances, and which complicate rationalizing our societal life and elucidating complex phenomena.

The Catholic Church in Poland has indubitable historical merits. Initially it had played a substantial civilizing role. In the Partition Era it served as an effective barrier to the denationalizing measures of the Partitioning Powers. The factor of religious faith fortified the spiritual sovereignty of Poles and strengthened their resistance to the denominationally different influence of the Partitioning Powers. Given such historical experience, it was easy to identify awareness of Catholicism with Polishness in the mind of the people. Thus, the task of church propaganda was facilitated, because it opposed revolutionary internationalist tendencies beginning with the last decades of the 19th century. The dissemination of the false stereotype -- and one, let us add, that results from a dishonest presentation of the problem -- of the Pole-Catholic lasts to this day and in certain circumstances, precisely such as exist nowadays, it is particularly intensified, although its fallacy should by now be evident also to enlightened Catholics.

It must also be admitted that a fallacious interpretation of internationalism in postwar Poland and the tendency of the official teachings of history and government propaganda to gloss over important events in the history of Polish patriotism was grist to the mill of those conservative stereotypes of Catholic Polishness, and it often placed the Polish left in dramatic situations. For owing to most often dishonest propaganda maneuvers, it is difficult in Poland to gain broad and authentic recognition as an undoubted patriot if one remains outside the church. Another recent phenomenon is traceable to this situation. Namely, less resistant individuals whose secular beliefs are weaker often do not know how to revise their attitudes so as to retain their identity without being identified with the errors of the Polish left and still remain part of that left without being shouldered to the wayside. This characteristically Polish problem of the last few years still awaits a fuller psychological, ideological, and moral dissection.

Another mystification of a political nature is the identification of Catholicism with West European culture, meaning also with Polish culture, in the context of a fallacious judgmental opposition of Western culture to the culture of the East.

True, Polish culture developed within the zone of influence of Mediterranean culture and assimilated many important features of the West European style of thinking about man and his affairs. Nevertheless, it has also drawn on Eastern culture and as a result gained the as yet not fully utilized opportunity for creating a synthesis.

Moreover, this being surely more important in this context, we received from Western culture not only Christianity and its Catholic segment but also socialist thought, inspirations stimulating the revolutionary worker movement, and scientific achievements that led to the materialist way of thinking.

Since we have mentioned the socialist tradition, it is worth noting that its achievements and part of its program are being appropriated by the Catholic Church. These shared domains make possible cooperation between the socialist state and the church, between the party and the religious movement in Poland, and they exist chiefly owing to the significant changes experienced by European Catholicism in the 20th century.

Formerly there did occur instances in which Catholic priests who understood the situation of the peasants and the urban proletariat, championed them, and struggled for their rights, but these instances were rare and met with definite criticism from the church hierarchy. For centuries, for entire eras, the church favored the mighty of this world, the proprietors, reneging on its own wellsprings and St. Peter's tradition of solidarity with the poor. In every revolutionary upheaval, in Europe and in Poland, the church played a conservative role: its solidarity was with those whose wealth and social position were based on social inequality. There is no reason for desisting from saying clearly what must be said. It was the revolutionary worker movement in the modern era that has introduced in the world's agenda such important issues as the value of human labor, the dignity of the working man and his social, civil, and moral rights, and a program of struggle for establishing in the world an order based on principles of social justice.

Now, as a result of the 20th-century evolution of the Catholic Church in the socialist countries, and also in other parts of the globe where in our century entire nations fought for their rights, strangely enough, important ecclesiastical addresses and documents (inclusive of papal homilies) contain declarations whoser tone is often very close to that of socialist ideals.

It was owing to the strength of the workers' social protest and its authenticity that concepts and ideas regarded as hostile by the church as late as in the beginnings of the 20th century have been incorporated in the church's ideology. Part of our socialist legacy has been appropriated by the church, as otherwise it would be condemned to social isolation and a marginal existence.

The process in question began relatively recently. Its development in the interwar years was tortuous and occurred in an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion on the part of the church hierarchy. Its pace speeded up only after World War II which shed a lurid light on the two-faced attitude of the Apostolic See and its missions in various European countries conquered by Hitlerite fascism. One consequence of these changes in Catholicism is the present-day possibility of understanding and cooperation between socialist states and the Catholic Church, for example in our country.

But this is only part of the truth about the appropriation by the church of certain domains of the socialist legacy. This is the part that is easier for us and more optimistic, because it demonstrates the validity of socialist ideology. The other part of the truth revealed by this process is that the 20th-century socialist institutions betrayed their own traditions, their genesis, and the ideals which they were established to translate into reality. The unfavorable phenomena and distortions in the socialist countries were another factor enabling the church to appropriate socialist ideals. The dialectics of this process is even paradoxical: this appropriation is accompanied by antisocialist accents.

One consequence of this complex historical phenomenon is the ambivalent attitude of the observer of papal visits to our country when such observer is secularly minded, attached to socialist traditions, feels dutybound to continue them, witnesses history in the making, understands -- insofar as it



is possible in the light of modern science -- the development of history, takes an active part in building the new order of social justice in postwar Poland, and experiences both gratification at the sight of the evident advancement of formerly underprivileged social classes and mordant bitterness about the attendant failures and disappointments.

The ambivalent attitude of such an observer is influenced positively by the satisfaction felt by the masses of the faithful. He reflexively disapproves of the attempts made to treat the papal visit instrumentally with the object of discounting its political aspects. He feels a surge of hope at moments when appeals for reconciliation among the members of the same national community and for restoring the dignity of human labor and the civic duties of man are made. He experiences anxiety when, regardless of the intentions of the honored guest [the pope], half-truths summoning up the still unextinguished substrata of quarrel and even hatred among Poles and still poisoning our public life, are imputed to various elements of the pope's visit. There is a critical distance between the church's appropriation of ideals that at first glance seem of alien origin and tradition to it, and the abuse it commits by the very fact of glossing over their actual sources and creators. At first glance, because aspirations toward social justice were not alien to the wellsprings and beginnings of Christianity.

Let me also mention the optimistic reflection that this is, despite everything, a proof of the historical victory of the traditions of the worker movement that had barely several decades ago been so violently opposed by the church. This is accompanied by the melancholy observation that values of socialist origin thus become oversimplified and treated in such a way as to be used in a manner negating their origin and nature. The hope for an accelerated process of the moral renewal of the Polish society thus combines with the apprehension that certain words and the manner of their emphasis may complicate building the fabric, or even damage what has already been partially restored with such difficulty.

And lastly, but not because this is the least important realization, there are the difficult reflections that, had it not been for the mistakes and also for the betrayals and abuses committed by the builders of socialism representing it in public opinion, all the problems tentatively presented here would have been different. One more problem has to be considered in more detail -- the aforementioned personalism of a uniquely Polish coloring. For several reasons. First, because in this case too mystification is present, although a rather conscious one. Spokesmen for Catholic personalism assume as a given that Marxists ignore the individual and subordinate him to general laws governing collective processes. It is a misunderstanding, and one tenaciously maintained by Catholic publicists, that the human condition, man's existential anxiety, and broadly conceived problems of personality are alien to Marxist thought and its development. The dishonestly oversimplified, because already long since unjustified, view being popularized is that the individual can find only in Catholic personalism a proper place for himself and the understanding and elucidation of the unique and unrepeatable matters important to him and for the richness of his existence as an individual.

But this is only one of the attempts to consider the problems of the individual in a meaningful way. Not to mention the world's other religions, because their influence in Poland is rather not too broad. It is worth noting here that for several score years now the problems of the philosophy of man have been developed by Marxist thought which nowadays, if one wants to act honestly, cannot be presented as if it has not experienced major changes during at least the last 30-odd years of its existence.

Another observation concerns the special coloring of Catholic personalism in Poland. Its advocates and popularizers point to West European culture as its source and clamor for the rights of man. By their practice they endow Catholic personalism in Poland with an interpretation such that terming it a pretentious personalism is justified. That is because ascribing importance to every individual human being, pointing to the feeling of personal dignity, and the importance of the inner and outer experiences and thoughts of every individual human being is voiced with special strength in the domain of demands and claims linked to criticism of the state authorities, which satisfy these claims with neither sufficient zeal nor completeness.

This West European Catholic personalism in its Polish edition is imperceptibly turning into Oriental fatalism as soon as the boundary line dividing pretensions from responsibilities is crossed. Immediately thereupon, the belief in the supremacy of man as an individual is abandoned and superseded by some not closely defined external forces, often termed "They," which relieve the individual of responsibility for the present-day world.

It is hoped, also with a thought to the papal visits, that this serious internal contradiction of Catholic personalism in its Polish edition will be rejected by its spokesmen and attention will be paid to the interrelationship and interdependence between the personalist claims of the individual and his responsibility -- also ensuing from personalism -- for both what was and what is and what shall be in the present-day world and in Poland.

Every visit by the pope to Poland is a challenge and a test to the state authorities, the party, the party intelligentsia, and the broadly conceived Polish left with secular traditions. It causes great complications to political life, but in return it also yields substantial benefits. A major benefit is the opportunity to work out jointly with the church new principles of coexistence as well as the opportunity for cooperation between the church and the state and between believers and unbelievers. A proper arrangement of these relations, such as befits a mature and civilized society late in the 20th century is, especially given the conditions in Poland, an indispensable prerequisite for channeling the society's energies in the direction of action to promote the growth of this country. Progress on this path will be of a certainty a major criterion for a historical appraisal of the events we are experiencing now.

Such are the reflections of a man viewing his country through the prism of three papal visits to Poland, two of which have already taken place, with the course of the third, whose advent is near, as yet unknown. They are the reflections of a Pole who perceives the difficult situation of his country and the -- each time -- complex nature of the papal visits with the great hopes

they arouse. But these reflections also are accompanied by anxiety about the price which will have to be paid for the positive effects of the coming visit. The visit may afford another opportunity for a moral renewal of the Nation and, as a consequence, cause Poles to rally genuinely round the vital issues of their fatherland. But it also may -- even irrespective of the pope's intentions and desire -- take a course and trigger events resulting in consequences such that even a positive balance sheet of the coming visit will not be such as would ensue from its optimal course.

We all without exception are facing another test of maturity.

1386

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## 'BLANK SPOTS' IN HISTORY OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS ADDRESSED

Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY in Polish No 22, 31 May 87 p 1

[Article by Franciszek Szpor: "Blank Spots, Black Holes"]

[Text] In April state representatives of the highest level jointly declared their desire for Poland and the USSR to eliminate so-called blank spots in the history of relations between our nations and peoples. The comments of journalists and historians, which we heard or read in the national media, can be divided into two groups. The first are those statements whose authors treated the declaration seriously, as a stimulus for public discussion of blank spots. And, is natural, in their comments they attempted to define or at least name some of them. The result proved to be poor: the dotted or lined out portions of their articles show that it is not yet time for public discussion. The second group is made up of commentators who, in their statement, seem to concede that they had not read the declaration or do not attribute any major significance to it. In their texts there are so many reservations, so much retrenchment and stammering on the subject of objective difficulties, i.e., the supposed lack of source materials. All this does not fill us with great optimism or hope that facts and events whose presence in the historical consciousness is not, unfortunately, a contribution to the schools or other institutionalized forms of shaping the historical knowledge of modern Poles, will at last find their way into school books and popular historical literature.

I am not overrating the rank of the school in teaching recent history. The family, above all, molds historical awareness. Father, mother, grandparents--they are the first and most efficient teachers of "recent" history, by virtue of the fact that they participated in that history, that they created it. So it is now, so it was in the past and surely one must commend this situation, for because of it we have survived--as a nation--the slavery of partitioning. But regardless of these or other pluses, it is always bad when the school is silent or openly treats otherwise the past which a pupils has come to know through the members of his family. Such school history is no longer history but propaganda, or rather anti-propaganda.

Blank spots in not so distant history are not unique to our past relations with neighboring states and peoples. There are plenty of them in our internal history and in this regard some significant declaration would come in handy. I



am thinking at this moment about the long and fascinating chapter of the history of postwar relations between church and state. On the 60th anniversary of the Katowice diocese we began publishing the "Catholic Church Calendar" in GOSC. In this permanent column, which has gone on for two years, we have conveyed the history of the diocese in a brief outline of facts and events, up to the 1960s. Yet many facts and events in the period described up to now could not be recalled. There were none--blank spots. Well, perhaps not literally, because they were not blank spots, merely dashes in special square brackets. And yet they existed, the memory of them persists, there is documentation for them, surely equally abundant in church and state archives alike. The issue is merely facts and events. For example, there was a time when all of Katowice's bishops "left" the diocese for almost four years. Why, under what circumstances? Nothing--a blank spot.

Many press articles on church-state relations in Poland have appeared recently. It is almost obvious--the pope's impending visit to Poland is a stimulus for casual commentators. The appraisals of those relations--this is also almost obvious--are positive. Sometimes references appear to a somewhat more distant time when "tensions existed" and there was a great deal of "caution." So reading this comments I wonder: Are things so good already that some kind of official declaration will be announced, followed by practical guidelines for appropriate institutions, as a result of which it will be possible to record blank spots in the history of the Polish church? Indeed, as one of the two leaders said aptly at the declaration mentioned above, "History is not merely a collection of facts," but it is impossible to write history without facts. Without all the facts that can be established.

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## LODZ FACTORY ON PAPAL ITINERARY VISITED, WORKERS PROFILED

Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 23, 7 Jun 87 pp 1,6

[Article by Marta Milaszewska: "Our Lady of the Third Shift"]

[Excerpt] The "Defenders of Peace" factory is a national "calling card" in another sense. It boasts of its 100-year tradition of worker rebellions, strikes and protests to extract shorter working hours and wage increases from employers (often effectively). Official directories stress the fact that (according to estimates by prewar police) 30 percent of the employees were communists. Today, according to information from the secretary of the Primary Party Organization [POP], every third worker belongs to the PZPR. Recent history has provided another reason for satisfaction. During martial law, only three people from the plant were interned and there were never, as a management representative told us, extremes under the name of "Fighting Solidarity."

The finishing room janitor shrugs. "You can easily tell where the administrative building is. The one with the most banners." The plant director greets the representative formally and haughtily. He does not invite me into his office and personally declines an interview.

"Without the executive committee's consent I will say nothing. No details."

"In general then. Your personal opinion on the Holy Father's visit to this plant?"

"Frankly, I am terrified. Supposedly, during the pope's last visit to Wroclaw, horrible things happened."

"You do not see any benefits for the factory and the employees?"

"We count on work discipline improving. Of course we want to welcome the pope properly. Please write, 'I am morally prepared.'"

For some time the plant newsletter, perhaps in connection with the moral preparation of employees, has published a series, "Man and Religion." This history of various religions is presented in a way that is consistent with the most recent accomplishment in research and in a language typical of a



certain kind of popularizers of "scientific philosophy." In the article, "At the Roots of Christianity," we read: "The birth of Christianity was not so much an act, a result of the founding work of Jesus of Nazareth, as the result of a long process...."

To a question on the papal visit, the legal and organizational secretary of the PZPR Provincial Committee in Lodz reacts with the serenity of a person qualified to carry on such a conversation.

"Of course we are happy about the pope's visit. We would be pleased if it were possible to improve order in the city and have a positive effect on dishonest people because of it. There can be social benefits from it because the pope will refer to the work ethic and we continue to note an increasing margin of those who feign work."

The Holy Father will begin his meeting with textile workers at 4:45 p.m. He will arrive here from the cathedral in the popemobile. The route of his trip will follow Piotrkowska, Mickiewicz and Kilinski Streets to 8 March Street. He will enter the weaving area amid the noise of running machines. A special platform will be set up in the center and when he mounts it, the machines will stop.

The weaving area measures 100 by 150 meters, more than a hectare of space. The factory director is of the opinion that only employees who work on the second shift--about 480 people--should take part in the meeting with the pope. The POP secretary does not rule out that those working in adjoining rooms will be able to enter the hall. No transmissions to other parts of the plant or the area outside the building are anticipated.

It is 2:30 p.m. The first shift is over. The POP secretary treats favorably my request to interview a few textile workers. He makes his own office available for this purpose and delegates three employee representatives. Two of them are active party members and the third is the wife of a PZPR member.

Maria G., foreman of the preliminary weaving department. She has worked since 1962. She takes care organizing 40 work stations. She is divorced and is rearing a 16-year-old daughter alone. She earns about 27,000 zloty a month, including bonuses. She was born in Koluszki into a large, religious family but was taken care of by others since her youth. Those people made it possible for her to obtain training, work and an apartment. She became disappointed with the church because of her daughter. The daughter was undergoing rehabilitation exercises and this conflicted with religion classes. The religion teacher did not want to take into consideration that the daughter's health was at stake. Despite this, the daughter received her First Communion. Maria G. is of the opinion that everyone has to choose what suits him best. On the pope's visit to the factory, she has a ready opinion:

"No doubt everyone would like to see the pope, but I am not at all surprised that our director is upset. The pope should meet with people in church instead. His visit will not improve the interests of the plant."

Hanna K. has worked here for 23 years on the swing-shift system. The plant has no housing for her but fate did not spare her. Her husband died in an accident and she was left a solitary widow. In order to get to the plant she has to transfer two or three times. The trip takes over an hour. She earns up to 25,000 zloty a month. She comes from Lodz. She says she is a believer but not a practicing Catholic. She has become discouraged not so much with the church as with priests.

"Priests today are looking for money and politicizing. They are pushing people away, not attracting them. More and more they are turning into such 'gentlemen.'"

She also has a ready opinion on the pope's visit to the plant.

"I am glad the pope is coming because he is a Pole. If he were anything else, it would not matter to me."

Wanda W. has worked for 32 years of her life.

"I did not join the party. It is enough that my husband belongs to it. He has nothing to pay his dues with." She looks around. "This is the first time in my life I have been in this office." She has two sons and four grandchildren. After years of working swing shifts she suffers from bone disease. She earns from 24,000 to 26,000 zloty monthly. She works on eight broad looms. "You can earn up to 30,000 zloty," she says, "if you can get your hands on an absent co-worker's loom. There is a lot of greed over pennies here. The women fight to get more work. People are chasing money today like never before. But I would not trade this job for another one. It is family tradition with us. I helped my mother weave on a loom in the village. If only the work were less feverish and easier and retirement depended on the number of years worked and not one's age." She describes her everyday life concisely: work, lines, housework. Church on Sunday.

And Zofia I. brought a poem she has composed to the plant newsletter. "Our hearts tremble, full of gratitude/That you, Holy Father, are coming to visit./May your eyes, full of gentleness/Embrace all working people./Like air, water and bread,/We need your blessing/That supports us and give us strength." Zofia I is already retired.

I accost my third interviewee on the street leaving the first shift. She invites me hospitably to her home. One streetcar, another, half a kilometer on foot, on the way a food store: soup bones without ration cards, two kilograms of blood sausage, milk. An M-3 on the fourth floor with no elevator. Four children of various ages. The youngest is six years old. The 10-year-old is making barley soup. Meat is eaten twice a week--on Saturdays and Sundays. Ham for Easter, Christmas and name days. Three folding beds in the apartment. Two people sleep on each. A cheap carpet, a television. The man of the house emerges from under a blanket. "I drank, I drink and I will drink. If I were sober the wind would blow me away." He has been drinking for five days in a row. When he is sober, he works in a private paint shop. He earns only enough for vodka but sometimes he is generous. Then he buys the children 30 cookies and four cream puffs.

"I come from the village. My husband carried my dowry: a feather bed, pillow and linen. My in-laws gave us a corner in the kitchen. I started working at "Defenders of Peace" in the sorting room. Years of lifting. One bale of material weighs 40 kilograms. Now I am 45 years old and unrecognizable. On Sundays I look in the mirror--it is really me? I was the prettiest one in the village; that is why he took me without a dowry. We got our M-3 after 15 years. He used to run away from my mother-in-law, our fights, the children's noise. He is not a bad person, but he is weak, not resistant to circumstances.

"When I was pregnant with our fourth child, he urged me to himself: 'Better to go to the hospital.' At work they told me, 'Why bring another child into drunkenness.' Maybe God will forgive me, I thought. I already had an appointment with the doctor but that night I had a dream. The Blessed Mother bent over me, exacting as she is in our picture, and said, 'Take care of my Child because I have to work on the third shift.' That is why Krzysio was born--our only son.

"I do not say much at work. I do not know how to varnish. I have a hard life but few people have it easy. What one can think about, cannot be spoken. What hurts me most is that truth is cowering again, hiding behind words, behind brown-nosing. We are all looking forward to the Holy Father's visit. Very few only out of curiosity. A person needs a word of good cheer so he can hold his head up for a while."

I leave the factory where several thousand women fight to work beyond human strength.

Where premature aging and illness are not an item in the statement of profits and losses.

Where for women, night work is the only chance to solve daily family and economic problems.

Where a person does not have the strength to look at his life and identity from a perspective different from that of everyday life.

Where high quality fabric is manufactured, but which is not a factory for human dreams.

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## 'POLITYKA' IMPRESSIONS OF POPE, JARUZELSKI STATEMENTS

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 24, 13 Jun 87 p 1

[Text] Long before the arrival of John Paul II, the airport and papal parade route was filled with crowds of Warsaw residents. We waited, as in 1979 and 1983, for Karol Wojtyla, the Pole with whom we associated special feelings and whose actions as head of the Catholic Church we observe with the closest attention.

For the third time John Paul II kissed the soil of his homeland. That is how he usually begins his trips abroad. Yet in Poland this symbolic gesture has special meaning. "I greet Poland, my Fatherland." The pope's words and the words of Wojciech Jaruzelski welcoming him, "On this soil, the pope-Pole is a guest of the entire nation," contain the great emotional charge released by this visit.

This time the pope will visit nearly every region of Poland and his trip--as always--has not only a purely spiritual dimension but a social and national one as well. The pope is the guest of the Polish church, the highest authorities and the public. "We sincerely wish," said the chairman of the Council of State at the airport, "that the pilgrimage that begins today might bring our distinguished guest most personal feeling and satisfaction, stimulate the finest emotions and support the faith of our nation in its own strength. That it might be beneficial to Poland and to peace in Europe and the world."

The spiritual reason for this visit is the Second Eucharistic Congress, which the pope opened in Warsaw. The congress, judging from the program announced in the Catholic press, will deal with the concept and significance of sacrifice and communion in the modern world, which in secular terms can be translated as uniting the community in the spirit of sacrifice and higher goals. The congress is not merely a doctrinal event. It also brings with it moral messages so important for the Polish Catholic community in these times: sacrifice and work not for one's own benefit only, and breaking away from individual and group egoism on behalf of higher values.

Implementing these values in public life is so necessary for us. The aims of the church and the political forces answering for Poland meet on the way to these values.



Dialogue has become a lasting means for church-state cooperation. Clarification of unavoidable difference and converging points. The meeting between John Paul II and Wojciech Jaruzelski and government representative at the Royal Castle in Warsaw was evidence of the significance and vitality of this dialogue. Partners will distinct ideological, doctrinal and political identities met and talked. They did not eliminate differences of motivation of justification; on the contrary, they openly emphasized them. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, they reach agreement on the issues most important to Poland, the fate of the world and the destiny of man.

Thus first of all, peace as the foremost, indispensable, fundamental value. "It is a matter of enormous importance to us," said Wojciech Jaruzelski, "that the personal authority of the pope-Pole and the diplomatic activity of the Holy See have become so earnestly involved in the protection of peace in Europe and the world." For the pope, peace is not only a political state but a moral one as well. It is a matter for societies, for people, each of whom has his own status and strives "not to be merely an object of actions from above by the government, the institution of national life, but to be a subject. And to be a subject means to participate in the composition of the 'Res Publica' of all Poles."

This is also the purpose of the "rebirth of socialism" discussed by the chairman of the Council of State. "A formula for socialist pluralism is taking shape, various forms of associations and self-management are and will be developed. We want the ever richer infrastructure of socialist democracy to be fulfilled in vivid substance. For every citizen to gain the sense that he is the true co-owner of his plant and city, village, region and entire country."

There is only one limit to openness to public participation and national understanding: "respect for Polish reasons of state, acceptance of the socialist principles of our nation." Believers, not only Catholics, are shaping Poland's future, together with non-believers, and Poland is creating new forms of this cooperation whose significance goes beyond our country. The state looks forward to church cooperation in rearing the young generation patriotically, improving public morality and "linking cultural progress to moral progress." Church social teaching, which elevates the work ethic, coincides with socialism's humanistic thought, which has "always sought the deepest meaning of man's liberation and dignity in assuring the subjectivity of working people."

Thus, as the pope said, man is always first. Social subjectivity is an autonomous value for both sides. But it is also a means of releasing human energy to overcome socio-economic difficulties.

In the Senatorial Hall of the castle, two Poles--mindful of national history and the responsibility to present and future generations of Poles that rests with them--talked with each other.

During the days of the papal visit, Poles everywhere, across the length and breadth of the country, are talking with each other. They are taking more seriously than usual and they are not ashamed of great words. It is solemn and festive. The atmosphere of elation will pass. The important spoken will remain. Let us hope that the conclusions that should flow from these words will also remain for everyone--believers and non-believers.

## CATHOLIC WEEKLY DESCRIBES FIRST DAY OF PAPAL VISIT

Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 24, 14 Jun 87 p 3

[Article by Ewa Berberyusz and Ernest Skalski: "June 8, The First Day"]

[Text] The Airport

From early morning on 8 June, the cars with reporters, like all the traffic at the airport, are routed circuitously. This was the not the case, so we cannot see or sense what is going on along the route. Not many received W-1 cards, this is, passes to the airport. So there are few of us. Few other people too, a handful, so there is no need to elbow one's way. Where are the Dominicans and their young people, where are the shouts and cheers? Yet there is disorder because several order keepers, who outnumber the participants, are creating their own kind of disorganization and making it difficult for even authorized people to reach the area.

Anticipation. Every so often in a small group of people a faint, uncertain song rises and fades. The banners are also hardly noticeable and exclusively informational: "Plock welcomes you," "Seidloe diocese," "Warmia prays and waits." A representative of GWIAZDA MORZA from the Three Cities stands next to me and shakes her head in disbelief. "Things are different back home, completely different."

A quadrangle forms. Government, clergy, academic leaders, diplomatic corps; a bit higher the press and small group of civilians. In the government group, I recognize only Kazimierz Barcikowski from the old crew of 1980. We can see the papal airplane only as it taxis toward the red carpet, along which Cardinal Glemp and Gen Jaruzelsi are moving parallel. The door opens and "pool zero" runs up with its cameras.

Above, silence and a white cassock. Below one hears "Boze, cos Polske" and timid applause that subsides immediately. The pope's extended conversation near the plane with the government and clergy group. And exchange of courtesies?

They are coming. Hymns. At the Polish hymn, the pope visibly lowers his head and thus he remains. Gen Jaruzelski's welcoming speech corresponds with the official banner, "Warsaw, the city of peace, welcomes the champion of peace."

Cardinal Glemp calls for faith through the Eucharist. The pope speaks with unusual solemnity, not to mention humility.

#### The Route

The route from the airport to the Old City is full of people, although some say that there were more four years ago. Indeed, they are less spontaneous than before, but the atmosphere brightens as we approach the end of the route. Fewer people in windows and on balconies perhaps. The security forces, more rigorous than during the last pilgrimage, are rather burdensome--as if there were no bullet-proof popemobile. People were cautioned not to entertain anyone and even windows were not to be opened. Guests invited to the homes of those living near the route were stopped. And here one has to pick up some flowers, there do something with the curtain.

#### The Cathedral

Noon at St John's Cathedral. Cloistered nuns from various convents sit in the pews. Various styles and colors of habits, different kinds of veils. A few are standing but besides them, the expanse of the church is empty. Except that in the main aisle are two sparse rows of church orderlies in yellow caps.

In the sanctuary, to the right not far from the altar, two nuns sit side by side: one in a black habit, the other in something white resembling a sari. It is Mother Teresa of Calcutta. Bent in concentration, she gives the impression of being asleep. Yet one can see how she fingers her rosary.

A few minutes after noon the stalls begin to fill. Polish and foreign bishops sit in them. Through the open door of the cathedral one can see vehicles arriving. A group of reporters with cameras sweep in and quickly find places in their station. Everyone in the cathedral stands, staring at the doors.

The Holy Father appears in them at about 12:20, a delay of a few minutes, without a special entry, in a group of black cassocks and the dark suits of the guard. At the entrance he sprinkles those assembled with holy water. Slowly he moves down the right side of the main aisle. He stops at every pew where a small crowd of nuns drift toward him. They reach out their hands to him, kiss his palms. The pope talks with them; he strokes the heads of some, clasps other to himself. All this without a hint of haste. The pope also embraces and blesses the orderlies.

Before reaching the sanctuary, the Holy Father goes to the left side of the church. Everyone kneels and adoration of the Blessed Sacrament takes place. After a moment John Paul, moving in the direction of the altar, greets the bishops sitting on both sides. Seeing Mother Teresa, he turns toward her. Mother Teresa kneels and kisses the pope's hand. John Paul strokes her head, clasps her hands and talks with her about something for a while. Then he turns to the main altar where he is greeted by Primate Glemp, who also talks about the contributions of the cloistered nuns. Their representative, the one who was sitting next to Mother Teresa, offers the Holy Father white and yellow flowers. Then John Paul II, standing before the microphone, gives his prepared speech.

An almost unofficial part follows. The pope notes that when a person prays, good thoughts come to his mind. Cardinal Glemp suggests that the blessing should also include those who are praying outside. So the pope extends his blessing to those in front of the cathedral, mentioning in particular the young scouts and those keeping order on behalf of the church and state. Here he is clearly in good form, jovial and relaxed.

He acknowledges Cardinal Glemp's remark that the church guard has adopted the motto *Totus Tuus* with a question of whether it has applied for copyright. Then he notes that Mother Teresa is competing with him as regards the effectiveness of making pilgrimages.

He turns to the nuns again, admonishing them to behave well, which will make good behavior easier for him too.

Before leaving, he turns to the still unfinished chapel containing Cardinal Wyszynski's tomb, where he prays a while, blesses the cornerstone and talks with the builders. A while later, to the strains of the hymn *Benedictus sit Deus*, he leaves the church and takes his place in the popemobile. It is 1:15 p.m.

#### The Castle

The Senatorial Hall in the Castle. The throne of Stanislaw August in the center. The pope and Gen Jaruzelski on either side. An impressive, enormous interior. A much larger auditorium for the government representatives than four years ago at Belweder. Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski talks about the past war and peace. People slowly draw into small groups to take places around All Saints' Church.

The pope listens without stirring. I think: how long can he stand on his feet?

And then he begins his speech, asking those present to sit, which turns out to be impossible; there are not enough chairs. He also talks about peace, but in his interpretation the word "peace" takes on a somewhat different dimension. He recalls the postwar movement of human consciences whose result was the Human Rights Charter. "If you want to keep peace, remember man!"

An exchange of gifts follows. The pope receives a copy of Balthazar Behem's manuscript from the 16th Century, which includes all of Krakow's municipal statutes beginning with the city's founding charter. The book is composed of 372 pages with illustrations. A beautiful present for one who loves the city so much. It will enrich the Vatican's Polish historical collection. Gen Jaruzelski also receives a work from the 16th Century, a portrait of "a great man of the church," one of the leaders of the Council of Trent, Cardinal Stanislaw Hozjusz.

Afterwards, the pope and general go off for a private conversation in the room of the "unknown" prince Stanislaw Poniatowski.



## The Grzybow District

The heat gets heavier. The route from Krakowskie Przedmiescie to Grzybowski Square through Krolewski Park and Street is overflowing with people. They are silent but at last one can feel an atmosphere of unity. No banners, no emblems, no insignia.

The windows of the 14-story buildings of the housing complex Beyond the Iron Gate serve as natural grandstands. The crowd is most dense around the yellow People's Party building, which is literally plastered with people. One can hear best there.

From where I stand I can see nothing, but the echo of applause coming from a different direction at every turn, as in an orchestra, tells us how the papal vehicle is moving. No shouts accompany the applause, as if all throats had been frozen.

And suddenly "Thou Queen of Poland of Old" explodes with incredible strength. The people of Warsaw are singing.

It is hard to estimate their numbers. People are pouring in through all the branches of the Square, more and more of them, because those from along the route are arriving. And they are praying, a fervent ecstasy of prayer. We hear that the Holy Father is dressing in the sacristy, that eight priests will celebrate the mass with him. We sing "I Adore You at every Moment."

From positions farther away, there is constant shifting of people where one can hear best. Because no one can see anymore; there is a human wall there. Only a few grumble: Could this not have been in Wilanow where the grounds to be followed by the pope were already planted; everyone would be alright there! Most prefer to pray today, not complain.

The mass engrosses them completely. It is so composed, the choir intertwines so marvelously with the general singing, everyone has such a sensitive ear in order not to miss the pope's voice that participation is total. Even the children have quieted down.

The situation is conducive to concentration. Despite the tall buildings, there is something of the mood of a pilgrimage to Czestochowa, the grass trampled to mud, the serenity. Because here, farther from the church, there are no longer any artificial fences, barriers or walls, no "do nots." Except from far away, the companies at the new monument to the heroes of the consolidation of people's power.

But this takes place beyond the reach of the holy mass. Here there is only us, our homes and the Holy Father.

"May Almighty God bless you." As he says it, his voice trembles a bit.

The mass lasts a long time. This is the last stop of the day. The pope distributes communion to the people, young, old, Seweryn Jaworski. John Paul has a tired face again.

I was worried about the weather this morning, but it has held up. As the people run after the popemobile on Miodowa Street, a strong pre-storm wind whips up. It thunders.

## RAKOWSKI ON 1981 SOLIDARITY TALKS, CURRENT ISSUES

Warsaw ARGUMENTY in Polish No 13, 29 Mar 87 pp 1, 3, 12

[Interview with Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Sejm Deputy Marshal, by Bronislaw Tumilowicz: "The Art of Dialogue"]

[Text] [Question] Conducting a dialogue, especially in conflict situations, requires meeting several basic conditions such as goodwill, specified goals, and civilized discussion. With respect to your books, "Partnerstwo" [Partnership] and "Trudny dialog" [Difficult Dialogue], let me ask you whether at the time, between 1980 and 1982, there had existed goodwill on both sides? Was there understanding of the mutual positions?

[Answer] Our political, and not infrequently ideological as well, opponents have been attempting for several years now to persuade those who listen to them that the party and the government were not at all desirous of this [of reaching an agreement with Solidarity]. This is an attempt to falsify Poland's modern history; even assuming that the agreements reached in Gdansk, Szczecin, and Jastrzebie had resulted from the pressures of the then arisen situation, what about the agreements that had been signed in the subsequent months? And there were more than 600 of them. Not all of them had been forced by the aggressive attitudes of those who, in the name of Solidarity, negotiated with the representatives of the authorities, and many were concluded precisely because the authorities demonstrated their desire for a dialogue. In the talks and negotiations held at the central level, too, we had explored compromise solutions, trying to understand our partners. Even though we repeatedly encountered simply unusual arrogance on the part of Solidarity representatives, we did not give up attempts to reach an understanding. This was because the ruling teams, and especially the party, irrespective of internal differences in interpreting the new reality, were aware that a major and genuine turnabout in domestic policy was needed, and that this involved acknowledging the necessity of basing the relations between the authorities and the society on the principle of a permanent dialogue entailing acknowledgment of the idea of partnership. This of course does not mean that within the party there had existed complete unanimity concerning the manner of conducting the dialogue as well as its chances. Some comrades had thought that the unfolding of the situation in the spring and summer of 1981 would end in a misfortune and that any attempt to maintain and develop dialogue was fruitless.

[Question] Was it mere "gripping" that the dialogue would be unproductive, or were some alternative proposals made?

[Answer] I have not heard of any proposals that could effectively replace the attempt to continue the dialogue without at the same time violating the policy of reconciliation. Within the party, especially following the Ninth Extraordinary Congress, the line of reconciliation, dialogue, and partnership concerned not just or above all the ruling team but the entire party and the delegates representing the party rank-and-file. This unequivocal position of the party rank-and-file resulted in that, even when it could already be seen that attempts to establish relations of partnership were futile, the party and state leadership persisted in pursuing an understanding [with Solidarity]. Let me recall here the meeting of 4 November 1981 between W. Jaruzelski, J. Gilep, and L. Walesa, and the Prime Minister's proposals, made in the Sejm 4 days earlier, for establishing the Council for National Reconciliation.

Now let's consider the other side, i.e., those whom we had wanted to treat as partners. I assume that an overwhelming majority of the rank-and-file membership of Solidarity as well as some of the activists of that organization had supported the concept of basing sociopolitical relations in Poland on the principle of dialogue and partnership. However, their drama consisted in that the main directions of Solidarity's action and especially its policy toward the government were determined by a relatively small group of leaders relying on advisers who had included persons regarding Solidarity as a means toward another end and viewing it as a force that would cause a change in the system of society in Poland. In the years 1982-1986 there appeared many publications by Solidarity supporters admitting that this was precisely how its role had been perceived.

[Question] Was it a group with uniform views?

[Answer] Of course not. In addition to extremists, there were moderate activists, but the real misfortune was that even those who did not regard themselves as such had felt convinced that they represented an extraordinary force capable of imposing on the government solutions that so often had nothing in common with a realistic appraisal of the situation. The belief in a simply unbounded strength of Solidarity engendered arrogance and unconcealed disregard of the other side, and by this I don't just mean disregard of the government at that but also contempt of the branch trade unions which, whatever else might be said, had an aggregate membership of more than 3 million. Nowadays, e.g., in the FRG the "Greens" are said to be a major force, because 3 million people had voted for them. To Walesa and his associates the fact that the membership of the branch trade unions was just as large meant nothing. Out of arrogance, if not haughtiness, they ignored the reformist spirit then imbuing the main assumptions of party policy. Nowadays I read in some of the works written by authors originating from the Solidarity circle that the failure to perceive the presence of supporters of renewal in the PZPR was a mistake. Nowadays this is crying over spilt milk. Those Solidarity members who were not thinking of opposing our system of society should know that, had it not been for the adventurist conduct of their leaders, gripped by the spirit of confrontation, the process of socialist renewal would have taken place much more rapidly. The imposition of martial law was a historical



necessity. That was a dramatic step, but by then there was no other way of protecting the imperiled most vital national interests. But there was also a reverse side to this coin: the martial law with its regulations was, objectively speaking, bound to impede the pace of reforming the economy and the life of the society.

[Question] Protract the process of reforming the economy and the life of the society.

[Answer] Of course yes, because a new political situation had arisen. Generally speaking, at the time reformist forces could not count on active support for their goals. The society was not only divided on the issue of attitude toward the martial law but also deeply frustrated, aching, and subject to various kinds of pressures. It should also be borne in mind that, already in the first few months of 1982, some Solidarity activists commenced to establish underground structures. The first underground structures, flyers, appeals for resistance, etc., had appeared. In May 1982 occurred the first troubles on the streets of Warsaw, in the vicinity of the Sejms Building, where just then, on the same day, Deputies were debating the draft decree on appointing the National Cultural Council and the Cultural Development Fund.

[Question] Your opinion is thus that those whom you wanted to view as participants in the dialogue had let you down. Sure, but there also exists the view that this is a too partisan perception of that period, in a word, that everyone has his own axe to grind. Is the government side so immaculate? I have met, e.g., with the view that you as the chief government negotiator had also violated the principles of dialogue, imposing your views, demanding a capitulation, etc.

[Answer] I have no axe to grind and I am far from painting everything in black and white, black for our opponents and white for us. During that unusually complex period we often used to say that we all must learn dialogue. This was not an empty slogan; we did really think so. In years past I have often been reflecting about my conduct during that period, asking myself what mistakes I had made during the negotiations. I am aware that there were moments when I lost inner peace, gave way to nerves, but no participant in these negotiations can state -- if he wants to be completely honest -- that both my associates and I did not demonstrate the desire to understand the other side. We attributed the aggressive conduct of our interlocutors to the youthfulness of the movement, lack of experience, impatience, etc. Nowadays, from the vantage point of the several years elapsed since then, I sometimes conclude that it is not to be ruled out that in some instances one should have been more resolute....

[Question] Both then and in the subsequent years the opinion was voiced that you had represented too moderate a line vis a vis Solidarity. Let me recall here the critical assessment published in NOWE CZASY of May 1983, in the article "When Orientation is Lost." Nowadays this is not a politically topical stand, but in its time it had been the subject of lively discussion.

[Answer] I am familiar with views such as those in the article you quoted. This is indeed in the past. Well, that is the way it goes. I must honestly



admit that these imputations or, if you prefer, accusations had not excited me very much, because I believed that my actions and conduct corresponded to our national interests. Both then and now my assumption has been that, as a person enmeshed in the gears of history I shall be one of the people responsible for the fate, the destiny, of this country, rather than some columnist or commentator observing Poland from the outside.

[Question] That difficult year 1981 is now behind us. The attempt to base the daily life of Poles on a permanent dialogue had failed. Now is the year 1987. Our knowledge of the conditions that must arise if the dialogue is to become a permanent custom is nowadays much greater than 5 years ago. Do you share this view?

[Answer] This is an astute observation, but I am of the opinion that the reasons warranting this and no other conclusion are worth considering. Namely, despite the defeat suffered in 1981 by the idea of dialogue, in the subsequent years the party and state leadership did not abandon the policy of convincing the citizens, including also those outraged at the authorities, that a permanent dialogue between the authorities and the society is a component part of socialist renewal. What is more, it is a historical necessity. During the difficult years following the imposition of martial law we introduced measures making this idea credible. Governing "with the curtain up," consistent repetition of attempts to reach the society, and especially the artistic community, despite the indifference or even hostility displayed by its segments toward the goals proclaimed by us, consistent endeavors to eliminate the causes of tension between the state and the church, the broadly employed practice of consulting the society about the principal intentions of the government [public consultations], the televised discussions of politicians with economic activists, the publication of stenographic records of the press conferences held by the Government Press Spokesman, the extremely cautious application of repressive measures against persons violating the law for political reasons -- such are just some of the instances demonstrating our constant striving to base cooperation among social classes and groups on a permanent dialogue. Clearly this dialogue is not an end in itself. The point is that the dialogue be of help in alleviating or eliminating from the nation's life the causes of conflict situations and antagonistic contradictions. The usefulness of dialogue, especially between the authorities and working people, in the socialist system of society, has been also perceived wherever optimal solutions producing material and spiritual benefits to the nation have to be explored. Dialogue as a permanent method for cooperation has to be carefully nurtured by all those political forces to which the structures of our system of society assign the leading role in determining the country's paths of development. Dialogue cannot be reduced to, e.g., merely relations between the state and the church, or between the authorities and their critics. Dialogue as a method is also needed in the plant or factory, in which operate the management, the party chapter, trade unions, and worker self-government.

I believe that during these extremely difficult years we have already gained a great deal of valuable experience in applying various forms of dialogue. This experience deserves being thoroughly analyzed, because the ensuing conclusions may prove useful to the continuing process of democratization. One conclusion

is worth commenting on: every participant in the dialogue must cultivate for himself the virtue of patience.

[Question] In the past months a frequent topic in our Press, and in the foreign Press as well, has been the formation of the Advisory Council to the Chairman of the Council of State. Opinions are being encountered that this new council is for show only rather than a concrete measure to broaden the planes of dialogue.

[Answer] I am familiar with this view and do not share it. I consider the establishment of the council to be a major political event and a practical demonstration of the thesis that socialist democracy is not a static concept. Socialism in our country at present is in a stage of necessary transformations, both in the base and in the superstructure. The transition from extensive to intensive growth cannot be confined to the economy alone. It must also extend to social and political life. I believe that this is the context in which the formation of that council is to be considered. It is not, as W. Jaruzelski declared, presenting a sham facade, and neither it is cultivating a plant purely with the object of growing fig-leaf ornaments.

To me, and I believe myself to be rather an attentive observer of the Polish political scene, the formation of the council, whose members include personalities of varying outlook, professing varied political orientations, is a phenomenon deserving great attention. This is another very important experiment in developing socialist democracy.

Of course, such a view is far from common among all the citizens who are interested or engage in politics. After all, there are people who believe that democracy exists only in the presence of opposition parties. Claiming this, they direct their gaze toward the West and actually propose reproducing under socialism the structures characteristic of the bourgeois system. This is an evident misunderstanding. Aside from the fact that the multiparty system in the bourgeois society is no longer what it used to be in, say, the 19th century -- the actual decisionmakers constitute a rather narrow group of economic and political managers -- socialism by its nature will explore other, new solutions. And hence, not the reproduction of what had been swept aside with the broom of the social revolution but the exploration of solutions assuring a genuine influence of citizens on the policy of the socialist state, and of course on the policy of the PZPR. And since citizens have much in common, but there also is much that divides them, the creation of new planes of dialogue is desirable.

[Question] It could even be said that the party is searching for its "opposition," to put it in inverted commas here.

[Answer] Social development is, in a socialist system of society as well, doomed to ossification in the absence of constructive resistance, that is, of opposition to specific proposals and projects or even to specified short- and longrange objectives. I don't think it possible nowadays to answer the question of what will the political structures of socialism in our country

look like in 10 or 15 years, but it can be assumed that at present as well as in the foreseeable future the supporters of socialism shall continue to oppose the kind of opposition whose goal is to change the system of society.

[Question] What you have said so far indicates that we have already learned how to listen to other views, but this aspect could also be regarded as the beginning of [national] reconciliation, whereas we should.... Well actually, do we want to reach unity in diversity or to cooperate despite the differences?

[Answer] Unity is not a word condemned to exile. There exist, e.g., national goals uniting all Poles regardless of their outlook, political beliefs, etc. And hence unity in diversity is not some abstraction thought up by ideologists and proclaimed by propagandists. As for the last part of your question, the history of People's Poland abounds with instances of cooperation on matters important to every citizen and to the entire national community, despite the differences in outlook, attitudes, etc. Who has built big industry and schools? Who has combatted illiteracy? Marxists alone?

I think that since nowadays we pay so much attention to such concepts as dialogue, reconciliation, unity in diversity, and cooperation, the reasons for this interest are worth exploring. Generally speaking, we must state that the decades-long explicitly defined concept of the exercise of power had collapsed at the threshold of the 1980's. Consider for example the formula of moral-political unity we had employed in the 1970's.

[Question] To stay with the issue of diversity and otherness, let us consider another related topic: the state and the church. In your opinion, what is the outlook for state-church relations in view of the differences of philosophy and independent goals of both these institutions, and also considering their cooperation in selected domains?

[Answer] That is a very broad topic, and hence there is always the danger that the limitations of a press interview may lead to oversimplification. In my opinion, nowadays, in the second half of the 1980's, this outlook is not bad or, if you prefer, even good. The history of cooperation between the Marxist-led socialist state and the Roman Catholic Church is replete in extremely different facts, positive and negative. There were periods in which objectively existing contradictions had led to acute tensions and menacing conflicts, but there also were periods in which readiness for compromise solutions gained ascendancy over the confrontational spirit. When I consider the first few decades of People's Poland, I have to admit that we Marxists found it difficult to adapt ourselves to the otherness of aims of the church, to its standing in the Nation, and readily hewed to the well-known saying of Karl Marx that religion is the opium of people. Sure, but the founder of Marxism also said that it is "the conscience of the insensitive world." On the other hand, it also is known that the church found it difficult to reconcile itself to the idea that socialism is a lasting social order rather than some utopia thought up by communists and imposed on nations. It can be said that both sides gained experience and accepted the necessity of mutual acknowledgment.



If we glance at state-church relations in Poland somewhat more broadly, it can be seen that the representatives of the two great varieties of world outlook could not be blind to the perils harbored in modern history, as regards both moral values, ecological dangers and, above all, biological dangers. I refer to the already accumulated nuclear potential. And since they have perceived them, they were bound to ask themselves whether genuine cooperation to minimize or totally eliminate these perils was possible. In a word, whether ideological divisions could be overlooked for the sake of the salvation of mankind, whose existence is imperiled now as never before? This means a feeling of shared responsibility as the supreme moral behest of our times! It already is known that both sides have entered the stage of drawing conclusions from this situation, as eminently demonstrated by the Budapest Forum, held from 8 to 10 October 1986, which was attended by 32 prominent Marxists and Catholics from 15 countries. The topic of the discussion was: "Society and Moral Values." The organizers of this unusual dialogue were the Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and the Gregorian University in Rome. The forum was held under the auspices of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Vatican's Secretariat for the Affairs of Nonbelievers.

[Question] Do you think that the will toward dialogue is also reflected in the state-church relations in our country?

[Answer] I believe this to be the mainstream of the Catholic Church, although dangerous eddies that have arisen owing to the events occurring in Poland at the threshold of the 1980's also have to be considered. As known, among the Catholic clergy there have appeared priests with extremist views of socialism. They are imbued with the spirit of absolute struggle against us. Judging from their proclamations, they oppose a dialogue with Marxists, with the secular state. It also is known that they view very unfavorably those priests who can be defined as representatives of the moderate tendency. To some extent, the dialogue was not helped either by the church's practice of sheltering under its wings those representatives of the opposition who decided to use some of God's temples as sites of political meetings. On observing this aspect of the activity of certain priests I conclude that the church hierarchy at present desires to relieve itself of this burden. Reflections on the relations between the state and the church are bound to lead to the conclusion that party and government representatives have, even in the most difficult years, in face of disturbances that also resulted from the activities of the abovementioned extremist priests, neither rent their garments nor abandoned dialogue. It also is worth noting that the intentions of the authorities were reflected in their immediate reaction to the murder of the Reverend J. Popieluszko.

All the official comments of representatives of the highest state authorities on the dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church can serve to construct the following proposition made by Marxists to those forces in the church which are, if it can be put so, searching for the most convenient, and of course permanent, niche for themselves under socialism. The design of that proposition is as follows: the ideological and philosophical dispute is a lasting element, and its results may be useful from the standpoint of the development of human thought; as for political coexistence, it may also prove useful if it is based on the acknowledgment of the socialist state by the one side and on understanding the identity and pastoral mission of the church by



the other. And lastly, the third aspect of that design is the assumption of the possibility of social cooperation between the state and the church in all the domains which require educational and moral work to combat evil and improve the quality of interpersonal relations. I believe that this is a creative and highly promising foundation for the development of relations between the Marxist-led state and the Catholics forming the church hierarchy as well as secular Catholic activists. Some dissonances are bound to occur, but in general they are difficult to avoid.

[Question] The dialogue between the state and the church is difficult, and it also is not easy for the state to find a common language with the rising generation, which clearly is "looking askance" at the authorities, and yet reconciliation in that domain is of cardinal importance to our future. Since few promises can be made to youth, what is there to be discussed with it?

[Answer] I think that the topics are many. Above all, a convincing answer should be provided to the question of the young, "How to live?" Our modern world requires nonbanal answers. To what extent are we prepared for these answers? I fear that rather a small one. From abusing so-called big words in the past we have converted to a language which not infrequently reduces to the sympathizing statement, "Poor man, we know that it is going badly for you in People's Poland." I don't claim at all that the housing problem is not important to many young people; it is the most important one. I also don't think that the material status of young workers and young intelligentsia can be ignored. In neither case unequivocal and glittering generalizations should be tolerated. But still, it seems to be that we have become too fascinated by the material aspect. What do I mean by this? Above all, I mean the underestimation of ideology in upbringing the young, that is, a too defensive stimulation of the interest of youth in the ideals of the left, progress, and social justice. And since we are touching on ideological upbringing, it must be admitted that we too often rely on language that sounds oldfashioned to the ear of youth, that our arguments smell of oversimplification in explaining the complexities of this world, and so on. It is not true that there are no young people open to the ideals of the social left. They do exist, but reaching them requires tact, finesse, sensitivity, and, most importantly, believing oneself in what one proclaims.

What is there to discuss? Everything that is of interest to young people reading themselves to enter adulthood. I reject the view that our youth is in its entirety apolitical. My fairly numerous meetings with youth from across the country impress me otherwise. I am not only being showered with questions but also their nature demonstrates that my youthful interlocutors are very interested in politics and are of an inquiring and sensitive mind. To be sure, it is not easy to establish rapport with them, but it is possible.

[Question] Well, there is one more great topic for a dialogue with the society, that matters most at present -- the economy. Work, wages, the market, prices, etc. We complain about the decline in the work ethic, and people can't control themselves. How then to speak to them? By way of money?

[Answer] This is a new and yet another major topic for the dialogue with the society. No, not only by way of money but also by means of nonmaterial

incentives. The creation of genuine rather than promised socioeconomic conditions enabling any ambitious individual to accomplish his life's goals, the support of contests and competition not only among plants and factories but also among workers, the rewarding of dynamic individuals who rise above the average, the elimination of the economic and social roots of envy -- such are just a few instances of action in the nonmaterial domain that influence man's attitudes within and without production. This also is ideological activity.

[Question] In conclusion, with regard to the great political dialogue in which you had taken part in August 1983 at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, do you still support the conduct of such debates "with the curtain up," publicly? What is their personal cost and what are their benefits to the society?

[Answer] The fact that we had conducted such debates in the initial years of the present decades has become a factor in overcoming the passivity of a substantial segment of the society in those times. People have become accustomed to debates of this kind, and even grown to like them, although they have not always approved of our declarations. The dialogue with the society conducted by, among others, Professor Baka, Professor Krasinski, and Minister Grzywa, has a rule met with a lively social response. I regret somewhat that there are now fewer such encounters "with the curtain up" than in the past. This kind of dialogue should not be confined to situations in which something is burning. More than once, in the sight of TV viewers, Minister Grzywa quarreled with his interlocutors, but he also won sympathy. Minister Krasinski familiarized the society with the necessity of price movements. The personal cost of such talks is, however, very high, for the politician in such cases sometimes confronts naked hate, incurs an avalanche of anonymous attacks, and so on. This has its effect on the individual's psyche. This cost must be recorded by the politician in the balance sheet, the more so considering that the social and political benefits of such encounters are indubitable. And as for the 1983 dialogue in Gdansk, if I had my druthers, I'd again opt for it.

[Question] Thank you for the interview, Deputy Marshal.

1386

CSO: 2600/652

## POLITICAL IMPORT OF LONG-CENSORED FILM EXAMINED

Strong Support by Political Weekly

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 13, 28 Mar 87

[Article by Zdzislaw Pietrasik: "The World According to Lucja Krol" surtitled "Is Stalinism Photogenic?"]

[Text] The newspapers title this film invariably "The Mother of Kings" [rather than "The Mother of the Krols" -- a play on words, since "krol" means "king" in Polish, in addition to which, "Krol" is also a Polish surname]. An intellectual friend of mine asked me what kind of kingly affairs was meant, considering that the film had to be shelved for a couple of years before being shown, once again surely owing to the contemporary allusions it contains.

Lovers of historical pictures have to be disappointed. This is not a film about Elizabeth of Austria, the wife of the Polish King Jagiello, customarily called the Mother of Kings because of her numerous offspring which had scattered to occupy the thrones of contemporary Europe. No, the queen in the film by Janusz Zaorski, based on the book by Kazimierz Brandys, is an ordinary woman from a Warsaw street, Solec, who makes a living by working as a seamstress and charwoman. She inherited her name, Krol, so unbecoming to her fate, from an ingrate husband who became a (surely drunken) victim of a trolley accident and left her alone in the world, with four sons.

The film begins precisely with that unfortunate accident. Mr. Krol is lying under the trolley's wheels, with only his feet and rolled up trouser legs being shown. Mrs. Krol pulls down his trouser leg with a nervous gesture, covering the exposed shin. She acts by reflex. In any situation, no matter how tragic, she knows what her duties are. She exists in order to wield the broom and the scrubbing brush. The world according to Lucja Krol is full of dirt which has to be thoroughly scrubbed away, even if splinters get into her fingers.

But her vision extends over a space broader than the surface of the floor she is scrubbing. Mrs. Krol is an eyewitness of this gray world, but she also is at the same time the judge and the jury. The moral code she follows is based on several simple principles. A mother must bring up her children into decent

people, and a wife should always claim that her husband is innocent, even if he has really broken the law, so that there would be enough to buy food and pay the rent.

In the film there is the following scene: One of the sons rushes inside, screaming, "Mom, mom, the war's on!" Mrs. Krol responds to this news expressionlessly, because just then she has a problem of her own. "War? So what," she answers furiously, "You stole the money, so how will I pay rent?"

Her entire life is a struggle for ordinary biological survival, but at the same time her tough protective exterior conceals a great deal of human warmth and sensitivity. The thus "scripted" Mrs. Krol is a plebeian version of the ideal Polish mother. In the Polish literary tradition hers is a unique and exceptional character. Usually, we tell our national dramas through the mouths of Kordians and not Chams. In the new postwar reality Kordian has turned into Maciek Chelmiński while Cham was deprived of his Golden Horn and ordered to "dance" at a folk festival. [Kordian is the hero of the eponymous 19th-century verse drama by Słowacki. He represents the eternal revolutionary and at the same time a solitary conspirator against tsarism and for Polish independence. Maciek Chelmiński is the ideologically confused killer in Jerzy Andrzejewski's post-World War II novel "Ashes and Diamonds." Cham is the boorish peasant in Wyspiański's surreal drama "The Wedding," reflecting the unreadiness of early 20th century Poles to struggle for national independence. The Golden Horn is blown in "The Wedding" to rouse Polish peasants for the struggle for independence, but they ignore it and keep slumbering. In the context of the above film review, Cham the Simpleton obeys the government and the party and dances to their tune instead of listening to the Golden Horn. The Golden Horn itself now represents the opportunity forfeited by Solidarity.]

Thrice did Lucia Krol write begging letters to the authorities, hoping for a change in her fate. The first time she wrote to the prewar President asking for help because she was a widow with four children and work was hard to get. The second time, to a postwar President, asking him to intercede for an unjustly arrested son. And lastly, the third time, in 1956, she wrote the Secretary [Gomułka] requesting that she be not deprived of her dwelling. Each time she got no reply. Three different authorities, but not one took an interest in the fate of that misery-ridden woman.

The last scene of the film shows her with the teamster Cyga, who likes to wet his whistle a bit and is her sole true friend. "You've had a hard life," Cyga says. "The others had it even worse," Mrs. Krol answers dispassionately.

The others in this world are the same ordinary people as she, but not only that. Above all, there is Dr Wiktor Lewen, a lawyer and a communist, the second most important character in the film. In the thirties he was a member of the communist party, under surveillance by the authorities and ultimately sentenced to 7 years in prison. It is Lewen who brings to the home of the Krols new ideals with which he nourishes their son Klemens. Later, while interrogated in Mokotów during Stalinist times, Klemens declares that he owes everything to Comrade Lewen.



Here is the other, terribly important motif of "The Mother of the Krols" -- the fate of Polish communists, starting with the KKP [Polish Communist Party] and continuing through the years of the Occupation until the fifties. In the thirties there were clandestine meetings, stubborn self-education, the assimilation of new ideas, and ultimately the prison cell inside which the KKP members learn that the Komintern has disbanded the KKP. Everyone is traumatized, except one comrade, the most enthusiastic one, who does not lose his spirits and argues with his fellow comrades. "This is a just decision, because we betrayed trust, so we must make still greater sacrifices and work even harder than before," he declares like the Orwellian horse.

The war means dispersal, with some becoming partisans; this is the briefest part of the film. They all find each other after the Liberation, and the film shows them during the gala May Day parade in Lodz. Dr Lewen greets the marchers from the main tribune, and those hurrahing in honor of the new authorities include Klemens Krol, Lucia's son, together with his wife whom he had by then succeeded in turning socialist.

Henceforth the mother of the Krols is relegated to the background and the film shows many things unfamiliar and mysterious to her. In general, she understands less and less in those times. She is no Gorki's "Mother" who had matured ideologically together with her son.

So Klemens marches in the joyful parade. In Lodz he attends a party school. Earlier, he was on Szucha [Gestapo headquarters and prison in Warsaw], in Auschwitz, and subsequently with the new authorities in Lublin. A beautiful biography. One of the old communists says of him, "He is the blood of our blood, the hope of the party."

But the times now are such that in offices whose walls are festooned with photographs of Stalin and Dzierzhinsky the desks are topped with lamps projecting a beam of high-intensity light at the faces of people being interrogated, people whose crystal-clear past is scrutinized for hidden flaws. Stalin's thesis that the class struggle is intensifying, that the enemy is only waiting for an opportunity, finds zealous supporters in these inhospitable little offices.

Klemens is placed under arrest owing to the accusation that he maintains contacts with the prewar organization [KKP], now regarded as an espionage organization, and because he was a helpless witness of the death of Comrade Kogut. These two "affairs," skillfully put together, constitute a bill of indictment against which there is no defense. Suspicion itself can be tantamount to sentencing. His ideological mentor, Comrade Lewen, cannot help him, because he himself is under suspicion. If the young Krol succumbs, he will also doom Lewen. Klemens faces a difficult choice. He knows that he could survive if he were to admit the fictitious accusations made by the guardians of people's rule, but he will not do so because he is an honest communist. Here we are dealing with more of this kind of dialectic. Even the martyr's death experienced by Klemens has a twofold meaning: he is the victim of an error, but this fatal circumstance enables him to demonstrate his attachment to the idea. Were communists to have their own saints, Klemens would rapidly be beatified.

Thus, we have yet another film about Stalinism. Let us add at once that no other picture produced till now, including "The Man of Marble," shows so many realistic details about those times. For example, the film shows Klemens being tortured and subsequently being pulled like a sack along a prison corridor. It also shows little groups of terrified women in front of the gate of the Mokotow Prison, and it reflects the atmosphere of terror.

The security apparatus makes no allowance for former merits. "They're destroying their own," Cyga says. After all, anyone can be a spy and a traitor. Tragic errors happen, but that is the price of every revolution. A functionary of the Security Office says, "In general, we make no groundless arrests," and these words inspire terror. Lewen himself admits, "We're groping in the dark and making an hundred missteps so that the 101st step would be right." He still does not know that he himself will be squashed.

Toward its end, "The Mother of the Krols" shows a welcoming rally on Parade Square, with 100,000 people singing "Sto lat" [May he live to a hundred'] in honor of Gomulka. Lucia Krol, who had always wanted to bring up her children into decent people, can now prepare her balance sheet: 30 years of working as a charwoman, dwelling in a tenement hovel, Klemens dead, Zenek is an outsider, the youngest, Stas, was expelled from school. Only Roman made a career, is living in a luxury apartment, and regards his success in life as recompense for former poverty. He carries a party card, but he says contemptuously of Klemens that he is a communist. It may be that in the not distant future he will take the place destined for the better brother.

Such is the ending of the chronicle of the Krols, covering more than 30 years. The film is now shown after a wait of 5 years. This fact is of political significance. The recent changes in cultural policy apparently are producing results. (I know some people who barely a year ago were ready to bet heavily that Zaorski's film would never be shown.) Since such works are now being shown, this means that the boundaries of criticism of the authorities and the system are continually broadening. More than once artists have been complaining that it is not possible to produce an acute political film in Poland. The example of "The Mother of the Krols" demonstrates that this is now possible.

It so happens that I viewed "The Mother of the Krols" three times; the first two times "clandestinely," as the opportunity arose, and the third time normally, at the Wars Cinema in Warsaw, where, incidentally, the attendance was besides miserably low, perhaps because this film is not being advertised and the cinema is in a relatively inaccessible location. Some are enthused by this film, while others perceive certain defects in it. The opinions I have heard so far could be classified as follows:

Against: The film's tone throughout is hysterical, with black and blacker colors dominating. Once again, Stalinism is caricatured, because the topic was taken up by a film director from the postwar generation who has not personally experienced these times. The secret police, as usual in films of this kind, are not shown to have any inner motivation -- they are depicted as dumb puppets manipulated by hidden originators of human misfortunes. The film shows no trace of the authentic enthusiasm of those times, of the joy over the

regained freedom and creation of a new world. The real picture of the past is more complex. Lucja Krol perceived only its fragments. In a word, negative rather than constructive aspects are highlighted.

For: "The Mother of the Krols" is above all a superbly produced film, extremely well photographed, with an entire series of outstanding characters, beginning with the main role. Lucja Krol is played by Magda Teresa Wojcik. (In my opinion, hers is the greatest female role in Polish cinema.) The young filmmakers may err in some details, simplify, duplicate some stereotypes, but in the main they do reproduce the spirit of the times. The fascination with the 1950's that is being observed in the last 7 years exists not just because Stalinism is photogenic (although this is not that certain). The sons want to understand the fathers and to warn themselves against the sins committed by the fathers.

I am in favor of the film "The Mother of the Krols," but I agree with one general criticism. No one so far has tried to present the rationale of the other side, represented by "villainous characters" in films. Thus, a variety of Polish films depicts, as a rule, gunshoes, plainclothesmen, Polish Youth Union members, dogmatists, as persons who are more ludicrous than terrifying (although Stuhra as a security agent in "The Mother" is genuinely terrifying). This demands a filmmaker who would treat seriously one of these "villains" and give him a lead role. This might result in a film testifying to that era in a manner no less chilling than "The Mother of the Krols."

Photo caption: Magda Teresa Wojcik and Boguslaw Linda in "The Mother of the Krols," directed by Janusz Zaorski. Mrs. Krol is a witness to this gray world, its judge and its jury.

#### Stalinist Times Realistically Portrayed

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 10 Apr 87 p 7

[Article by Malgorzata Dipont: "Through the Prism of a Life" subtitled "The Mother of the Krols"]

[Text] From the moment she finds her husband's corpse crushed under a trolley car, Lucja Krol has to rely on herself alone. She has to toil in order to preserve her home and bring up her four sons. Lucja has one goal: to feed her children and provide them with an education, so that they would do honest work. Her other goal is to preserve family bonds regardless of the external circumstances. She remains faithful to this goal throughout the quarter-century of her life stretching from the early 1930's to the mid-1950's.

This precisely is the period covered by the action in the film "The Mother of the Krols," which is based on the novel by Kazimierz Brandys published 30 years ago. The motif of Lucja's fate is coupled in the film to another important thread, serving to demonstrate commitment to social and political activities. This coupling is not just a scriptwriter's ploy linked to bonds of family and friendship; it also plays a major role in providing food for thought. For Lucja's point of view becomes a distinctive commentary on dramatic and painful events that determine attitudes and protagonists, both



those in their formative stage and those defined and toughened by years of experience in ideological work, police searches, and prison, and also by accusations hurled by fellow comrades.

For "The Mother of the Krols" is also a film about Polish communists and probably the first Polish film to deal with this topic and try to present it credibly and depict penetratingly the complex fates of activists entangled in dramatic and difficult periods of history. Zaorski follows his protagonists from the interwar 20-year period through the time of war; both these periods, while treated rather briefly, reproduce all the events and experiences which become crucial in the principal part of the film, which takes place in the 1950's.

This is because this portrayal of the Stalinist era serves to mirror in an individual's fate the guiding mechanisms that imposed attitudes, responses and conduct and standardized the mode of thinking. But while he demonstrates the repetition of mechanisms leading to doctrinal distortions, Zaorski's vision is not schematic; he does not attempt to verbalize different rationales and instead he attempts to mirror in his film the complex whole of psychological mindsets and reactions. The credibility of this portrayal is reinforced by excellent acting, by a gallery of psychological portraits emanating truth about man, reflecting both the strength and the fallibility of the characters.

The chief protagonist in that part of the film is Wiktor Lewen, a family friend of Lucja, the ideological father of her sons, a wise rationalist who, once he reaches high office, feels for the first time a menace in the air. Wiktor, that once reliable and loyal man, backs away twice from Lucja's tenement following the arrest of Klemens, the first time because he has nothing to say about her son's fate, and the second because he no longer dares to look that woman in the eye. It is not Klemens, who died a martyr's death, but Wiktor, for whom that death becomes henceforth a burden shouldered till the end of this life, that is a tragic character, whose depth of feeling is moving, as played superbly by Zbigniew Zapasiewicz.

It is, however, Lucja's figure that dominates the whole of "The Mother of the Krols." It is she, this simple and courageous woman, endowed with warmth and truth by Magda Teresa Wojcik (this is not the first outstanding role to have been played by this actress), who has, despite the blows and experiences, retained that moral compass which so many have lost. Lucja, who guides herself by an infallible instinct and by a deep feeling of loyalty and solidarity, introduces a tone of bitter hope by her faith in the indestructibility of fundamental values, in that moral Decalogue which imbues the individual and the community with the strength to survive and endure.

Universal reflections on the destinies of human beings enmeshed in the toils of history are suggested by this film owing to its force of artistic creation and plausibility of portrayal, which suggestively mirrors the climate of those times and the complexity of human experiences. Side by side with Andrzej Wajda's "The Man of Marble," "The Mother of the Krols" by Janusz Zaorski is also a significant accomplishment of our cinematography, significant as an expression of the attitude of an artist who demonstrates social responsibility in settling accounts with the past.



### Stalinism Strongly Condemned

Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 15, 12 Apr 87 p 6

[Article by Tadeusz Szymal: "The Mother of the Krols"]

[Text] [-----][Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Point 6, Article 2 (DZ.U., Item 99, No 20; revised in DZ.U., Item 204, No 44, 1983)] [i.e., censored passage]. Thirty years ago Kazimierz Brandys had published a novel narrating the misery-ridden life of a certain Lucja Krol, a simple and poor woman, the mother of four sons, whom life deals blows during the Sanation period, during the Occupation, and especially during Stalinist "people's rule." At the time Brandys's book had been an important although not entirely convincing attempt of that previously radical leftist writer to reject his own political past and the motives and modes of conduct which had caused the entire horde of "tactical conformists" to stray onto the position of moral participation in the untruths and crimes of the era. The film's director Janusz Zaorski, himself born already several years after the war, who, following August 1980 [the rise of Solidarity], decided to produce "The Mother of the Krols," was able to treat it with a certain detachment by highlighting its epic, realistic quality and universal message while at the same time avoiding those more or less sincere explorations of accountability among the intelligentsia that once used to stir the literary community. The resulting moving picture of an "injustice done to a simple human being," which at the same time is a penetrating study of the functioning of the psychological mechanisms of opportunism in the presence of ruthless repressions, had to wait under a "plan" yet another 5-year period before the permit for showing it to so-called "limited audiences" was granted. In practice, these audiences are even smaller, for various reasons. This is an irreparable loss, because Zaorski's splendidly produced, superbly acted, and, above all, strikingly truthful films should be a mandatory part of programs for universal education -- historical, political, and moral -- were such education to exist.

The life story of a washerwoman who ironically, as it were, bears a "royal" last name encapsulates almost symbolically the quiet experiences of that forgotten category of human beings who, toiling from dawn till sunset and continually oppressed by History, spend their lives in a poverty-stricken kind of decency regardless of changes in the system of society under which they live. The film begins with a young widow with four sons of whom the youngest is a posthumous child, who vainly appeals to the Polish President in the 1930's for assistance in finding some job. After the war, although by then as a model representative of the officially ennobled working class, and in addition the mother of an idealistic communist who had been tortured "under the German" on Szucha and in Auschwitz, she likewise has no luck in obtaining support from Bierut for her innocent son who is arrested and maltreated by the Security Service. She is also let down by a former friend, now a party V.I.P., who himself is being menaced with a show trial despite his "radiant" past as a member of the KKP. Following October [1956, workers' bread riot in Poznan], finally, indefatigable and tenacious, she makes another fruitless appeal, this time to Gomulka, for... not evicting her from her longtime

miserable hovel that is supposedly too large for a single tenant. She wants to remain there solely in order to live at an address known to her children and continue to wait patiently for him who, after all, can no longer return to her alive, as well as for her favorite youngest child of whom all trace was lost while he did his conscript service.

Seen from the historical point of view, the tangled and divergent destinies of Lucja's sons and of the Krol family friend Wiktor Lewen, a communist activist, and his comrades, are the most interesting. For they broaden the relatively confined field of vision of a woman who does not understand too well what is happening around her. They serve not only to shed intense light on a major part of this nation's history -- from the interwar period until the mid-1950's -- but also to perceive the mechanisms of the great political trials originating from personal decisions and attitudes, as well as from ideological justifications of choices made by individuals. The roots of the distortions of the 1940's and 1950's are traced here to a much earlier period; they arise in the thought habits of activists like Lewen and his associates as early as during the "heroic" imprisonment stage of their political struggle.

Zaorski's screenplay retains the novel's point of view, which mirrors that of the prewar and postwar communists, and as such it does not seem to me particularly creative or exploratory or the most suitable for drawing up a genuine balance sheet of the past. Even so, it has afforded the scriptwriter-director an opportunity for unveiling an exceptionally broad domain of sociopolitical reality that has been so often obscured by the fog of lies and oblivion. It also has enabled him to create a film that represents one of the strongest accusations against Stalinism in our official culture, an accusation that is neither general nor impersonal. This accusation of a system personified by the omnipresent photographic likelihood of the moustached leader is mirrored in the film by varieties of human conduct assuring the functioning of the horrible machine at every level of the social structure, beginning with the leader and other figures most often in public view, running through doctrinaire ideologues, functionaries at all levels, secret agents, interrogators, lawyers, and ending with the gray masses of people mindlessly chanting at rallies and parades, zealously clapping their hands, and keeping a silent watch during the March mourning rallies in 1953 [upon Stalin's death]. The boundary between "us" and "them" is drawn here across hearts and minds, across the consciences of individuals, including those who become the victims of an alienated juggernaut crushing into jam both "its own" and "the alien class."

Filmwise "The Mother of the Krols" is a black-and-white picture, but not in the esthetic sense, in which it displays colors of the rainbow. Artistically viewed, this is an absolutely right solution. The nowadays so rarely viewed austere black-and-white images are in perfect harmony with the unfolding of the gloomy events shown on the screen, and with the entire reality of misery, injustice, and crimes encompassed by the camera. They also naturally mesh with archival excerpts from old film chronicles which are montaged to blend with the malignant vision realistically portrayed by the director. Of the many masterly directed scenes at least two are assured of a lasting place in the history of the Polish cinema, such as the prison scene in which Lucja's son Klemens, after being tortured during his interrogation by the Security

Service, tries to choke his fellow cell inmate, a Hitlerite criminal, because the latter unwittingly makes him aware of his own responsibility for the attitude of mindless obedience to all directives from the top.

Klemens is acted by the extraordinarily talented Boguslaw Linda. His former ideological mentor Wiktor Lewen, whose idealism becomes gradually debased by compromises and tactical ploys, Pharisean avoidances, and, lastly, a conformist feeling of terror and impotent guilt, is portrayed by Zbigniew Zapasiewicz, an actor who excels in depicting psychological nuances. This is undoubtedly a major accomplishment in his artistic record. Krzysztof Zaleski is capital in his thankless role of the degenerate son of God-fearing Lucja -- a primitive trickster who knows how to feather his nest under Stalinism too. Jerzy Stuhr evokes chills in his periodic appearances as a wily expert in extorting confessions by persuasion (in the bare antechamber of the gloomy interrogation room). And the subplot with Joanna Szczepkowska as Klemens's loving wife who lets herself be convinced so readily of her husband's "guilt," affords a nearly clinical study of fanatic devotion to the party. However, the accomplishments of these actors are outshone by the role created by Magda Teresa Wojcik. Her mother of the Krols seems to be on the scale of an ancient tragedy, despite her proletarian drabness. Restrained in her expressions, movingly simple, deeply human, she imperceptibly ages in the audience's eyes and freezes in boundless pain. Yet, she does not turn into stone, not only because of her exceptional endurance but also because of her strangely trusting attitude and goodness, undoubtedly deriving from religious sources, which prompt her to concern herself continually with those dear to her rather than to be obsessed by her own misfortunes. As a result, this outcast of Fortune achieves a truly queenly dignity [again the play on words: "Krol" means king or royal in Polish].

#### Continued Government Reservations Noted

Poznan WPROST in Polish No 17, 26 APR 87 PP 26-27

[Article by Edward Pawlak: "The Queen of Solec Street" under the rubric "In My Cinema"]

[Text] "The Mother of the Krols" was filmed in 1982 by Janusz Zaorski on the basis of the eponymous novel by Kazimierz Brandys that had gained renown in its time. It had to wait 5 years for its premiere. This film has been, like Kieslowski's "The Incident" a continuing source of conflict. The authorities had long been opposed to the showing of this film, because they thought it to be pessimistic, painted in excessively black color and, once again, as in "The Man of Marble," "Shudder," or "The Great Race" (which, although now taken out of storage, still is not being shown publicly), presenting Stalinism in a too onesided manner, without trying to understand the rationale of the opposing side, that is, of the authorities, who after all, in creating the new reality, were not doing evil alone. Hence, the patron [the authorities] demands that not only the shadows but also the glitters should be shown and the rationales of the opposing sides should be mirrored more objectively, because only then, in confrontations among films, the picture of those complex times would be more complete. All this is true, but whenever any filmmaker chooses as his subject the tortuous turns on our postwar path, all kinds of Arguses at once



grab a magnifying glass and scrutinize the idea with a deep mistrust, thereby discouraging artists of varying orientation from tackling these difficult subjects. For such subjects, contrary to what is officially declared, there is still no "green light." The road of these films toward cinema screens (and the example of "The Mother of the Krols" here is most eloquent) is indeed a veritable Golgotha, and when they finally are released, they are "penalized" by being shown to extremely limited audiences, in the absence of any publicity; because why should discomfiting and "unfair" cinematic works be recommended? And yet, strange as it may seem, for the most part they are films of great artistic value, superbly produced, dealing with substantive issues, discussing passionately and in an unorthodox manner our Polish affairs -- without venom and intransigence, contrary to what is often said about them, thus condemning them to obscurity, but also without glossing over, rounding the angles, and cosmetic rouging and powdering.

In this context, "The Mother of the Krols" is, I believe, one of the most important films to be produced in People's Poland. This is a fully mature work depicting in a realistic and unschematic manner various Polish destinies, from the prewar years to the turnabout year 1956, abounding both in facts and in psychology, filled with pain and anxiety, and, despite the cool, objective narration, moving in its eloquence. The cast is excellent, particularly the role played superbly by Magda Teresa Wojcik as the eponymous mother of the Krols, splendidly photographed (in black-and-white monotone), with a dynamic background music score. This is certainly not an easy film to view, for it requires of the spectator some familiarity with political facts and even some personal experience relating chiefly to the period of Stalinism, a period to which the film devotes most attention. This is a political film par excellence and it provides considerable food for thought, while at the same time maintaining dramatic tension like a detective story, ruling out any inattention.

It focuses on the drama of the proletarian Krol family from Solec Street in Warsaw; the mother and her four sons, entangled in History and exposed to the press of events whose nature they are incapable of plumbing. Lucja Krol, a tragic and moving figure, guides herself by instinct and simple rules; she knows that she must feed and bring up her sons, raise them into "human beings," and be to them "the priestess of home and hearth." Self-sacrifice, tenacity, personal dignity, and a naive faith that fate will prove merciful, such are the determinants of her attitude. But, unfortunately, fate becomes increasingly ruthless. Mrs. Krol thrice writes petitions to the authorities, first to the President of the prewar Polish Republic, asking for employment, then to People's President Bierut asking him to intercede for her unjustly accused son, and lastly to "Mr. Secretary" Gomulka, asking him not to be deprived of her apartment. But her letters remain unanswered. Who can help a careworn woman, considering that everyone is busy with more important matters -- with making History?

History is the other important protagonist of this unusual film; it fills its entire framework, swells like a river in flood and elevates and downgrades people and makes of them its tools and its victims. "The Mother of the Krols" is, and let us emphasize this strongly, the first Polish film to show so candidly the tragedy of Polish communists enmeshed in a juggernaut which



breaks and dehumanizes even the most resistant and most decent of them. A procession of the most varied characters moves past our vision: from party dogmatists and zealots to boundlessly sincere individuals who wander about in a fog, being entangled in the increasingly exacerbated class struggle; according to the rules of that struggle, the individual is a cipher, a cog which, for the good of the millions, can be at the right moment unscrewed and laid at the altar of the revolution.

Also in the foreground, next to Lucja Krol, is the lawyer Lewen, played by Zbigniew Zapasiewicz, a member of the KKP [the prewar Polish Communist Party], arrested and incarcerated by the Sanation authorities. In prison he receives the news that the Komintern disbanded the KKP. Lewen cannot believe what happened, while his fellow prisoner, and subsequently a stoolpigeon for the new authorities (Henryk Bista), declares that agent provocateurs have infiltrated the party "and we betrayed trust."

During the Occupation Lewen tutors in Marxism Klemens (Boguslaw Linda), a son of Mrs. Krol. Klemens is caught by the Gestapo, tortured on Szucha, and transported to Auschwitz. He returns to Solec Street wearing a soldier's uniform -- a fate like that of many others.

The most dramatic part of the film, which elicited the greatest reservations, concerns the Stalinist period. It is richest in details of the era; the background and details faithfully reflect those times, moods, and climate, the more so because Zaorski incorporates in the narrative flow fragments of documentary film chronicles, e.g., those showing a mourning rally on the occasion of Stalin's death. The screen shows parades, mass chanting, banners, forests of flags carried in procession, portraits of leaders, huge busts of Yosif Vissarionovich in government offices. But the consequences of the doctrine of supervigilance, mistrust, and groundless accusations are increasingly tangible. Klemens is jailed, accused of contact with a foreign intelligence service, and tortured (these scenes produce a shocking impression), but prefers to die than to renounce his ideals and betray Lewen. Where is truth? "The party is infallible," Klemens's wife declares with conviction, thus renouncing her husband, believing that he is "an enemy of the people." But Lucja Krol says, "Formerly, when a man was arrested, women used to scream. Now, unfortunately, they accuse him." Such is the consequence of blind faith.

Mistrust pervades the party's own ranks. Suspicion also falls on Lewen; the Security officer interrogating him warns him, upon eloquently adjusting the lamp on his desk, "In general, we make no groundless arrests." Lewen is a lawyer and knows that accusations can be cooked so as to turn an innocent man into a victim. This system operates more and more efficiently. Criticism is nipped in the bud; one should speak and clap one's hands like everyone else, in unison, to the rhythm. Having a personal opinion is a manifestation of individualism, deviationism, bah, of hostility toward the new system of society. One sequence in the film shows "An Important Conference" chaired by Lewen. One of his fellow prisoners from Sanation times takes the floor. He speaks of the suppression of criticism. He is interrupted by angry muttering from the audience, and when he sits down, the other comrades ostentatiously move away from him. Then Lewen rebuts his revisionist, hostile remarks. A

storm of applause. When, however, the next speaker makes several critical comments about Lewen, the audience again applauds. Consternated, Zapasiewicz after a while also places his hands together in order to applaud. He applauds, of course, criticism...of himself, in accordance with the rules of an ironclad scenario.

Fear is dominant. Briefcases bulge with denunciations and the security apparat snoops even on the highest leadership. "Spaniard," a prewar KKP member, tells Lewen that Klemens is dying in prison. "They destroy even their own and deceive us, yet we refuse to listen to what people are saying on every street. What are you defending? This desk, this telephone, the official car? Do something. Save Klemens."

But Lewen will do nothing, because he himself is under suspicion. He circles the tenement in which Lucja Krol lives, but he lacks the courage to visit her, because he feels the reproaches of conscience. Mrs. Krol waits for him in the building in which he has an office, but she waits in vain, because dignitaries leave it by another exit. Despairing, she screams in the silent telephone receiver, "How long can one wait?"

In the epilogue view documentary pictures of the famous manifestation on the Parade Square. The crowd chants "Sto lat" to Gomulka, while the aged Lucja Krol is seated at a table and reads to Cyga a letter addressed to the new Party Secretary. "You've had a hard life," Cyga says. "Others had it harder," the mother of the Krols humbly answers. Her face becomes frozen as the film ends. And thus the fate of Lucja and her four sons illuminates the very heart of that thicket of our tangled history, depicted by Janusz Zaorski with high seriousness and simple wisdom.

#### Director's View of History Faulted

Warsaw KULTURA in Polish No 17, 29 Apr 87 p 12

[Article by Tomasz Milkowski: "The Sons of Lucja Krol" (Footnote) ("The Mother of the Krols," directed by Janusz Zaorski, a Polish film, produced by the X and Rondo film studios)]

[Text] Young spectators view "The Mother of the Krols" like a Western. Not just because it is a black-and-white film with a kind of black-and-white poetry. To the young the world of the silver screen is a world of the fable of the iron wolf with an admixture of unintended grotesquerie. When one of the protagonists speaks of his loyalty to the party, the audience bursts into laughter. The young who view this film together with their families are better situated. They laugh less often, if at all, concentrate on the film, and afterward ask their elders whether this had indeed been so. The elders restrainedly agree and become pensive as their own reminiscences overwhelm them. Some draw hasty analogies.

It may be precisely that these -- anticipated -- audience responses were one reason why Janusz Zaorski's film was kept on shelf. These responses conflict with the rather popular thesis that ours is a nation excessively absorbed in

its own history and less alert to the present. And yet, historical awareness, and especially awareness of the experiences of recent history, is based on stereotyped and mythologized thinking. Is Janusz Zaorski's film an attempt to counter these stereotypes? If yes, to a small extent.

The filming of the probably justly forgotten novel by Kazimierz Brandys must, by the nature of things, reflect the deficiencies of the novel. Brandys's work is a typical novel of his times, part of the rising surge of literature on accountability following October [1956, workers' bread riots in Poznan]. The author thus demonstrated his abandonment of the literary practice of the first half of the 1950's, but he did it by such elementary means as reversing the polarity of positive and negative signs and dousing the whole with an existentialist-symbolic sauce. Hence also, among other things, the psychological-demonic interpretation of the "contagion of suspicion" as being supposedly characteristic of communists, whether prewar, wartime, or postwar communists, has appeared in Brandys's novel. Zaorski has, however, made a virtue of the cognitive deficiencies of the novel and produced a convincing psychological film with a strong moral accent. He treats history and its tangled paths as a background for a tale of endurance and hope.

This does not mean evading history, which is hardly possible anyhow, considering that Lucja Krol and her sons not only face the necessity of coping with events but also, in some cases, take an active part in creating a new reality. History is, however, treated emblematically; Zaorski relies on the personal experience and knowledge of the audience (and in this, as it turns out, he is often mistaken).

Hence also, the story of the fate of Lucja Krol, although narrated in a cause-and-effect order, is a synthesis that overlooks many episodes. More even, certain parts of Lucja's biography, and in this connection also of the biography of her generation, are treated as fragments of a greater whole without going into petty detail. As a result, the narrative is more dramatic and proceeds in a series of climaxes, but also it loses in cognitive value. The rhythm of the storyline is imposed by the letters that Lucja Krol writes to the highest representatives of the authorities, letters that acquire a symbolic eloquence, just as the principal setting of the story, a hovel in an old tenement on Solec Street, inhabited by the heroine, has its own eloquence. This is, on the one hand, a symbol of endurance, of sticking to one's place in the world -- Lucja Krol has no aspirations for social advancement and the nature of her job remains unchanged and her living conditions change only slightly. This endurance, this attachment to one spot, this waiting for sons who are to return from the war, and subsequently waiting for sons who are to return from prison, is consonant with the durability of the moral principles to which Lucja remains faithful. These are not overintellectualized values, and they are based on the traditional stock of folk beliefs and principles of family bonds. On the other hand, this persistence has its negative opposite: it symbolizes the trapping of decent people by fate and reveals the persistence of traditional zones of poverty under the new system of society.

The principal strength of Janusz Zaorski's film is the acting of Magda Teresa Wojcik who, in her title role, creates without pathos and without grandiloquence the character of a mother struggling for a happy fate for her



sons. In this struggle she sustains defeats whose causes she does not understand, but she also scores victories. Her faith in the triumph of justice, her trust in others -- even contrary to obvious facts, and her evangelic resignation to her fate, in the interpretation of Magda Teresa Wojcik gains in credibility and rarely shown but intense warmth. Others in the cast also are outstanding, as for example the communist activist movingly played by Zbigniew Zapasiewicz or the lyrical role of the coal teamster and Lucja's friend played by Franciszek Pieczka. The montage of the film also deserves much praise. It was the filmmaker's excellent idea to combine the dry narrative on the investigation of Klemens Krol with images of a joyful Nation's Capital -- an emotional contrast demonstrating the multidimensionality of time.

Accountability for the past and the tragedy of the fate of Lucja and her sons are thus suggestively combined in this film. The subplot of the milieu of communists and their tragedy is a weaker part of the film. This is nothing surprising: in this respect the film follows the rut of its literary model. Thus, while mirroring the aura of the distortions of the Stalinist era, the film makes no attempt to understand the political and social mechanism generating that aura, and its treatment of the motives behind political measures is superficial. But it would be a mistake to view Zaorski's film as a political picture. While it touches upon politics, though emblematically rather than empathically, as I noted before, it concentrates on depicting the fate of individuals, chiefly of Lucja and her sons, enmeshed in the ultimately unintelligible (to its protagonists but also to the filmmaker) gears of history. History is shown as a hostile, ruthless force, a kingdom of necessity in which the individual does not count. Thus, paradoxically enough, this film (like Brandys's novel itself) is consonant with the simplified perception of the historical process pertaining to the first half of the 1950's.

Despite this flaw, Janusz Zaorski's film is an important one, not only because of its artistic value. "The Mother of the Krols" clears the forefront and is one of those pictures more of which should and must yet be produced in order to create a filmed chronicle of the genesis of current times.

#### Lack of Historicism is Applauded

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 9-10 May 87 p 8

[Article by Stanislaw Zawislinski: "Through the Prism of the Krols" surtitled "Studio Films" (Footnote) ("The Mother of the Krols," screenplay and direction by Janusz Zaorski, "Rondo" and "X" film studios, 1982)]

"The Mother of the Krols," a novella by Kazimierz Brandys, was written at a turning point in our postwar history, during the so-called Thaw. The writer completed it in March 1957, and half a year later it already was in the hands of readers.

The film "The Mother of the Krols," based on this book, directed by Janusz Zaorski, also was produced during a stormy and dramatic period, in 1982, but only now is it being shown in studio cinemas and DKF's [film-discussion clubs].



Comparisons of the book and the film may not be necessary but suggest themselves. It should be said of the book that from the artistic point of view it is not an outstanding work, being at best middling. Its principal value lies in its subject matter, which may at present be not as painful and agitating as it had been 30 years ago when injustices committed in the name of the Personality Cult only began to be repaired. Besides, Zaorski did not hew to the book's text with a pharmacist's meticulousness, without however distorting its storyline or meaning. Moreover, he drew much sharper psychological portraits of nearly every character, broadened and varied the background of their actions, at times bringing it sharply into focus with the aid of archival photographs, and he emphasized particularly dramatic scenes with a rapaciously disquieting musical score composed by Przemyslaw Gintrowski. As a result, the film "The Mother of the Krols" is much richer than its literary model. Although it was shot in black and white, it produces an unexpectedly strong impression; I must admit that I liked it.

This is a story of the complex and dramatic destinies of a working-class family, the Krols, and of their close acquaintances, and it is depicted in several planes. In the political plane it refers to clashes and conflicts among communists over a period of more than 20 years (the action begins in 1933 and ends after Stalin's death), and it presents the political divisions, mistakes, and distortions of the immediate postwar years. The small circle of characters engulfed in mutual conflicts and intraparty struggle indicates that the conclusions to be drawn from the film story should not be too far-reaching. The fragment of modern history depicted for debunking purposes is just that, a fragment. After all, the intelligent spectator is perfectly aware that postwar Poland was built not only by communists, and that not everything communists did was a mistake: the history of their participation in political life is not a mere chronicle of errors and bitter social and individual experiences. But one should not nourish grievances because this or that work of art does not consider the entire complexity of the issues it deals with, issues that in this case are undoubtedly difficult. That Zaorski's film does not avoid gloomy questions and events is all the more reason for ruminating on the complexities of our modern history. Bitter truths are needed. The awareness of darker aspects should not obscure brighter ones to any reasonable person. Reflections on social deformations and on responsibility for the evil caused should be prompted even by critical works as well. Such works often substantiate belief in the possibility of changes to the better and suggest that everything depends on the human element, which, as known, varies from one individual to another.

These political aspects form the film's background against which the fate of Lucja Krol and her four sons, whom she raises on her own following her husband's lethal accident, is enacted. The privations experienced by the mother of the Krols are moving by their tragism and authenticity. Each of the sons of this simple and straight woman (outstandingly played by Magda Teresa Wojcik) travels a different road in his adulthood. The idealist Klemens, entangled in a suspicious political "affair," dies of exhaustion in prison. Zenon does not believe in people's rule. Roman achieves a "proper" career and for some time is "with the wave." The youngest, Stanislaw, at first renounces Klemens at a ZMP [Polish Youth Union] meeting, but later also finds himself in prison and finally, caring little about anything, joins the army.... One

family, but so many stances and such a knot of ideological and moral choices, dramas, divisions, passions.... The mother intuitively finds her way to each of her sons, whom she had wanted to raise into decent citizens, although she does not understand many things. Did she have to understand? Can a reason be found for everything? When Lucja's old friend tells her toward the end of the film, "You've had a hard life," she answers, "I'm not complaining. Others had it harder...."

Others had it harder: this declaration implies that much more shocking stories could be told. "The Mother of the Krols" gains a lot from its avoidance of exaltation; the narration is rather calm: of course, nowadays the audiences too respond more coolly to works that may vex or excite. Always, however, we become in one way or another enmeshed in history and politics, regardless of whether we are mere witnesses or active participants in events. This often tragic entanglement also is seen through the prism of one's family, and this is yet another instructive reflection on Zaorski's work.

#### Film Teaches Fifties History

Warsaw SZTANDAR MŁODYCH in Polish 15-17 May 87 p 9

[Article by Malgorzata Huniewicz: "Black and White"]

[Excerpts] Film legends and myths are slowly beginning to lose the flavor of "forbidden fruit." As recently as a few months ago, in an interview granted to SZTANDAR MŁODYCH, filmmaker Janusz Zaorski had voiced his deep desire that his film "The Mother of the Krols" be finally shown to the public. Now we can not only view this picture but also Krzysztof Kieslowski's "The Incident" (why has its showing in Warsaw cinemas been so quickly discontinued?) or even -- for the time being on the so-called "limited scale," Robert Gliniski's "Sunday Games."

Reviewing "The Incident" is subject to other criteria, because that film touches upon the problems of our most recent reality. But "Sunday Games" and especially "The Mother of the Krols" deal with a chapter in history set 40 and more years back and rarely portrayed in Polish cinema.

Rarely we deal with such a moving study of human dignity combined with impotence as "The Mother of the Krols." The austere world of the proletariat of Warsaw during a period stretching from the thirties to the mid-fifties, the sad and narrow alleys of Powisle -- such is the scenery of the film. It presents to us an "unemployed widow," the mother of four sons, each so different, who writes letters seeking justice, being an immaculately decent person. She sends them everywhere, each time believing and trusting that this will be the last time. The filmmaker has turned these letters into milestones of the film, each letter in turn being linked to the succeeding era in our modern history.

The film focuses on the life of Lucja Krol, who continually struggles for the existence of her sons. Yet, imperceptibly as it were, it also touches upon other issues, especially those into which, by the nature of things, Zenon, Roman, Klemens, and Stanislaw become "involved" unwittingly or quite

deliberately. That is, above all, politics, and also, for example, so-called social maladjustment.

A major asset of the directorial art of Janusz Zaorski is that it shows politics in the most attractive of the possible ways, that is, through the prism of the action and conduct of living, "noncardboard" characters. As for their conduct not always being credible, that is another matter.... Hence it is hard to fault the audiences when they react with amusement to the news that the Komintern disbands the Polish Communist Party (KKP). Its activists, who just then sit behind the bars, react to this news with unnatural pathos. I did not have on hand the book by Kazimierz Brandys on which the screenplay is based, but I suspect that these schematic representations and stereotypes occasionally so difficult to accept by present-day audiences originate from that book. After all, that used to be the mode of writing during the Thaw, in times when accountability was an issue.

The scenes dealing with World War II in "The Mother of the Krols" are much better depicted. Here, Janusz Zaorski was already able to base himself on much better models. Hence, above all, the superb depiction of dual attitudes toward the nightmare of the Occupation: the foxy attempt to "adapt" to which also, unfortunately, succumb the two older sons of Mrs. Krol (or rather just one, because vodka becomes increasingly important to the other), and the tough, unbending stand against Hitlerism taken by Klemens under the influence of a friend of the family, Wiktor Lewen, hiding out at Lucja Krol's home because of his leftist activities.

Even so, Lucja Krol does not cease for a moment to be the dominant protagonist in the film. All the storms of history surging across Poland in the periods covered by the film concern primarily her and only later her sons. To be sure, she understands little about the views, attitudes, and discussions presented in her home by her sons and Wiktor Lewen, but her elemental wisdom infallibly enables her to discern good from evil. Thanks to her, the film's approach to presenting Stalinist years, ceaseless interrogations, investigations, and the ubiquitous feeling of danger is justified.

In this place it is time to give due credit to the role created by Magda Teresa Wojcik. To be sure, she does not always and everywhere convince everyone by her Thespian practices, which at times are too restrained and ascetic, but they fit ideally precisely this film, "The Mother of the Krols." It almost seems as if Brandys had written his novel precisely for this film.

It is precisely the restrained yet tragic acting of Magda Teresa Wojcik that is most instrumental in making plausible to present-day audiences the picture of the fifties created by Janusz Zaorski, because, unlike, say, Jerzy Domaradzki in "The Great Race," this filmmaker did not avoid piling on stereotypes, which is yet another proof of the axiom that the 1950's still require an honest answer to the question, "What was it really like?"

Next to the protagonist of the title, the character of Klemens, her middle son, is the subject of the most interesting psychological study. A sensitive, intelligent boy, an idealist in the best meaning of the term, he dies in prison following a prolonged interrogation. This is another outstanding role



in the film, as played by Boguslaw Linda. Let us also add Zbigniew Zapasiewicz as Wiktor Lewen; properly speaking, the entire cast of "The Mother of the Krols" orbits around this trio.

The fifties still fascinate. This is confirmed by one other film that had also been placed on shelf in 1982. This is the picture by the young (class of 1952) director Robert Gliniski, titled ingenuously "Sunday Games."

Glossing over and a certain schematism are the principal faults of which "The Mother of the Krols" and "Sunday Games" may be accused. Were the rising generation to want to learn history from these two films, that would be a mistaken decision, because an unbalanced one. Still, they are among the first few attempts to portray our modern history, which is so enslaved by tragic moments. These pictures abound in stereotypes, but they cannot be ignored. It also matters that artistic quality and acting are in both cases the forte of these pictures, the more so considering that both were shot in black and white with a minimum of funding.

The passion and sincerity of Zaorski and Gliniski should not, however, be enough in themselves for us, and neither should be their ability to evoke deep emotion in spectators. The fifties still are awaiting a thorough discussion, through the medium of the silver screen as well. The renown gained in the Soviet Union by Tengiz Abuladze's metaphorical film "Pokayaniye" [Repentance] also should encourage our filmmakers to abandon the impoverished black-and-white paradocumentary form and storylines that abound in oversimplifications. We are still waiting for a complex, balanced, multidimensional approach to those years.

#### Stalinist Absurdities Revealed

Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 21, 24 May 87 pp 5,6

[Article by Tadeusz Sobolewski: "They or We"]

[Text] The film "The Mother of the Krols," directed by Janusz Zaorski, magnifies the effect of a memorable scene in "The Man of Marble": Deceived and injured, Birkut tries to persuade in 1957 his fellow villagers to participate in elections, "because this is our own country...." Then a festively dressed, smiling old peasant woman approaches the voting urn and glances at the camera. Why is such an impression produced by this subsequent mute documentary sequence? Each and all of these people could say the same thing as a protagonist of Brandys's novel, "The Mother of the Krols": "I don't want to govern. Let them govern me." Their faith in law and order, their trust in the powers-that-be, remain a positive value even when it turns out that they were deceived, and even though we know that 13 years later Birkut is shot to death in Gdansk. This trustfulness of ignorant people, combined with a historical experience that should negate this trustfulness, produces a dramatic effect that is as strong as Greek tragedy. Both in "The Man of Marble" and in "The Mother of the Krols" we view innocent victims. In the final scene of the film, Lucja Krol, not yet knowing that her imprisoned son is no longer alive, having been tortured to death by the Security Service, answers as follows to a



gesture of sympathy: "Others had it harder." Her unawareness is moving, but the nature of the drama lies in that Lucja Krol has no one to accuse for all the injustices experienced by herself and her son. They can only accuse an abstraction.

The novel by Kazimierz Brandys, written following the 20th PZPR Congress and published in October 1957 (and never reprinted) is, properly speaking, a philosophical tale. It accomodates a story of a life within the schema of a common and necessary fate. Jerusz Zaorski has hit upon the cinematic counterpart of this mode of narration. We often view Mrs. Krol in a crowd; her figure is montaged with images of old film chronicles of prewar military parades and postwar civilian parades. A widow with four sons, she fruitlessly appeals for help to the President in the Royal Castle, then to Bierut, and lastly to Gomulka. Caught in a raid, with a characteristic ingratiating smile she asks a Gestapo man to let her go; she simply begs him to spare her life. Revealing in Zaorski's film is the depiction of the 1933-1956 period as a single uninterrupted procession of events deprived of all ritual gestures and historical dates. The outbreak of the war is barely noted and the [1944 Warsaw] Uprising and the Liberation are not included. Only the appearance of the tenement's courtyard changes. This is a picture of life seen from the point of view of someone who does not grasp its historical significance but bears its entire burden, always waiting for "a better future." It is interesting that we owe this authentically folksy point of view to a writer as irreproachably intellectual as Kazimierz Brandys. It was he who conceived two female roles that have become part of the history of the Polish cinema: Felicja in "How To Be Loved" (Barbara Krafftówna) and Lucja Krol, who is superbly played by Magda Teresa Wojcik. These characters are in a way alike, both being the bearers of a kind of bitter wisdom. There is no justice in the world, there is no supreme judge, there are no criteria for guilt and merit, and there is no requital of love -- these loving women could say.

The mother of the Krols is rather a bit like a figure from a legend or a ballad. She is the keeper of the fire on the hearth, the one who loves and therefore has faith in "Knock and the door shall open" (vide the scene in front of the prison) and that if someone begs for bread he will not be given stones. The good faith of Lucja, the laundress of Solec Street, also extends to those on the top -- those in power. She invariably believes in their good intentions. This faith consistently fails her, even and especially in times when people's rule was proclaimed and the word "humanism" interpreted in every possible manner. The postwar destinies of Lucja's sons are illustrations of the Polish fate.

Her best-loved son Klemens (Boguslaw Linda) is the first to be taken from her. Enlisted during the Occupation into the [communist] organization by Dr. Leven, a communist, he undergoes his first Golgotha on Szucha. An idealist, liberated from the concentration camp at war's end, he makes a career in politics (Those at the top say of him that he is "the blood of our blood"). Incarcerated during the struggle against the "rightist-nationalist deviation," he confesses to crimes he did not commit, whereupon he withdraws his confession and, following the interrogations, dies. Another son, Roman (Krzysztof Zaleski), pursues a facile career in the party by riding on Klemens's coattails. Zenon (Adam Ferency), decent and embittered, stays with his mother and takes to

drinking. The youngest, Stas (Michal Juszcakiewicz) is a hoodlum; at the same time he writes poems and makes paradoxical, cynical utterances (as for example when he refers to Stalin and Jesus as opposites: one martyrs others while the other is martyred, in both cases for the good of the world). He is sentenced for robbing a newsstand, but he enacts a comedy of repentance and declares his desire to "stride on the path of a citizen of People's Poland." Such are several different variants of possible Polish biographies in which decency and dishonesty, good and evil, all equally lose.

Lucja cannot understand that the successive stages in Polish history introduce new unprecedented forms of evil. The teamster Cyga (Franciszek Pieczka) comments, "Now we have education for all and I became a truck driver, but they took the truck away from me." Zenon says, "Work is available, but the wages are too high to croak and too low to live on. Before the war there was greater despair, after the war there is greater malice." Lucja thinks, it used to be that one knew whom to ask for help, but nowadays no one can help.

The imprisoned Klemens is placed in the same cell with an SS-man. Klemens's life was spared by the Germans, but he was tortured to death by his own people. He says, "They don't forgive their own." Klemens, "the blood of our blood," becomes a truly tragic martyr: no one will know about his self-sacrifice. This may be the most bitter of the truths expounded by the film: the official notice of Klemens's death is montaged with authentic pictures of the mourning parade following Stalin's death, marching on the Third of May Boulevard. There is something perplexing about that crowd of people with enigmatic faces, about the torches they are carrying, and about the manifold photographs of the leader of communism. Is there any more explicit way of accusing a system of thought under which the individual "renounces his freedom for the sake of participating in (future) freedom"? He renounces it for the sake of an abstraction to which traits of God are attributed. It is hard not to respect this sacrifice, but it also is hard not to perceive in it the brand of the absurd. Because tragedy is always absurd. In "The Mother of the Krols" Brandys -- soon after Milosz who had written in 1951 the famous text, "Before He is Forgotten" -- put his finger on that mysterious quality of communism represented by its religious dimension (having previously experienced it on his own skin). This concerns an unnamed faith for whose sake Wiktor Lewen defends his ideals and his disciple Klemens dies.

In the novel, a former fellow KKP member tells Comrade Lewen, "For 30 years I had been saying 'we,' but it turned out that each of us contained him, so now I say 'they.' What does 'we' mean? Do you think that this does not concern you? Where have you been? Why have not we heard things whispered about at every street corner by everyone except us? Our name will be infamy for centuries. We shall be disgraced. I had not known, because I had not wanted to know! The ideal Justice! We buried it in the sand of cemeteries. What are you trying to justify? What has remained for you? memories? An apartment and an office? A telephone? You dread infamy? But it already is a fact. Simple people despise us."

And Lewen answers, "You shouldn't say this. You have no right. Not everything is over."

How much defense of the "purity of the idea" is there in this pathetic dialogue, how much Sartrean "acceptance of responsibility" -- and how much is there of self-justification, ordinary mendacity, false attribution of heroism to consequences of human pettiness, out of fear for one's own skin or even only for one's career? This too was human and without the ballast of philosophy.

It is significant that in Brandys's novel *Lucja*, to whose feeling of justice the author constantly refers, does not despise Lewen. On the contrary, again and again she grants him her confidence. It was possible to think and write thus in 1957. Brandys's novel also represented as much an attempt to resolve the question of accountability for Stalinism as an attempt at self-justification. The existential notion of man's absurdity had been a veritable spiritual tonic for adherents of "a new faith." I do not mean to be ironic. Who else should draw up such personal balance sheets than primarily the participants in those events? And why should we refuse them the right to justify themselves? Literature is a kind of self-justification. Who writes against himself? When read nowadays, "The Mother of the Krols" acquires the additional value of being an analysis of a depraved awareness, a study of self-deception and the self's unmasking of sophistries ready to permeate any simple moral truth. In this drama of martyrdom Lewen plays the role of Pilate who washes his hands and asks, "Is this true?" The martyr is a communist. For all that he could also be a Home Army man. But Brandys speaks for people such as Dr Lewen and his faithful disciple Klemens, for whose martyrdom Lewen is in a way responsible.

In adapting this novel in 1981, Janusz Zaorski extracted from it what still can move and prompt reflections: the question of the responsibility of the power elite, of responsibility that is not always tantamount to guilt but often is coupled with impotence. *Lucja Krol's* trusting gaze collides with the gaze of Lewen who, to be sure, is one of those at the top but is completely helpless to do anything about the events that occur. The system which destroys the individual at the same time renders those in power powerless. "It used to be that I knew whom to ask for help, but nowadays I don't." Lewen circles *Lucja's* tenement but dares not enter -- he has nothing to say to her. Perhaps he feels shame, or perhaps, like certain protagonists of Toranska's interviews, he feels only resentment and injury.

This drama can be easily summed up by saying that these are "their" affairs which do not concern "us." *Lucja* trusted Lewen because she was stupid; it is her own fault for having trusted him. But how many people would admit that they never trust anyone, not even over a penny? Zaorski astutely illuminated the differences and similarities between "their" and "our" fates, between Lewen and *Lucja*. Both are surprised and deceived by their fates.

It can even be said that Lewen fell victim to a cruel religion which recognizes no innocents. But within that community of fate he and *Lucja* were assigned different roles: she will always be a hewer of wood and drawer of water while he will suffer the remorse of conscience in luxury, at the top. He will always stand on the balcony, and she will remain in her tenement novel.



## YOUTH WEEKLY DISCUSSION GROUP ON ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

Warsaw SZTANDAR MŁODYCH in Polish 3-5 Apr 87 pp 1,3-4

[Compiled by Zbigniew Gajewski: "A Time for Ideology" under the rubric "Discussion Club of SZTANDAR MŁODYCH"]

[Text] The thesis of the disideologization of present-day societies has been advanced fairly often in recent years. It is proclaimed from political tribunes and scholarly pulpits. Sometimes this opinion can be met with in this country too. Is it true? What is the relationship between our social reality and the ideological premises inherent in the socialist system of society? Does youth need ideology? Such questions were asked of each other by participants in the regular meeting of the Discussion Club of SZTANDAR MŁODYCH. Below are recorded certain aspects of the discussion.

Decline of Ideology?

Janusz Kowalski: Ideology is the whole of ideas and perceptions of the world and of life of the society proper to a given social class or group. This is its shortest definition. Are we here in Poland a society without an ideology? Of course not. We are even dealing with an ideological aggression, the development of petit bourgeois ideology. Petit bourgeoisie is flourishing in our attitudes and imposing on us a lifestyle and models of conduct. And even the working class is succumbing to this ideology. It has elevated "possession" to the rank of its life principle number one.

Krzysztof Szamalek: The Marxist ideology, which was the motive power of great changes in modern world history, is recently becoming less dynamic as it were. This is a consequence of historical processes, of the struggle between ideological systems. After all, capitalism is not voluntarily relinquishing its positions. This is all the more reason why our ideology should be audacious and preemptive and influence more significantly the awareness of the working class rather than lag behind.

Krzysztof Janik: The phenomenon defined as decline of ideology originates, in my opinion, from metaphysical circles and should be regarded as such. Experience teaches that people always believe in something, and thus decline



of ideology can be ruled out. On the other hand, it is possible and necessary to speak of changes in the hierarchy of ideological values or of their revaluation.

Besides, Marxism cannot be viewed as something that remains in the vanguard or in the rear of social awareness. Marxism is above all a methodological directive of a cognitive and sociological nature that helps to cognize and understand the world, but also to transform it. Hence it is not Marxism that lags behind -- it is only we who don't know how to exploit its creative qualities. The techniques developed so far for "translating" it into political practice are quite clearly becoming exhausted. This is proved, to say the least, by M. Gorbachev's comment that Marxism in the USSR still exists in its 1930's stage.

Andrzej Barcikowski: To me, too, the question of the decline of ideology seems to be falsely posed, although it has already been appearing in social thought, if only in the works of R. Aron [Aaron] or O. Bell. But events in subsequent years have disproved this thesis. When in the late 1970's Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had proposed in Moscow an ideological disarmament in East-West relations, Jimmy Carter in the United States was just then launching a campaign for human rights, that is, ideologizing international relations.

But, seen from another point of view, I believe that the question of the decline of ideology is improper. For ideology is nothing other than an emanation of social interests and contradictions. So long as these interests and contradictions exist, ideology continues to exist. Now, a decline of social interests is hardly to be expected.

Why is it then that an ideological crisis in its various dimensions is being mentioned in our country? Because we perceive a crisis of forms of expression of ideology, of the agitational values of Marxism. These have undoubtedly grown weaker, especially to the rising generation.

K. Szamalek accuses Marxist ideology of being conservative at present. I believe this judgment to be oversimplified. In the USSR the thesis of the ideological unblocking of the development of socialism is being advanced. Nowadays in that country ideology is a factor triggering social transformations.

Ideology can become a conservative force only when it ceases to articulate the interests of the class to which it is related. But then also it ceases to be ideology.

[Inset] "Presenting the ideas of thinkers who are so far above mediocrity as, precisely, Marx and Engels is becoming an intended or unintended kind of interpretation. Any genuinely great creative work is a source of diversified and many-directional inspiration, but it also demolishes all schemas. Hence the disputes concerning the validity of various interpretations and schemas...." Julian Hochfeld, "Studia o marksistowskiej teorii społeczeństwa" [Studies of the Marxist Theory of Society]."

[Inset] "The specific nature of the model of man being propagated in Poland apparently consists in that political programs are its chief provenance, because, unlike in the previous eras of the history of Poland or other socialist countries, in our country literature and other arts initiate practically no new models." Aleksandra Jasinska and Renata Siemieniska, "Wzory osobowe socjalizmu" [Personal Models under Socialism].

Pawel Gleorgica; It is symptomatic that when a society becomes ripe for fundamental changes, first a decline in ideology is mentioned and immediately afterward it turns out that ideology becomes increasingly important. This is so in recent times. The class struggle between the systems of society continues, and both sides experience the most varied problems. That other side -- the West -- also has problems in demonstrating attractive models of life.

### Ideology and Practice

SZTANDAR MŁODYCH: Since we agreed that we are dealing not so much with a decline of ideology as with a crisis of the forms of its transmission, let us try to determine how this influences the social realities. Even superficial observations indicate that the gaps between ideology and social practice are numerous.

Andrzej Barcikowski: J. Kowalski stated that petit bourgeois ideology significantly influences social awareness in this country. This thesis is only partially right. I am opposed to making this kind of accusation, because it is in a way a surrogate for thought and deepened analysis. For example, what about this fascination with consumerism? I am not exaggerating when I say that it is an obsession to a nation whose living standards have declined markedly in the last few years and whose market still is not stabilized.

As regards the condition of Marxist ideology, it is not the same in every stage of social development. This ideology plays its most significant role before and directly after the political revolution. Afterward, its fate varies. Its condition always improves when the reality under socialism becomes receptive to needs for a reform, when it becomes ripe for a change. Then also, new elements of ideological awareness crystallize, and ideology becomes an important instrument of change. This is so at present. Its importance is markedly growing, although this is not yet visible on the surface of public life. Certain things are still maturing.

Grzegorz Nowacki: Every ideology becomes concretized by some operational program for translating into reality its basic values. Regularly conducted surveys of social awareness indicate that socialist ideology is widely accepted; at any rate, no alternative systemic solutions are being proposed. But while the ideological premises of socialism are accepted, their practical realization elicits, as known, reservations. Hence, the main problem of an ideological nature at present is the protection and implementation of the economic reform. Only that reform can demonstrate in practice the validity of the premise that socialism generates a new quality of life.

**SZTANDAR MŁODYCH:** Various contacts with our readers indicate, however, that they view the ideological values of our system of society as relatively uncohesive and are even more disturbed by the economic reform, because it forces them to ask new questions and answer them. This also raises the question of which of these values, numerous as they are, should be placed in the foreground. Grzegorz is in favor of the values linked to the reform. What do the other colleagues say?

**Andrzej Wrebiak:** As an economist, I believe that, of course, nowadays it is primarily questions relating to economic issues in Poland that should be answered. In view of what is happening at present to the economic reform, I conclude that the principal constraints on it ensue primarily from the absence of answers to questions of an ideological nature. For example, what should be the extent of employee participation in enterprise management if we want employees to be interested in their work? Should joint ventures between state-owned and private capital be allowed, if only in order to encourage individuals to participate in the accumulation so far performed chiefly by the state? No answer has still been found to the dilemma of the extent of the acceptability of differentiation between highest and lowest wages under the economic reform, or to the question of the permissible level of the involvement of foreign capital in our economy. More questions of this kind could be asked. An economist could not answer them, because they are of a broader, ideological nature. At present we live in a transition stage to which no fixed rules apply. They have to be continually worked out.

[Inset] "A new civilization cannot be built by people who grow up in present-day civilizations; it can be built only by people who themselves are already growing up in the new civilization. In practice this might seem to be a vicious circle. But this is not so. Because, on the one hand, old civilizations contain in themselves embryos of a new civilization..., and on the other, the new civilization does not have to arise full-formed all at once, comprising the entire culture and the entire mankind..... All that is needed is that, from the very outset, the new civilization be endowed with developmental forces leading to its refinement and extension to a continually widening scope of culture and increasingly numerous groups of mankind." Florian Znaniecki, "Ludzie terażniejsi, a cywilizacja przyszłości" [Present-Day Mankind and the Civilization of the Future].

**Janusz Kowalski:** To me, labor and its results should be the ordering value of modern ideology. For it is the absence of a proper work ethic in this country that is the cause of all the other frustrations.

**Andrzej Barcikowski:** Labor cannot be a fundamental ideological category. No abstract value, not even such a significant value as labor, suffices in itself to create a system, and without a system we cannot speak of ideology.

**Krzysztof Janik:** Marxism is a doctrine about changing the world and its goal is to meet man's needs more fully. If we agree with this, many of the dilemmas perceived by Andrzej Wrebiak are of only an apparent nature. Of course, we have reached a stage in which the materialization of this principle requires new forms, and this probably is the reason for the "perestrojka" [restructuring] slogans in the USSR.

Pawel Gieorgica: Indeed, ideology needs new domains of social values that have previously been underappreciated and absent in social practice. It may be that these values will emerge owing to the economic reform, just as at one time the spirit of Protestantism resulted in the emergence of values which promoted the development of capitalism. For example, pragmatism, or a high rationality of all social measures.

#### Offer to Youth

Malgorzata Raczynska: At the first session of the Advisory Council under the Chairman of the Council of State, one of its members claimed that our social awareness is greatly disordered, that we hardly know what we desire in the most important domains of personal self-fulfillment, i.e., in the domains of ideas, values, perceptions of reality. It may be that we here on this discussion panel know what is ideology and what it lacks at present. But the society, and especially its youth segment, knows little about it. To teenagers, Marxism is the opposite of religion. Few regard it as a way of cognizing reality. Discussions and talks on this subject are infrequent. And yet, contrary to appearances, youth is neither non-idealistic nor entirely consumerist-minded. It greatly desires objective discussion of ideas and values, to be followed by efficient measures to translate them into reality. There is no one to conduct such discussions. Often also our approach is that everyone has his own value system and it is too late to influence it positively.

Zbigniew Pawlowski: I think that the awareness of young people is torn between chauvinism and cosmopolitanism. Hence, in my opinion, patriotism should be a value on which greater emphasis should be placed in education.

Grzegorz Nowacki: All ideological offers made to youth so far that have met with its positive response were based on the idea of demolishing the old, creating the new, and sharing power and responsibility with the young.

Krzysztof Janik: Grzegorz is not making a good offer. The thesis that the rising generation is the source of innovation has already been disproved a couple of times, and not only in this country at that.

Malgorzata Raczynska: Contemporary patriotism among the young should be expressed in not only building a new road in one's village without glancing at others over the shoulder but also desiring to share the burden of deciding on the country's destinies. This is not possible in the absence of thorough preparation, knowledge, and self-education. But good sociopolitical literature, especially for beginners, is lacking.

To shape patriotism among the young we need adults with authority, leaders on the grand scale, who know how to communicate with youth in its own language and in the forms it has adopted. There is a lack of such individuals.

Krzysztof Janik: Did you think that a list with names of such individuals should be sent to you by the Central Committee? Why don't you yourself, in your Association, propagate such models. Allow me to quote Gramsci:



"Every generation can be judged by its own appraisal of the preceding generation. A generation which underestimates its predecessor and is blind to its greatness and importance is bound to be trivial and lacking confidence in its own powers, even if it girdles itself with a gladiator's belt and spouts drivel about greatness. A strong and vital generation which desires to work and strengthen itself is prone to overestimate the preceding generation, because its own energies imbue it with confidence that it can progress even farther."

Pawel Gieorgica: We all agree that it is difficult to design an attractive ideological offer to youth. The reason for this crisis is because we want to employ old and obsolete vehicles and modes of expression for such offers. If we want to change this, tactic must dominate over strategy. Let us view the successes of Teleexpress from this angle. This form of reaching youth is perhaps the best-adapted to our times. So it is too condensed and superficial? Perhaps. But it is extremely effective. Nowadays there exists an absence of demand for an extensive circulation of ideas of social justice or equality. On the other hand, the demand for a superficial reception of ideas exists. Accepting this reality would enable us to regain flexibility and stimulate further and deepened discussion in the direction of interest of us.

P.S. The above is a taped voice record, and the comments of the participants in the discussion are not authorized.

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## 1986 YOUTH LAW GRANTS NEW POWERS, OBLIGATIONS

Warsaw SZTANDAR MŁODYCH in Polish 16 Mar 87 pp 1,2

[Article by Dariusz Szymczycha: "The Sejm Controls" surtitled "Decree on Youth Starting Adulthood"]

[Text] The complaints about the Sejm's being merely a legislative and voting body rather than a controlling one, so often made toward the end of the last Eighth Sejm, are becoming groundless. Less than a year ago, on 22 May 1986, the Decree on the Principles for the Participation of Youth in the Government, Social, Economic, and Cultural Life of this Country was voted, and it became effective as of 1 January 1987. By now the Sejm has evaluated its implementation.

On 15 April the Commission for National Education and Youth held a session that was nearly entirely devoted to this subject. The initiative for this evaluation originated with the Presidium of the Sejm, and its results have been quite satisfactory.

One Deputy, who is active in a special taskforce for evaluating the implementation of [illegible, probably the Sejm's] recommendations by the Executive Branch, has provided a rather paradoxical but strong argument. For there are laws that had been voted 20 years ago and that delegate a number of powers for issuing implementing regulations but to this day many such regulations are lacking. Yet as many as five of the rights delegated under our Youth Decree have already been translated into reality. We wrote on this subject last March, in our series of articles "Ensuing from the Decree." Ordinances of the Council of Ministers on this matter are still lacking on the subject of:

-- granting assistance to parents and guardians of young people who are unable to assure the education, upbringing and care of their children or wards;

-- defining the principles and procedure for keeping records and the scope and forms of assistance to handicapped and incapacitated youth.

Minister for Youth Affairs Alexander Kwasniewski, who reported to the Commission on the implementation of the Decree, blamed these gaps on the procedure for interministerial agreements. It turned out that the concerned

ministries are hardly interested in issuing the related implementing regulations. As for the Minister for Youth Affairs, all he can do about it is to prod them. It is expected that the missing implementing regulations will be prepared within a month. The opinion of Deputy Jacek Piechota (class of 1959), who presented a joint report on behalf of the Commission, was more critical. He said:

"The problems piling up prior to the issuance of these two sets of implementing regulations have to be urgently resolved, because they concern the severely disabled youth groups that need help."

However, the assessment of the implementation of the Decree, presented by Deputy J. Piechota, was positive. The extremely broad and many-sided manner in which those implementing the Decree propagated its substance is to their credit. The Deputy warmly praised the articles in youth press, and especially in SZTANDAR MŁODYCH, which besides was consonant with the appraisal by Minister A. Kwasniewski.

Since the Decree is temporary, it was proposed that its implementation be more broadly reassessed a year later on the basis of greater experience to be gained in the meantime.

The discussion among Deputies following the presentation of the reports was more controversial. Several Deputy-members of the Commission for National Education and Youth expressed skepticism about the value of the provisions of the Decree and the effectiveness of its propagation. It was complained that youth is unfamiliar with the date of promulgation of the Decree, its language, and the ways in which it meets their needs. The skeptics or, if one prefers, cautious optimists or pragmatists, were rebutted by the more enthusiastic members of the Caucus of Young Deputies who had been invited to this session of the Commission. Deputy Wiesława Godz (class of 1958) declared that the complaints of Deputies about youth's unfamiliarity with the decree ricochet against them as it were, because it is precisely the Deputies who should be most concerned about publicizing the Decree. The occasion for this is afforded by, e.g., lessons in civics or the propaedeutics of social sciences. Deputy Jacek Buganski (class of 1955) pointed out that, inasmuch as the Decree has been passed, it must be implemented and supported in any situation. However, the inconsistent conduct of the authorities, which have not so far issued the two sets of implementing regulations, is disquieting. A similar opinion was voiced by Deputy Secretary of the Caucus of Young Deputies, Deputy Julian Bartkowski (class of 1954). The enthusiasm of the younger part of the audience about the Decree was shared by Deputy Albin Siekierski (class of 1920), who pointed to the educational aspects of the provisions of the Decree of 22 May 1986:

"Its provisions on protecting the health of youth are valuable, because it is not true that our rising generation is physically more healthy. The young are unwilling to take medical examinations and prefer to live on until something suddenly goes wrong with their health. This 'Sarmatian' attitude to one's own health was doubtless inherited by youth from its forebears."

A special subcommission is drafting recommendations of the Commission for National Education and Youth on the implementation of the Youth Decree, and it shall submit them for a vote at the next session, toward the end of April.

## YOUNG SEJM DELEGATES DISCUSS YOUTH LAW IMPLEMENTATION

Warsaw SZTANDAR MŁODYCH in Polish 16 Apr 87 pp 1,2

[Article by Dariusz Szymczycha: "Youth Takes Part" surtitled "Ensuing from the Decree"]

[Text] This time we will refer not to the implementing regulations for the so-called Youth Decree but directly to its provisions, which endow the ZSM [Union of Polish Socialist Youth], the ZMW [Rural Youth Union], the ZHP [Polish Scouts Union], and the ZSP [Polish Student Association] with many new powers.

The manner in which these powers are utilized will affect the extent of the participation of youth in solving its own problems and those of this country. It is justly said that the new powers of youth organizations serve to strengthen their so-called political presence, something that is neither a slogan nor a concept thought up by theoreticians.

But political presence does not mean "seizure" of powers and gratification of ambitions, because the new powers not only grant the right to decide but also teach coresponsibility. Hence also, dear officials, directors, managers, chairmen, etc, the saying "Nothing Concerning Us Without Us" mobilizes and educates. The Decree's provisions which we will discuss in this article afford a chance to not only the young but all who desire to treat youth as a partner.

First, the Decree specifies the scope of activities of youth organizations, meaning the education and socialist upbringing of youth, the mobilization of youth for work to promote in all ways national development, the defense and advocacy of the rights of youth, the conduct of economic activities, etc.

Second, the Decree of 22 May 1986 endows youth organizations with the "right to pronounce opinions on all matters relating to youth."

Third, this being a legislative innovation, the Decree introduces the duty of consulting youth organizations on legislation concerning youth with respect to, in particular, such domains as personnel and wage policies, questions of occupational, professional, and social advancement, social services, housing construction, education and upbringing, higher education, health care,



culture, and physical culture and tourism. This does not mean that youth need not be consulted on other matters.

What are the obligations of the partners in the consultation process?

The authors of youth-related proposals, that is, agencies or bodies of state administration and economic administration and the management of other institutions and plants and factories, are placed under the obligation of:

- transmitting complete copies of the proposals to the youth organization or organizations authorized to express their opinions, and fixing a realistic deadline for the reception of their comments;

- considering the submitted recommendations and comments and especially those which are realistic and substantiated;

- informing the youth organizations on reasons for the decision not to consider their recommendations and postulates.

The organizations to which the proposals are transmitted are placed under the obligation of:

- considering the text of the proposal by the statutory procedure, i.e., the comments should not derive from the salaried staff or experts and the like, unless this is explicitly approved by the statutory body;

- taking a position on the proposal before the deadline fixed by its author. The author, that is, the state agency, has the right to regard failure to receive comments before the deadline as the youth organization's failure to exercise its right to submit an opinion. However, the lack of response from the youth organization may not be viewed as its consent to the proposal.

Attention, employees of the head offices of the ZSMP, the ZMW, the ZHP, and the ZSP: On 27 January 1987 the Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers Professor Zbigniew Gertych dispatched a circular to ministers and directors of central offices, requesting them to "adhere to the principle that socialist youth associations should present their views on legislation that concerns in particular the issues mentioned in Article 28, Paragraph 2, Point 1, of the Decree of 22 May 1986." In view of this, the ministers cannot resort to explaining that they are unaware of the text of the Decree, considering that they have received a special reminder from the Vice Chairman.

Fourth, youth organizations may recommend new legislation or amendments to old legislation concerning youth. The state agency or body to which such recommendations are addressed is dutybound to take a position on such recommendations within a month and, in the event that its position is negative, to provide an explanation for it.

Hence, the new Decree contains many innovative provisions. How long will it take us to familiarize ourselves with the new rights and obligations? Send in "frontline reports" to SZTANDAR MŁODYCH. If the need arises, we will assign to you a SZTANDAR MŁODYCH reporter.

## DECREE OUTLINES MEASURES TO INCREASE FOOD PRODUCTION

Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian No 37, 15 May 87 pp 1-8

[Decree of the Council of Ministers and National Council of the Fatherland Front No 26 of 23 April 1987 Concerning an Improvement in the System for Achieving Self-Sufficiency in Agricultural Products]

[Text] The system for self-sufficiency of the population holds an important place in the nation's socioeconomic development and in carrying out the party's program for further raising the standard of living of the people. It helps to unleash worker initiative and establish conditions for the year-round and steady supply of the population with the main agricultural products. As a result of this, the supply of food products to the public is improved.

However, the achieved results do not fully meet the goals and criteria posed by the party's 13th Congress and by the July 1986 conference on the production of more goods and services for the public. We have not fully met the main requirement of the system for the year-round and steady satisfying of the needs of the population in the conurbation systems and the okrugs for the main domestically-produced agricultural products. There are unjustified differences between the okrugs in terms of satisfying the public with agricultural products and foodstuffs. We have not sufficiently applied new forms and methods for involving the physical plant and the labor resources in the production of agricultural products.

In order to bring the work in the area of self-sufficiency in accord with the decisions of the party's 13th Congress and the requirements of the Regulation Governing Economic Activity and to create conditions for maximum supply of the public in the okrugs and conurbation systems with agricultural products,

The Council of Ministers and the National Council of the Fatherland Front decree:

Chapter One: Basic Provisions

Article 1. (1) The self-sufficiency system is aimed at increasing agricultural output and more fully satisfying the public's needs for all types of vegetables and fruits, meat, milk, eggs and other agricultural products.

(2) The self-sufficiency system is to be improved on the basis of the extensive development of the initiative, interest and competition between the population points, conurbation systems and okrugs for the steady and year-round supply of the public with agricultural products in a fresh and processed state.

Article 2. (1) Satisfying the needs of the population for all types of vegetables and fruits, meat, milk, eggs and other agricultural products is the primary obligation of the people's councils, the brigades in agriculture, the agroindustrial complexes [APK], the other agricultural and cooperative organizations and other organizations which carry out agricultural activities (called below "agricultural organizations").

(2) The necessary agricultural products is to be provided through the self-sufficiency system on the basis of the following:

1. Production from the agricultural organizations assigned for the self-sufficiency of the public, in establishing and developing small farms, fruit orchards and vegetable gardens, hothouses and other agricultural facilities;

2. The further development of private farms by involving the public in the production of agricultural product;

3. The organization of subsidiary farms under enterprises, organizations, institutions, schools, military units and so forth;

4. The development of diverse cooperative forms for producing agricultural products, with the cooperative organizations being provided with land, farms, hothouses and other agricultural facilities for use and in employing various forms of cooperation for the public, including by establishing small cooperatives for tilling the land, tending animals, purchasing and processing agricultural products and so forth;

5. The establishing of small enterprises for processing agricultural products, including those operating with customer-supplied materials and including canneries, dairies, slaughterhouses and so forth;

6. The further use of the existing hothouses and the establishing of new ones including solar hothouses, those heated with thermal waters, waste steam and other thermal resources;

7. The establishing of settlement, intersettlement and interokrug societies with the involvement of the agricultural organizations, consumer cooperatives, industrial, trade and other enterprises and organizations and which are interested in pooling their resources and efforts to increase agricultural production.

(3) All agricultural production from the self-sufficiency system remains at the disposal of the conurbation systems.

Article 3. (1) The self-sufficiency system is directed by the executive committees of the people's councils. Participating in it are the agricultural and cooperative organizations and the public from the conurbation systems.

(2) The executive committees of the people's councils are responsible to the public for the following:

1. Creating conditions for the production of more agricultural products for the need of the population in the conurbation system;

2. Achieving the per capita consumption rates for agricultural products.

(3) The executive committees of the people's councils:

1. Plan, organize and supervise the production, purchasing and sales of products from the self-sufficiency system;

2. Are responsible for the state of the domestic market in all settlements on the territory and at least once a year report to the general meetings of the public on the state of the market and on the satisfying of consumer demand;

3. They organize and exercise supervision over the observance of the tolerable standards for residual quantities of pesticides, nitrates and heavy metals in the agricultural products.

(4) The criterion for assessing the work of the personnel in the okrugs and the conurbation systems in the self-sufficiency area is the degree of achieving the consumption standards using own-produced resources.

## Chapter Two: Planning the Public's Activities in the Self-Sufficiency Area

Article 4. (1) The activities of the public in the self-sufficiency area are carried out on the basis of the plans of the agricultural and cooperative organizations and the subsidiary farms as well as with the active involvement of the public.

(2) The self-sufficiency plan of the conurbation systems is discussed and approved by the general meetings of the labor collectives and the public in the conurbation systems.

Article 5. (1) The self-sufficiency plan of the conurbation systems is worked out on the basis of approved per capita consumption rates for vegetables, fruits, meat, milk, eggs and so forth. With the self-sufficiency plan conditions are created for reaching and surpassing the standards as well as the necessary reserves generally for the self-sufficiency system of the conurbation system.

(2) Previous consumption standards were worked out by the State Planning Commission with the approval of the Council for Agriculture and Forestry under the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Trade and were approved by the Council of Ministers generally for the nation and for the okrugs. The



executive committees of the okrug people's councils have differentiated the standards approved for them for the conurbation systems depending upon the traditions in the diet of the public, production conditions, as well as the presence of large industrial, resort, tourist and other major consumption centers.

Article 6. (1) The State Planning Commission and the Committee for the Material Economy in working out the state plan establish conditions for furthering the self-sufficiency of the conurbation systems and supplying the essential fertilizers, chemicals, small-sized equipment, farm tools, building materials and so forth.

(2) The executive committees of the obshtina councils and the agricultural organizations organize agronomic, veterinary and other services for the private and subsidiary farms in terms of mechanization and transport to fulfill the self-sufficiency plan of the conurbation systems.

Article 7. (1) The products produced by the self-sufficiency system above the amount foreseen in the consumption standards may be employed for exchange, processing, sale or for other purposes, and when it is not necessary for the appropriate conurbation systems can be supplied under contract to the other conurbation systems. Whether the product is surplus for the conurbation system or okrug is a matter to be determined by the executive committee of the appropriate people's council.

(2) When the conurbation system cannot provide by its own resources the necessary agricultural products according to the standard, it supplies them on a contractual basis by exchanging products with other conurbation systems.

Article 8. The executive committees of the okrug people's councils can submit a proposal for the supply of resources from the centralized commodity stocks only after having proven that there are objective conditions which do not allow the production of the necessary quantities and types of products for satisfying the demand of the population within the okrug.

Article 9. The executive committees of the obshtina people's councils carry out extensive explanatory and organizational work to involve all the enterprises and organizations as well as all the public of the conurbation system in producing the necessary agricultural products through the self-sufficiency system, in:

1. Assisting the agricultural and cooperative organizations in involving the public in the production of agricultural products on a piece-work basis, in supplying ancillary brigades, in organizing procurement points, in opening stores and so forth;

2. With the private farmers they clarify the possibilities of producing agricultural products and on this basis they ascertain their requirements and provide help in delivering seed, planting stock, fertilizers, chemicals, livestock, chicks, building materials and so forth;

3. They assist in providing land for the consumer cooperatives to produce agricultural products for self-sufficiency needs;

4. They organize the establishing of conurbation societies between the enterprises, organizations and so forth for producing agricultural products and providing services related to the public's self-sufficiency;

5. They assist in providing the citizens with small vegetable gardens and orchards, dessert vines, berry patches, small farms and so forth.

### Chapter Three: Resources of the Self-Sufficiency System

#### Section I: The Rational Utilization of Agricultural Land

Article 10. The executive committees of the okrug people's councils, the National Agroindustrial Union Association and the agricultural organizations carry out systematic measures for the most efficient use of agricultural land.

Article 11. (1) The executive committees of the obshtina people's councils together with the leadership of the agricultural organizations, the lumber combines and the fatherland front organizations search out, map and turn over to the enterprises, institutions, organizations and the public abandoned, unproductive, low-productive, small, sloping and other incompletely utilized land from the landholdings according to the established procedure. Land which is fit for intensive farming may not be turned over to the public under this provision with the exception of instances designated in Article 14.

(2) The mapped lands under the previous paragraph are set aside for producing agricultural products in the following amounts:

1. For the subsidiary farms and cooperatives, depending upon their need;

2. For cooperative members, workers, specialists, employees and pensioners from agricultural and other organizations involved in agricultural activities--up to 2 decare above the land for personal utilization under the condition that they work the minimum number of man-days set by the general meeting of the brigade or another agricultural organization or produce a certain quantity of product on a piece-basis;

3. For the families of workers, employees and pensioners not employed in agricultural production--up to 1 decare;

4. For beekeepers owning from 5 to 10 hives--1 decare, over 10 hives up to 2 decare and for public bee farms, depending upon the number of hives;

5. For hunting societies and rabbit-raising groups--up to 15 decare which can be provided in different areas of their rayon;

6. For silkworm associations near population points--up to 15 decare for establishing collective mulberry orchards.

Article 12. (1) The land under the previous article is granted gratis for indefinite use.

(2) The land granted to persons under Points 3 and 4 of Paragraph 2 of the previous article may also be formed by their heirs when the land is used under the conditions and according to the procedure of this decree.

Article 13. The land granted for farming use can be confiscated:

1. When it is not employed for producing agricultural product;
2. When it is not tilled within a period of 2 successive years by members of the household or is rented out;
3. With the carrying out of illegal construction;
4. With the necessity of state or public needs, in providing other land and in paying for the legally performed improvements.

Article 14. Close to population points it is possible to allocate plots which are irrigated or suitable for vegetable production with a size of up to 200 square m. In these places the executive committees of the obshtina people's councils and municipalities may organize the construction of common buildings (storage sheds) using funds of the individual farmers for the storage of supplies and tools, public stations for the canning of fruits, vegetables and so forth, sheds and lean-tos for bad weather, without disfiguring the area.

Article 15. The agricultural organizations whenever possible may provide 1 decare of alfalfa or 2 decarees of meadow for each cow, heifer, buffalo or 10 sheep but not more than 3 decarees as a total to persons who have concluded contracts to sell meat and milk, above the land used for other reasons.

Article 16. (1) The agricultural and cooperative organizations and the forestry combines organize maximum utilization of tilled lands and pastures in forested areas for producing fodder, for creating walnut, almond, hazelnut and other plantings, for improving and utilizing wild-growing trees, for enlarging the area under honey-bearing and herbal plantings, as well as creating conditions for increasing the number of tended sheep, cattle, bees and so forth.

(2) The executive committees of the people's councils together with the agricultural organizations and forestry farms annually prior to 30 March are to determine the pastures for livestock from the nationalized, private and subsidiary farms and are to take measures for their most complete utilization.

(3) Forested areas suitable for agricultural use and for pastures are not to be reforested but are to be employed for producing agricultural products by the lumbering enterprises or are to be made available through the obshtina people's councils to the public or to the subsidiary farms.

(4) Unswampy land on which poplar and other plantings have been established, after clearing are to be employed for agricultural production. For this

purpose the executive committees of the okrug people's councils together with the leadership of the forestry combines are to initiate the appropriate measures.

## Section II: Increasing Meat, Milk, Egg and Fish Production

Article 17. The executive committees of the people's councils and the leadership of the agricultural and cooperative organizations are to disclose additional resources for increasing the amount of animal products. For this purpose:

1. They are not to limit the raising of sheep and cattle by the population in mountainous areas and in population points established by the executive committees of the okrug people's councils in semimountainous areas. The number of animals which can be raised in the remaining population points is to be determined by the executive committee of the appropriate okrug people's council;

2. They are to expand the practice of having the shepherds of the collectivized flock tend their own sheep in them and the number of private sheep is to be determined by the general meeting of the appropriate agricultural organization;

3. Citizens, cooperative members and the subsidiary farms are to be provided with small livestock farms and other farming installations for producing livestock product;

4. Reservoirs and the remaining bodies of water are to be effectively employed for increasing the production of freshwater fish;

5. The processing enterprises and consumer cooperatives are to provide the population with conditions for processing in return for payment the meat, milk and other agricultural products obtained from the private farms. The conurbation systems are to set up canning shops, dairies, slaughtering houses and so forth and are to introduce a system of processing customer-supplied materials, with the products being supplied for processing, upon the request of the citizens, being delivered to them piecemeal year-round.

Article 18. The agricultural organizations, the consumer cooperatives and the appropriate other organizations are to ensure:

1. The production of the necessary animals and poultry for breeding and fattening and fish stock for satisfying the needs of the public and subsidiary farms;

2. Breeding stock for animals on the private and subsidiary farms and expanding artificial insemination of the public's agricultural animals. Insemination is to be provided gratis, with the necessary funds being provided from the budget of the appropriate people's council;



3. Standard plans for the procurement centers, buildings and structures for the tending of agricultural animals and poultry on the private and subsidiary farms and provide help in constructing them.

**Article 19. (1) The State Veterinary Affairs Association:**

1. Is to provide the necessary medicines and biologicals for prophylaxis and treatment of the agricultural animals, poultry, rabbits, freshwater fish and bees in the nationalized, private and subsidiary farms;

2. Carry out gratis the compulsory prophylactic veterinary medical measures to protect the agricultural animals and poultry in the nationalized, private and subsidiary farms.

(2) The veterinarians, zootechnicians and agronomists as well as agricultural specialists with a secondary education who service the private and subsidiary farms outside of their legally-established working time, are to be paid on the basis of an additional labor contract.

(3) The Ministry of Finances and the executive committees of the okrug people's councils annually provide the necessary funds for the gratis execution of the compulsory preventative measures.

**Article 20.** The agricultural and cooperative organizations may purchase agricultural animals for fattening from the private and subsidiary farms or sell to them for this purpose animals at maximum prices for the appropriate breeds, categories and areas, regardless of their live weight.

**Article 21. The executive committees of the people's councils:**

1. Are to organize the complete collecting, processing and utilization of waste food from the public dining system, from the enterprises of the food industry and from the public for tending and fattening pigs and other animals.

2. Together with the agricultural organizations provide herdsmen for the livestock of the public with the herdsmen being paid by the corresponding agricultural organizations.

**Article 22.** Livestock and poultry can be raised in the settlements and villa areas, with the exception of housing developments and areas occupied by multistory buildings in the capital and major cities.

**Section III: Increasing the Production of Fruits, Vegetables and Potatoes**

**Article 23.** The executive committees of the people's councils and the agricultural organizations ensure the active involvement of the public in raising vegetables, fruits and grapes. For this purpose, the agricultural organizations:

1. Organize vegetable gardens and orchards, hothouses, canning workshops and so forth for producing and processing the products through the self-sufficiency system;

2. Under contracts with members of the labor collectives, citizens, subsidiary farms and cooperative organizations they provide vegetable gardens and orchards, dessert grape vineyards, hothouses and so forth and provide them with assistance in producing agricultural product;

3. Provide help to the private and subsidiary farms in increasing the area and production of the orchards and vineyards, in carrying out the basic tilling of the land and providing planting stock against payment.

Article 24. The executive committees of the okrug people's councils establish conditions for increasing the area and production of orchards, vegetable gardens and dessert grape vineyards, in providing assistance for:

1. Organizing associations for the year-round supply of the population in the conurbation systems with fresh fruits and vegetables on the basis of introducing early, super-early, late and super-late varieties, developing solar hothouses, utilizing local thermal sources and organizing fruit storage capacity;

2. Establishing orchards and dessert grape vineyards near the population points, including on abandoned land, in entrusting their tending to enterprises, public organizations, schools and so forth;

3. The planting of fruit trees along roads, railway lines, farm yards and in population points.

Article 25. The agricultural organizations may permit citizens participating in the harvesting of fruits and vegetables to purchase the quantities they require for personal needs.

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Article 27. The executive committees of the people's councils together with the Varietal Seed and Planting Stock Economic Trust provide the following:

1. Sufficient quantities of seed and planting stock for all varieties and types of vegetables, fruits and grapes. Through the sale of early and late varieties they are to extend the period of the production and consumption of fruits and vegetables in a fresh state;

2. The opening of new stores and temporary points for selling vegetable and grape planting stock and seed for the private and subsidiary farms, in more fully utilizing the store network of the cooperatives and other trade organizations. Seed is to be sold without varietal exchange, in small batches, with labels showing the variety and with brief instructions for raising the crops.

Article 28. The agricultural organizations, the consumer cooperatives and the procurement organizations are to provide help to the producers in increasing the production of fruits and vegetables by:

1. Farming measures;
2. Economic help for encouraging the producers of fruits and vegetables;
3. Opening procurement points in the population points and organizing the procurement of fruits and vegetables from households.

Article 29. Enterprises from the chemical industry and the Agrochemical Services Economic Organization are to provide the necessary fertilizers and chemicals for plant protection in a packaged form for satisfying the needs of the private and subsidiary farms. The producer plants are to carry out the packaging with indications as to the dose and the method of employment.

Article 30. The Council for Agriculture and Forestry under the Council of Ministers is to coordinate the following:

1. A study of the needs of the population and subsidiary farms for hand equipment, farm tools, and implements and so forth;
2. Provide production and importing of farm implements for the private and subsidiary farms and a full supply of hand equipment;
3. Organize the servicing of the hand equipment in the conurbation systems, including in cooperation with the machine-tractor stations and the agricultural organizations.

Article 31. (1) The executive committees of the okrug people's councils are to organize the establishing of dairy and fruit-vegetable areas for satisfying the needs of the population in Sofia and the other major industrial and tourist centers.

(2) The organizing of the dairy and fruit and vegetable areas should involve the self-managing economic organizations on the territory of the appropriate okruga with the providing of plans, investments, manpower and other resources.

#### Chapter Four: Procurement, Processing and Sale of Agricultural Products

Article 32. (1) The product produced for self-sufficiency of the population within the consumption standards is to be purchased and sold on the territory of the corresponding conurbation system by the agricultural organizations and consumer cooperatives through their own store network, the cooperative markets and by commission trade. For this purpose, they are also to employ the stores in the trade network for handling agricultural products in a fresh and processed state.

(2) When the conurbation system does not have processing capacity, the agricultural products produced for the self-sufficiency of the population, on the basis of concluded contracts, are to be processed by enterprises outside

the conurbation system with the obligation of returning the finished product to meet the needs of the population.

Article 33. The executive committees of the people's councils and municipalities organize the following:

1. Production and supply of the population on their territory with bread, meat and meat products, natural fruit, vegetable and other juices as well as the repairing and opening of small- and medium-sized enterprises such as bakeries, dairies, creameries, slaughterhouses, pastry shops and production lines for natural juices and non-alcoholic beverages;

2. Cooperative markets meeting modern requirements;

3. Stronger supervision over observance of maximum prices for the seasons and periods.

Article 34. (1) Self-sufficiency products sold in the stores of producers are to be sold at the current retail price corresponding to the type and category of the trade installations.

(2) For the sold agricultural products which are own-produced or purchased from the public for self-sufficiency purposes under the previous paragraph, the producers receive surcharges on the purchase prices, bonuses and subsidies under the procedure governing products purchased for centralized stocks.

#### Chapter Five: Participation of Citizens in the Production of Agricultural Self-Sufficiency Products

Article 35. The agricultural and cooperative organizations may conclude supplementary labor and other contracts according to the Labor Code and other enforceable enactments for the production of agricultural products by the public.

Article 36. (1) In-kind bonuses of concentrated fodder in return for the purchased product from the private and subsidiary farms are to be provided at the prices for the agricultural organizations and standards according to Appendix No. 2.

(2) The necessary grain for the in-kind bonuses as of 1 August 1987 is to be provided:

1. By the agricultural and cooperative organizations which provide their own feed on a contractual basis to the citizens for the production of meat, milk and eggs according to the self-sufficiency plan;

2. From the state feed balance for the purchased livestock products for the centralized stocks.



(3) In concluding a procurement contract an advance of 30 percent of the grain due according to the standard is provided with the advance rising to 50 percent in the mountainous and semi-mountainous areas. The remaining amount is provided steadily within the agreed-upon time.

(4) At the request of the farmers the unsold fodder for purchased agricultural products is paid for at treble the state prices for sale to the public.

Article 37. With the non-procurement or non-delivery of the contracted-for agricultural products as well as with insufficient fodder at certain times, the agricultural and cooperative organizations and citizens pay penalties or compensation for the harm and losses caused and for the missed income, if this is greater than the fines.

Article 38. Citizens who have concluded contracts for the production of agricultural products have the right to receive land for personal use, vacation vouchers, food in dining rooms and other benefits under conditions stipulated by the general meetings of the agricultural organizations.

#### Chapter Six: Private and Subsidiary Farms

Article 39. (1) A private farm is a continuation of the nationalized or socialized farm and is employed as a form for the active involvement of the public in the production of agricultural products through the self-sufficiency system.

(2) The private farm is an subsidiary farm of the cooperative members, industrial workers, white collar workers and pensioners from agroindustrial complexes and other agricultural organizations and is developed as a form for organizing the additional production of agricultural products for more completely meeting the needs of the public in the conurbation systems, and employing the labor of the household members and land provided for private use, without impeding their regular involvement in the work of the nationalized farm.

(3) The private farms can also be made available to industrial workers, white collar personnel and pensioners not employed in agriculture and who own their own land or to whom land is provided for use under the established procedure as well as those who raise livestock and poultry for their own requirements or for sale.

(4) It is prohibited to employ hired labor under any form whatsoever on a private farm.

Article 40. Subsidiary farms are established upon a decision of the labor collective under an enterprise, institution, school, military unit and so forth for the production and self-sufficiency of agricultural products for the labor collectives. They are an inseparable part of the self-sufficiency system.

Article 41. (1) The subsidiary farms must provide as a total for the conurbation system at least 50 percent of the meat, fruits and vegetables necessary for the worker dining rooms.

(2) The self-managing economic organizations develop and extend the activities of the subsidiary farms, in employing modern production methods and an efficient organization of labor in the aim of satisfying the needs of the worker and employee families for agricultural products.

(3) The production of livestock products on the subsidiary farms is organized by using waste food from industry, commercial food and from the public as well as from the production of own fodder from provided land.

Article 42. (1) In organizational terms the subsidiary farms are established as:

1. Independent farms under separate enterprises, organizations and institutions;
2. Associations of the enterprises, organizations, institutions and so forth;
3. Cooperative farms.

(2) The subsidiary farms are granted land according to the established procedure depending upon the size of the labor collectives. The self-sufficiency commissions in the conurbation systems periodically assess the employment of the land provided to the subsidiary farms and take measures for its efficient utilization.

#### Chapter Seven: Cooperative Organizations

Article 43. Cooperative organizations may undertake activities in the self-sufficiency area regardless of the area of their activities, in:

1. Producing agricultural products on land, small farms and so forth provided by the agricultural organizations;
2. Build livestock farms, sheds, hothouses and so forth for producing agricultural product;
3. Assist in organizing the production of all types of agricultural products on the private farm and provide direct help in supplying the producers with planting stock, vegetable sets, seed, polyethylene film, tools, in performing services with agricultural equipment, building hothouses and so forth;
4. On a contractual basis participate with capital investments in the joint construction along with the agricultural organizations of orchards, vineyards, vegetable gardens and livestock farms in return for payment from the products produced by them;

5. Utilize various forms for encouraging the producers in purchasing high-quality, labor intensive and high-demand fruits and vegetables;

6. Organize the packaging and making up in common packages for the individual crops chemicals sold to the public with instructions as to the method of their application;

7. Produce in their own hatcheries chicks for sale to the public, with the Poultry Raising Economic Trust providing the necessary eggs for propagation on a contractual basis;

8. Together with the Union of Beekeepers they organize the production and on a contractual basis with the producers purchase bee honey and other honey products and supply the beekeepers with hives and tools; with money they help the Union of Beekeepers in expanding and improving the bee foraging areas, in supplying bee hives and wax combs, in breeding and melioration work, the production of queen bees and other measures for the development of beekeeping;

9. They organize independently or in cooperation with other enterprises and organizations the processing of the agricultural products for the self-sufficiency of the population in the conurbation systems.

#### Chapter Eight: Functions and Tasks of the Self-Sufficiency Commissions

Article 44. (1) The Self-Sufficiency Commission under the Council for Agriculture and Forestry of the Council of Ministers as a state-social body:

1. Provides procedural leadership, coordination and supervision over the fulfillment of government decisions on the questions of the self-sufficiency of the population;

2. Procedurally directs the okrug self-sufficiency commissions;

3. Adopts decisions and takes measures to provide the necessary resources for achieving the per capita consumption standards in the okrugs;

4. Participates in working out the national consumption standards and in their differentiation by okrugs.

(2) The decisions of the Self-Sufficiency Commission within the limits of its competence are obligatory for the appropriate bodies and organizations.

(3) The membership of the Self-Sufficiency Commission is determined by the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Article 45. (1) The okrug self-sufficiency commissions are state-public bodies of the executive committees of the okrug people's councils and are led by the chairmen of the executive committees. Their membership is determined by the executive committees of the okrug people's councils. Their decisions within the limits of their competence are obligatory for the organizations and bodies on the okrug territory.

(2) The okrug self-sufficiency commissions carry out the functions under the previous article on the okrug territory.

Article 46. (1) The obshtina self-sufficiency commissions are state-public bodies of the executive committees of the obshtina people's councils and are led by the chairmen of the executive committees. Their membership is determined by the executive committees of the obshtina people's councils.

(2) The obshtina self-sufficiency commissions:

1. Assist the agricultural and cooperative organizations and the other socialist organizations in producing agricultural products and in carrying out other tasks under the self-sufficiency system;

2. Together with the leadership of the agricultural organizations they assist in allocating abandoned and low-productive land;

3. They assist in settling disputes which arise on carrying out the contracts between the citizens and the procurement organizations.

Article 47. The National Agroindustrial Union Association assists in the development of the self-sufficiency system in pooling the resources and coordinating the efforts of its members.

Article 48. The Fatherland Front committees and organizations on the spot are to take an even more active part in carrying out the tasks of establishing the self-sufficiency system. The public is to be involved in an evermore massive manner in producing more of the agricultural products from the socialized and private farms. For this purpose:

1. They are to carry out more specific explanatory, propaganda and organizational work with the public in the places of residence for producing vegetables and fruits and for tending agricultural animals;

2. They are to assist in the actual resolution of producer problems according to the requirements of this decree and the concluded contract;

3. Together with the councils for agriculture, forestry and water management under the okrug people's councils, with the leadership of the agricultural organizations, the trade unions, Komsomol and other organizations, they are to propagandize and popularize scientific-technical innovations as well as achievements and experience of the agricultural pacesetters, they are to organize and hold competitions, social reviews, as well as meetings for the study and exchange of positive experience;

4. They are to exercise permanent public supervision over the application of this decree and over the extensive preventive and indoctrinational organizational work among the public in order to prevent deviations from the socialist essence, principles and requirements of the public self-sufficiency system;



5. Periodically, jointly with the people's councils, the agricultural and other organizations, they are to make inspections and reports on the fulfillment of the decree.

Article 49. The Management Council of the Bulgarian People's Agrarian Union, the Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth League are to organize extensive explanatory and organizational work for involving the public in the self-sufficiency system and for increasing the production of meat, milk, fish, fruit, vegetables and other products. Self-sufficiency for the populus is to be turned into a concern of all the people.

Article 50. It is recommended that the mass information media systematically inform the public of the fulfillment of the self-sufficiency plans for the conurbation systems.

#### Supplementary Provision

Section 1. (1) Whoever violates the provisions of this decree is to be punished by a fine of up to 200 leva according to Article 32 of the Law Governing Administrative Violations and Punishments.

(2) Violations are established by statements drawn up by the bodies of the people's councils and by the corresponding control bodies why punitive rulings are issued by the chairmen of the executive committees of the people's councils or by officials empowered by them.

(3) The establishing of violations, the issuing, contesting and fulfillment of punitive enactments are carried out according to the procedure set out by the Law Governing Administrative Violations and Punishments.

#### Concluding Provisions

Section 2. Repealed is the Decree No. 11 of the Council of Ministers of 1982 (promulgated in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, No 22, 1982; amended and supplemented in No 99 of 1984).

Section 3. Amended and supplemented is Article 33 of the Directive Governing Credit Activities of the State Savings Bank (promulgated in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, No 79 of 1978; amended in No 94 of 1979, No 72, 86 and 100 of 1980; No 91 of 1981; No 70 of 1983; No 36 of 1984, No 3 of 1985 and No 56 of 1986) as follows:

1. The words "and bee hives" should be added to Point 2 of Section 1.
2. In Paragraph 2 the number "2000" is to be replaced by "3000."

Section 4. In Paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the Decree No. 30 of the Council of Ministers of 1985 (DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, No 48, 1985) the words "Article 15, Paragraph 1, Point 2 and Paragraph 2 of the Decree No. 11 of the Council of Ministers of 1982" are to be replaced by "Article 11, Paragraph 2, Point 2 and

Article 15 of Decree No. 26 of the Council of Ministers and the National Fatherland Front Council of 1987."

Section 5. The Council on Agriculture and Forestry under the Council of Ministers is to provide instructions on the application of this decree.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers  
Georgia Atanasov  
Chairman of the National Fatherland Front Council  
Pencho Kubadinski

#### Appendix No. 2 to Article 36, Paragraph 1

#### In-Kind Bonuses of Concentrated Fodder for Animals, Poultry and Livestock Products Sold to Procurement Organizations by Private and Subsidiary Farms

Indicators	In-Kind Bonus per Unit of Product (kg)		
	Total Amount	Including	
		Grain	Mixes
I. Per kg of meat on the hoof			
1. Pork	4.0	2.4	1.6
2. Poultry	2.5	x	2.5
3. Lamb, kid and weaned lamb	2.0	2.0	x
4. Veal	1.5	1.5	x
5. Sheep, goat, cow and buffalo	1.0	1.0	x
6. Rabbit	2.5	0.5	2.0
7. Small piglets up to 20 kg	5.0	1.0	4.0
II. By number			
1. Pullets before egg laying	10.0	x	10.0
2. Month-old chicks	1.0	x	1.0
III. Per liter of milk with 3.6 percent fat	0.3	0.3	x
IV. Per egg			
1. Free-ranging	0.150	x	0.150
2. Raised in cages	0.200	x	0.200

Note. Grain fodder for lambs, kids and weaned lambs as of 1 January 1987 is gratis.

## COMMUNICATIONS, POWER ENGINEERING ASSOCIATIONS CREATED

Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian No 38, 19 May 87 pp 3-6

[Orders No. 34 and 35 of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of 4 May 1987 Governing the Formation of the Communications and Power Engineering Associations]

[Text] ORDER NO. 34 OF THE BUREAU OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF 4 MAY 1987 GOVERNING THE FORMATION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION AND THE CONVERSION OF COMBINES AND ENTERPRISES

The Bureau of the Council of Ministers Orders:

1. As of 1 May 1987, the Communications Association is to be organized with headquarters in Sofia for carrying out a uniform development, production, investment and market policy and for coordinating the activities of its members and for:

a) Establishing conditions for a rapid transition to qualitatively new communications services in the national economy and for the public with high reliability, uninterruptedness, quality and level of services;

b) For more fully satisfying the nation's needs for communications services in the conurbation systems and the major economic centers and facilities;

c) For the study, transfer and introduction of integrated systems, information-communications and "humanless" technologies into communications, scientific and information services;

d) Employing new forms of communications management with the active involvement of the consumers and with the extensive employment of the state-public principle;

e) The establishing of conditions for eliminating the departmental limitations along the entire chain from the primary production units to the association, in reconciling the interests of the state and the consumers with the interests of the self-managing economic member organizations.

2. The Communications Association, in addition to the state functions granted to it under the Law Governing Communications, on the basis of Article 24,

Paragraph 1 of the Regulation Governing Economic Activities, is to also carry out the following state functions.

a) Exercises specialized supervision over the functioning of the national communications system and communications activity;

b) Coordinates and supervises the elaboration and fulfillment of the national specific communications program;

c) Participates in the activities of the specialized international organization in the communications area and of which Bulgaria is a member;

d) Organizes the training and retraining of executive and leadership personnel, including by setting up its own schools under the established procedure as well as the final degree in the training of the students.

3. The organizations according to the appendix participate in the association as basic members.

4. The Communications Association plans, forms and distributes its income on a centralized basis and makes tax and other payments to the state budget.

5. As of 1 May 1987, the Council for the Producers and Consumers of Communications Services and Facilities is to be established as an ancillary body of the association's management council with a chairman who is also chairman of the Communications Association.

6. As of 1 May 1987, the following conversions are to be made:

a) The Sofia Telephone and Telegraph Stations Combine is to become the Sofia Telephone and Telegraph Communications Economic Combine [SK] as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and the following range of activities: telephone and telegraph services, applied scientific activities, technical operations, maintenance and repair and reconstruction work on telephone and telegraph communications and the data transmission network in Sofia;

b) The Sofia Postal Communications Combine is to become the Sofia Postal Communications Economic Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: postal services, applied scientific activities, technical operations, maintenance and repair-reconstruction work on postal communications in Sofia;

c) The Radio and Television Combine is to become the Radio and Television Economic Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: radio and television services, applied scientific and engineering activities, technical operations, maintenance and repair and reconstruction work on the radio and television transmitters and relay stations in the nation, as well as radio relay and space communications links;

d) The Telekomplekt [Teleset] Combine is to become the Telekomplekt Economic Trust as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the



following activities: applied scientific, design activities; material-technical supply, production, engineering and trade activities in the nation and abroad;

e) The okrug communications enterprises in the okrug communications economic combines as legal entities with headquarters in all the okrug cities and concerned with the following activities: postal, telephone and telegraph services; applied scientific activities; technical operations, maintenance and repair-reconstruction work in the area of postal, telephone and telegraph communications, the data transmission network and the wire loudspeaker system.

7. As of 1 May 1987, the Center for the Electronization and New Technology of Communications is to be established as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: development and introduction of electronic systems in the communications area. The center is to be formed on the basis of the Electronic Computer Center under the Communications Economic Trust.

8. The Communications Economic Trust is to halt its operations on 30 April 1987. The assets and liabilities shown on the balance sheet on 30 April 1987, as well as the other rights and obligations of the Communications Economic Trust are to be taken over by the Communications Association with the agreement of this association.

[as published]

10. The newly formed economic combines and enterprises are to assume, respectively, the assets and liabilities shown on the balance sheet as of 30 April 1987 as well as the other rights and obligations of the organizations on the basis of which they are formed.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers:  
Georgi Atanasov  
Chief Secretary of the Council of Ministers:  
Ivan Shpatov

#### Appendix to Point 3

#### Organizations Which Are the Basic Members of the Communications Association

1. The Sofia Telephone and Telegraph Communications SK in Sofia. 2. The Sofia Postal Communications SK in Sofia. 3. The Radio and Television SK in Sofia. 4. The Telekomplekt SO [Economic Trust] in Sofia. 5. The okrug communications economic combines. 6. The Press Distribution Enterprise in Sofia. 7. The Mobile Post Offices Enterprise in Sofia. 8. The Cable Line System Enterprise in Sofia. 9. The Loudspeaker and Sound System Enterprise in Sofia. 10. The Departmental Motor Vehicle Transport Enterprise in Sofia. 11. The Industrial and Repair Communications Enterprise in Ruse. 12. The Bulgarian Philately and Numismatics Enterprise in Sofia. 13. The Center for Electronization and New Technology in Communications in Sofia. 14. The Communications Scientific

Research Institute in Sofia. 15. The Communications Control Inspectorate in Sofia.

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**ORDER NO. 35 OF THE BUREAU OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF 4 MAY 1987 CONCERNING THE FORMATION OF THE POWER ENGINEERING ASSOCIATION AND THE FORMATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMIC TRUSTS, ECONOMIC COMBINES AND INSTITUTES**

The Bureau of the Council of Ministers Orders:

1. As of 1 May 1987, the Power Engineering Association is to be formed with headquarters in Sofia for carrying out a uniform technological, production, investment and market policy in the area of power engineering and for coordinating the activities of its members to achieve efficient production as well as the economic and rational utilization of energy and fuel and effective management of the unified power system.

2. In addition to its functions under the Law Governing the Electric System, Article 23 of the Regulation Governing Economic Activities and the Regulation Governing State Power Control in Bulgaria (promulgated in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK, No 72 of 1984; amended, No 49 of 1985 and No 56 of 1986), the Power Engineering Association also carries out the following state functions:

a) Cooperation of the power system with the unified power systems of the CEMA member nations as well as the power systems of other countries;

b) Coordination and supervision over the elaboration and fulfillment of national programs for the efficient utilization of power and fuel;

c) Carries out under the order of the competent state body a controlled system of electric power consumption.

3. It recommends that the organizations, according to the Appendix, participate in the association as basic members.

4. The Power Engineering Association in 1987 on a centralized basis forms and distributes income and makes tax and other payments to the budget for the economic associations, economic combines and enterprises under Section II of the Appendix.

5. As of 1 May 1987, the Council of Producers and Consumers of Electric Power, Thermal Energy and Coal is to be established as a state-public body. The council is to periodically discuss the state, needs and prospects for the development of the production and efficient consumption of energy and fuel and of the optimum satisfying of the nation's requirements. The membership of the council is to be determined by the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

6. The following organizations are to be transformed as of 1 May 1987:

a) The Elektroizgrazhdane [Electric Construction] Combine is to be turned into the Elektroizgrazhdane Economic Trust [SO] as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: organizing applied scientific, design, production, commercial and engineering activities in the nation and abroad in the area of building, modernizing and repairing the power transmission networks;

b) The Minstroy [Mine Construction] Combine into the Minstroy Economic Trust as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: organizing applied scientific, design, production, commercial and engineering activities in the nation and abroad in the area of mine construction;

c) The Energoremont [Power Repair] Combine into the Energoremont Economic Trust as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: the organizing of applied scientific, design, production and commercial activities in carrying out basic and emergency repairs at electric plants and producing spare parts and non-standard equipment in the nation and abroad;

d) The Industrial Power Combine into the Industrial Power Economic Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: organizing applied scientific, design, production, construction-installation, service, commercial and engineering activities in the nation and abroad in the area of industrial power;

e) The Tekhenergo [Energy Technology] Combine into the Tekhenergo Economic Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: organizing applied scientific, design, production, commercial and engineering activities in the nation and abroad in the area of the rationalization, automation and modernization of production processes in power engineering;

f) The Energoproekt [Power Design] Institute into the Energoproekt Scientific Research and Engineering Institute as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: the organizing of scientific research, design, commercial and engineering activities in the nation and abroad in the area of the production, conversion and transmission of electric and thermal power; power equipment for the integrated automation of production processes and the conversion to unmanned production methods;

g) The Minproekt [Mining Design] Institute into the Minproekt Scientific Research and Engineering Institute as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: the organizing of scientific research, design, commercial and engineering activity in the nation and abroad in the area of the mining, processing and briquetting of coal; equipment for full mechanization and automation and integrated systems for controlling the production processes;

h) The Energoavtomatizatsiya [Power Automation] Enterprise into the Energokibernetika [Power Cybernetics] Center for the Electronization of Power Engineering as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: organizing applied scientific, design, production, commercial and engineering activities in the nation and abroad in the area of energy informatics, electronization and full automation of production processes and control in power engineering;

i) The Nuclear Power Combine into the Nuclear Power Economic Trust as a legal entity with headquarters in Kozloduy and concerned with the following activities: organizing applied scientific activities in improving the operation of nuclear power plants and the production of electric and thermal energy and heat supply;

j) The Maritsa-Iztok Combine into the Maritsa-Iztok Economic Trust as a legal entity with headquarters in Radnevo and concerned with the following activities: the mining of coal; the production of briquettes, electric and thermal power; organizing applied scientific activities on the use of low-calorie coals;

k) The Bobov Dol Combine into the Bobov Dol Economic Mining and Power Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Bobov Dol and concerned with the following activities: the mining and processing of coal and the production of electric power;

l) The Georgi Dimitrov Combine into the Georgi Dimitrov Economic Mining and Power Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Pernik and concerned with the following activities: the mining and processing of coal and the production of electric and thermal power;

m) The Marishki Baseyn [Maritsa Basin] Combine into the Marishki Baseyn Economic Mining and Power Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Dimitrograd and concerned with the following activities: coal mining; production of electric and thermal power;

n) The Balkanski Baseyn [Balkan Basin] Combine into the Balkanski Baseyn Economic and Mining Power Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Sliven and concerned with the following activities: mining and processing of coal; production of electric and thermal power;

o) The Energoproizvodstvo [Power Production] Combine in Sofia into the Economic Power Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: production of electric and thermal power and thermal supply;

p) The Energoproizvodstvo Combine in Plovdiv into the Economic Power Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Plovdiv and concerned with the following activities: production of electric and thermal power and thermal supply;

q) The Energoproizvodstvo Combine in Varna into the Economic Power Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Varna and concerned with the following activities: production of electric and thermal power and thermal supply;



r) The Energoproizvodstvo Combine in Ruse into the Economic Power Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Ruse and concerned with the following activities: production of electric and thermal power and thermal supply;

s) The Elektrosnabdyavane [Electric Supply] Combine in Sofia into the Economic Power Supply Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: transmission, transforming and distribution of electric power;

t) The Elektrosnabdyavane Combine in Pleven into the Economic Power Supply Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Pleven and concerned with the following activities: production, transmission, transformation and distribution of electric and thermal power;

u) The Elektrosnabdyavane Combine in Gorna Oryakhovitsa into the Economic Power Supply Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Gorna Oryakhovitsa and concerned with the following activities: production, transmission, transformation and distribution of electric and thermal power;

v) The Elektrosnabdyavane Combine in Varna into the Economic Power Supply Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Varna and concerned with the following activities: production, transmission, transformation and distribution of electric and thermal power;

w) The Elektrosnabdyavane Combine in Stara Zagora into the Economic Power Supply Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Stara Zagora and concerned with the following activities: production, transmission, transformation and distribution of electric and thermal power;

x) The Elektrosnabdyavane Combine in Plovdiv into the Economic Power Supply Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Plovdiv and concerned with the following activities: transmission, transformation and distribution of electric power;

y) The Sofia Okrug Electric Supply Combine into the Okrug Power Supply Economic Combine as a legal entity with headquarters in Sofia and concerned with the following activities: production, transmission, transformation and distribution of electric and thermal power.

7. As of 30 April 1978, the Power Engineering Economic Trust ceases to exist.

8. The Power Engineering Association with its agreement assumes the assets and liabilities of the Power Engineering Economic Trust as of 30 April 1987, as well as its other rights and obligations.

[as published]

11. The workers and white collar personnel from the converted combines and enterprises and who on legal grounds received additional remuneration may continue to receive these.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers:  
Georgiy Atanasov  
Chief Secretary of the Council of Ministers:  
Ivan Shpatov

Appendix to Point 3

## BASIC MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS OF THE POWER ENGINEERING ASSOCIATION

### Section I

1. The Elektroizgrazhdane SO in Sofia. 2. The Minstroy SO in Sofia. 3. The Energoremont SO in Sofia. 4. The Industrial Power Engineering SK in Sofia. 5. The Tekhenergo SK in Sofia. 6. The Energoproekt Scientific Research and Engineering Institute in Sofia. 7. The Minproekt Scientific Research and Engineering Institute in Sofia. 8. The Energokibernetika Center for Electronization of Power Engineering in Sofia. 9. The Energoimpeks Commercial Enterprise in Sofia.

### Section II

1. The Nuclear Power SO in Kozloduy. 2. The Maritsa-Iztok SO in Radnevo. 3. The Bobov Dol Economic Mining and Power Combine in Bobov Dol. 4. The Georgiy Dimitrov Economic Mining and Power Combine in Pernik. 5. The Marishki Baseyn Economic Mining and Power Combine in Dimitrovgrad. 6. The Balkanski Baseyn Economic Mining and Power Combine in Sliven. 7. The Economic Power Combine in Sofia. 8. The Economic Power Combine in Plovdiv. 9. The Economic Power Combine in Varna. 10. The Economic Power Combine in Ruse. 11. The Economic Supply Combine in Sofia. 12. The Economic Power Supply Combine in Pleven. 13. The Economic Power Supply Combine in Gorna Oryakhovitsa. 14. The Economic Power Supply Combine in Varna. 15. The Economic Power Supply Combine in Stara Zagora. 16. The Economic Power Supply Combine in Plovdiv. 17. The Okrug Power Supply SK in Sofia. 18. The Pirin Mining Enterprise in the village of Brezhani, Blagoevgrad Okrug. 19. The Rila Hydropower Enterprise in Sofia. 20. The Nuclear Power Investment Enterprise in Belene. 21. The Thermal Power Systems Investment Enterprise in Sofia. 22. The Transformer Station and Electric Wire Investment Enterprise in Sofia. 23. The Dobrudzha Coal Deposit Investment Enterprise in Sofia. 24. The Hydropower Installation Investment Enterprise in Sestrimo, Pazardzhik Okrug. 25. The Reservoirs and Hydropower Plant Enterprise in Sofia. 26. The Emergency Facilities in Pernik.

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CSO: 2200/104

## PRICING AS INDISPENSABLE PART OF RESTRUCTURING DISCUSSED

Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech No 22, 1987 p 3

[Article by Eng Jan Klak, Technical Economic Research Institute of the Consumer Industry, Prague: "Prices an Integral Part of Restructuring"]

[Text] The economically key problem of forming and coordinating the development of price levels has so far not been adequately addressed in Principles of Restructuring the Economic Mechanism and Rules for Managing Experimenting Production Units in the matter of preparing other instruments of management so that the initial euphoria experienced in the sector of economic price setting has given way to considerable perplexity. Some production managers do not fully realize how complicated in the course of development the system of interface relationships has become in the mechanism of the national economy and that at the given time actually every economic system is considered a formal link between the price tender of goods and disposable income in a relatively balanced state (the quality of this balance, however, is not under discussion). From these facts there follows the practical impossibility of making a radical change in economic conditions strictly in a local area of the replacement process or a change in management instruments which is partial and de facto infringes on correlation with other instruments.

#### Risks of Local Changes

In recent years there has been a marked tendency to depart from a production type of wholesale pricing based on calculation of production costs toward setting prices in recognition of market conditions for goods transactions. These are the prime methods of price setting based on the use of market conditions: deriving wholesale prices by foreign price relations, deriving wholesale prices from export prices, and deriving wholesale prices from retail prices. These methods of setting prices can substantially simplify in light industry the very complicated system of calculating prices by means of price norms and can help make price setting more flexible.

On the other hand, it must be said that economic conditions of replacement production abroad are often diametrically different from domestic conditions and simply transferring the relations or conditions from abroad

cannot automatically standardize, rationalize or regulate the internal economic balance. It is far more likely that mechanically bringing foreign elements into the economic organism will upset the existing "balance" of the internal market, leading in extreme cases, to changes in the accepted basis of economic functions. As a typical example we can cite some findings from the experimenting VKhJs [economic production units].

In the initial phase of the experiment the employees of these organizations effectively requested free setting of prices based on agreements between the producer and the purchaser (commercial organizations). It was overlooked as immaterial that the turnover tax schedule prescribed that products with a negative tax - in case they fall into the category of prices set by agreement - be subject to a turnover tax rate in the amount of 0 percent. The loss of state allocation which the negative tax represents in this case clearly changes retail prices and market specifications of certain kinds of utility galssware, ceramics and textile products. This may, as a consequence, cause considerable economic hardship to individual producers.

An entirely new problem of price setting which is appearing in connection with the experiment is the potential emergence of different levels of wholesale or retail prices within a single production sector. The experimenting organizations in going over to the new method of setting prices are quite automatically establishing a new level of wholesale prices for their products more or less distinct from the level of other producers in a given sector who--insofar as the rules of the experiment do not relate likewise to them--are obliged to maintain their original price level. This form of "preference" and "discrimination" of production units can rapidly form new economic relationships in local areas which the general system of management of the national economy is not adequately prepared to control and regulate.

#### The Need for a Comprehensive Concept

I consider it necessary to again emphasize that the present economic balance represents a complex of very complicated relationships which developed independently over the years. In addition to differentiated rates or different turnover taxes, acting as further stabilizing factors, is an extensive system of direct state allocations and interventions and a range of material input with state regulation of prices. This complex can be violated only with great difficulty in isolated cases and at the same time consistently maintain economic independence and implement full khozraschet at the experimenting units.

From the facts cited it follows that in addition to the problem of continuous updating of standard elements for preparing pricing calculations and the necessary data on the level, relationships and structure of prices abroad, there appears in this area as a prime problem the need to form a new, economically comprehensive concept of state management of prices, continually coordinated with other management instruments of the national economy. In my opinion this concept cannot be applied



successfully in locally confined economic units but rather totally, with timely coordination and in proportion to the whole economy.

The state-wide plan for price development in 1988 included in its initial stage implementation in the majority of basic production sectors of light industry. As the basis for calculating new wholesale prices the original method used the cost plan of 1986 with projection of the progress of cost development to 1988.

The costs that determined the calculation of wholesale prices in 1988 were based on the restructuring method adjusted for depreciation. This resulted in a considerable reduction in the amount of depreciation in light industry because of deviation from prescribed coefficients in the use of capital assess. The impact on costs from this entitlement in light industry organizations of the CSR alone amounted to about Kcs 1.4 billion.

In connection with non-adherence to prescribed levels in the use of capital assets, just as in the case of depreciation, the value of production assets was also reduced which served as the basis for the amount of profit. The profit deficit when compared with the non-reduced base of production assets projected in prices came to almost Kcs 1.1 billion for light industry in the CSR. There were other profit reductions at some VPIs as the result of poor export efficiency.

Compared with other branches of the national economy, light industry has available a limited and considerably outdated base of production assets, especially capital assets. In spite of the fact that in the 1988 plan for price development a differentiated standard range of profit was stipulated for individual branches relative to preferential branches of the consumer industry, in my opinion this difference is not sufficient and works to stabilize the present enduring bloc, accenting the dominant role of national economic group A.

For the MP [ministry of industry] department of the CSP the government approved adjustment of the cost plans for 1987 and the need to raise the appraised value of labor in cost and price calculations (so-called parafiscal) as well as other reasons led pricing agencies to decide to initiate another stage in restructuring wholesale prices in light industry and to request new calculations in view of the changed conditions.

In practice, this means canceling in a number of production sectors already issued 1988 wholesale price lists and in a short time again preparing timely and administratively very difficult calculations of new wholesale prices (the final deadline for the finished goods production sector of light industry is 30 June 1988).

#### The Ideology of Price Adjustments

Under these circumstances it is essential to again consider critically the whole philosophy of price restructuring and consequently its intent and purpose. It is generally known that the original restructuring

objective was to achieve, after more than 20 years of increasing costs and prices (the overall index of wholesale prices in industry for 1985/1965 was 1.899; CSSR Statistical Year book for 1968 - 1986), a reduction of wholesale prices on a statewide average of more than 10 percent. The planned price reduction is to bring the level of Czechoslovak prices closer to prices on foreign markets and thereby open the possibility of projecting the level of world prices into our economy. In addition, the reduction in prices was to be a tool to bring pressure on savings in production costs in the organizations themselves.

However, two material existing circumstances are not being taken into account:

- the differences in the technical, quality and organizational provisions of the production process and consequent differences in labor productivity and costs between Czechoslovak and modern foreign products will not change with an adjustment of prices;
- the fact that administratively reduced prices (viz reduction of depreciation or unreal cost plans) do not mean a reduction in actual nationally necessary costs of production and the need for full reimbursement for resources expended will exist to an undiminished extent as a basic requirement for simple replacement in the form of costs, regardless of the wishes or expectations of economic entities.

The differences in the level of labor productivity and economic conditions of exchange between production in industrially developed countries and the Czechoslovak economy can be seen, among other ways, in the comparative export indicators contrasting economic conditions of production with those conditions abroad. To illustrate the situation it suffices to take as the basis comparative price indicators used as the limits for adjusting profits in the methodology of the plan for wholesale prices in 1988. According to this methodology, in the light and wood-processing industries comparative price indicators in intervals of 81 - 90 were considered sufficiently efficient for export to nonsocialist countries; for socialist countries the range is 19 - 105 (the standard range of profit is not reduced for this effectiveness). In actual practice the comparative indicator of 0.85 of the wholesale price represents the limit of production costs in most production sectors, in other words, the limit for simple replacement.

In production under such conditions, however, not only is the profit of the producer irretrievably lost but also all other product residuals (turnover tax) serving as a basic source of net capital formation and to cover national requirements. At the same time the materiality of the instrument used for converting foreign costs to internal costs (VRCV) is not so important. Higher franco prices of exports obtained through any adjustment of this instrument will automatically also mean higher import prices and consequently higher production costs and pressure to increase wholesale prices. The result is a closed circle.

If we return to the demand to carry over the level of prices on world markets into the Czechoslovak economy there would ensue, in view of the

actual results of export efficiency, apparently a relatively rapid liquidation of a number of domestic production sectors and consequently (providing the comparative price indicator for the whole national economy is not in intervals of at least 130 to 150) a complete economic disintegration. The protective policies of not only developing countries but the majority of industrially advanced countries are, therefore, quite proper. The originally planned reduction in the level of wholesale prices by more than 10 percent would, of course, to the eye, improve the efficiency of exports up to now.

### The Effect of Implementing Provisions

Efficiency of foreign exchange created by a one-time planning action is a highly dangerous illusion about our own abilities in competition. Moreover, the scheme to reduce prices has a paradoxical effect, given the situation that economic development in the majority of industrially advanced countries has for decades shown constantly increasing costs and prices.

An example of overall reduction of production costs and prices could perhaps be applied over a long term in a completely isolated and absolutely self-sufficient economic system. Here, these tendencies were pursued in connection with the restructuring of the national economy in the second half of the fifties. However, this kind of development was fairly quickly overcome in economic practice and subsequently abandoned. The deciding reason, among others, was the fact that the Czechoslovak economy is a typical example of an open economy which has a real chance to exist only in a system associated with international division of labor. But then it is necessarily subject to all the influences that arise from this fact.

Economic units with planned reduction of prices based on an "ordered" level of costs will, in all likelihood, retain intact the actual amount of all remaining cost items except for material input. Essentially, the need to finance the replacement of capital assets, especially where imports are involved, the payment of overhead, etc., will remain the same (or likewise unsatisfied) regardless of the ideology behind the restructuring. Insofar as production organizations will cover their needs from the results of sales at reduced prices, it is likely that, to an extent not yet quite clear, rich enterprises might become poor ones and poor enterprises become unprofitable. Overall public services consumption will be "enriched" (the turnover tax will rise), but on the other hand, society may be faced with many new economic problems (unprofitable-or low-profit enterprises) greatly interfering with the ability to implement the basic principles of restructuring the economic machinery.

Finally, one cannot overlook the fact that using a method of setting prices emphasizing market conditions for the sale of products here and abroad in itself negates the purpose of restructuring prices which rests on the principle of cost (production) type prices. The proliferation of these methods of price setting degrades to a considerable extent the pricing calculations from a management tool to a gauge for deflecting

costs of individual producers from the exchange of confirmed costs deemed socially necessary. But this role can, for the time being, be filled by planned calculations or later calculations. The thesis of socially necessary costs as a weighed average of costs of individual producers is no longer valid today. So that the economic dilemma of the size of production costs and the price level of products comes back here too, as a basic question for the future concept of pricing policies of state and economic units.

On the basis of all the above-mentioned facts it can be stated that the laborious and very demanding statewide restructuring of prices works out to be primarily a change in proportion in dividing the national income. The value of created national income and the per capita productivity of labor are not changed by these measures.

Increasing economic efficiency of production and labor productivity is another matter. It lies in the ability of producers to make the increased value of production higher than the increased costs. For this, of course, there must also exist appropriate resource accumulation in addition to the natural requirements of economic operations. It is not likely that implementation of the planned price restructuring will substantially affect the growth of these resources and their efficient structuring.

In the entire development so far of economic machinery both here and in other socialist countries it has not been possible to achieve an explicit and functionally satisfactory resolution to the very complicated problem of integrating national principles of pricing policies with other instruments of management and the whole system of economic indicators and standards. The principles of restructuring the economic mechanism in keeping with the attained level of development of production relations shift the focus of central management of economic processes from the area of direct instruments to the area of indirect instruments. This naturally also brings about a weakening of the functional justification and purpose of central management and coordination of the level and relationship of wholesale prices.

A comprehensive system of indirect instruments (standards) providing central concentration and consequent efficiently planned distribution of significant portions of created capital accumulation can, in my opinion, effectively make up for direct management of the development of the level and relationship of prices in certain segments of the national economy. In accordance with this there is emerging in light industry one variant of possible further development, the alternative of full transfer of authority and responsibility for the formation of wholesale prices into the sphere of economic organizations. The role of central pricing agencies remains essential for the formation and control of compliance with state principles of price policies, guaranteeing, in addition to the protection of national interests, protection of the interests of individual consumers, also, among other things, in case of unilateral assumption of monopoly positions by production organizations.



## POLISH-USSR JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT PUBLISHED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (REFORMA GOSPODARCZA supplement No 90, 27 Nov 86 pp 1,3)  
in Polish 27 Nov 86

[Text: "Agreement Between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Basic Principles of the Formation and Operations of Joint-Venture Enterprises and Organizations"]

[Text] The Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 8 April 1965 Between the Polish People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, and guiding themselves by the decisions of the 10th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party and the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the acceleration of the development of their national economies and on improvements, on this basis, in the welfare of working people, as well as being desirous to further promote and deepen socialist economic integration, attaching great importance to implementing the resolution at the highest-level of the Economic Conference of the Member Countries of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance for the further development of specialization and coproduction, translating into reality the Longrange Program for the Development of Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation Between the Polish People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Until the Year 2000 and, in accordance with the Plan for Measures to Implement that Program, proceeding from the need to concentrate efforts on the priority directions of the development of science and technology contained in the Comprehensive Program for Science and Technology Progress in Member-Countries of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance Until the Year 2000 and the Longrange Polish-Soviet Comprehensive Program for Science and Technology Progress, and also taking into consideration the desire of Polish and Soviet enterprises and organizations to develop new forms of joint economic activity, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1. For a more effective utilization of the advantages of international socialist division of labor and of the scientific, technological, and industrial potential of both countries, the Parties to the Agreement shall establish economically efficient joint-venture enterprises (in the Polish

People's Republic, in the form of international enterprises or companies with foreign participation) and joint-venture organizations (associations) and safeguard the conditions for their operations.

Article 2. Joint-venture enterprises will operate in their own name on the basis of socialist ownership of the Parties to the Agreement.

Joint-venture enterprises are authorized to own, use, and dispose of their assets in accordance with the objectives of their operation, plan targets, and the designation of these assets.

Joint-venture organizations coordinate the whole or part of the economic activities of their participants.

Article 3. Joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations will be established on the basis of international agreements.

Joint-venture organizations and, in cases specified in the law of the Polish People's Republic, also joint-venture enterprises, may be established on the basis of civil-law agreements concluded by the economic organizations of both Parties to the Agreement.

The formation of a joint-venture enterprise is contingent on the drafting of mutually coordinated technical and economic assumptions. Joint-venture enterprises operate within the economic system of the country in which their headquarters are located.

Joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations operate pursuant to the laws of the country in which their headquarters are located, unless otherwise specified in the international agreements concluded between the Polish People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or in the intergovernmental understandings (agreements) on their formation (hereinafter referred to as "founding charters").

Article 4. Joint-venture enterprises acquire legal entity pursuant to the laws of the country in which their headquarters are located.

Joint-venture enterprises operate on the basis of complete cost-accounting and self-financing.

Article 5. The following may participate in joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations:

In the Polish People's Republic: state enterprises, cooperatives and their unions, and other organizations existing as legal entities that are authorized to participate in joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: state and cooperative enterprises, and other organizations existing as legal entities.

When so needed, the participants in joint-venture enterprises may be, in the Polish People's Republic, agencies of state administration, and, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ministries and offices.

A managing body consisting of representatives of the participants is appointed in joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations.

Article 6. The founding charter of a joint-venture enterprise should specify in particular: its name, seat, nature of activity, composition of participants, amount of statutory fund, size and kind of contribution to (share in) of every participant in the statutory fund, procedure and schedule for the contribution to (share in) the [statutory fund], responsibility of participants for failure to fulfill or improper fulfillment of obligations relating to contribution to (share in) [the statutory fund], nature of division of production and profits, rules for material and technical supply, departments of the joint-venture enterprise, organizational structure, and powers of the managing body.

The founding charter of the joint-venture organization should contain in particular: its name, nature of activity, functions, composition of participants, size of contribution by each participant to the capital fund, and powers, structure, and operating procedures of the managing body.

The founding charter should be supplemented with the statute of the joint-venture enterprise (joint-venture organization) if so required by the laws of the country in which the enterprise (organization) is headquartered.

Article 7. Joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations may establish branch offices -- and joint-venture enterprises may also establish branches (affiliates) -- on the territory of the Parties to the Agreement. Branch offices and branches of the joint-venture enterprises (joint-venture organizations) may be established on the territory of third countries, in accordance with the laws of these countries.

Article 8. A joint-venture enterprise acquires legal entity with the moment of the adoption (approval) of its statute and, if its registration is required by the laws of the country in which it is headquartered, at the moment of its registration.

Article 9. Joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations operate on the basis of current and longrange plans drafted and confirmed by themselves.

The governmental agencies of the Parties to the Agreement may not impose on joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations any mandatory plan targets.

The plans of joint-venture enterprises should be coordinated with the development plans of the corresponding industrial subsectors of the Parties to the Agreement.

Article 10. A joint-venture enterprise bears responsibility for its obligations within the limits of the assets it owns.

The enterprise bears no responsibility for the obligations of the countries whose governments are Parties to this Agreement or for the obligations of participants in the enterprise, while these countries and the participants in the enterprise bear no responsibility for the obligations of the enterprise.

Those branches of the joint-venture enterprise which are legal entities bear no responsibility for the obligations of the joint-venture enterprise, and the joint-venture enterprise bears no responsibility for the obligations of these branches.

Article 11. The joint-venture enterprise forms a statutory fund from the contributions (shares) of its participants.

The statutory fund may be supplemented from the profit-making activities of the joint-venture enterprise or, if the need arises, also from additional contributions by participants. Such contributions may include buildings, structures, equipment, and other facilities, the right to use these buildings, structures, and facilities, and also other rights to fixed capital as well as liquid capital in the currencies of the Parties to the Agreement, in transfer rubles, and in convertible currencies.

The land, the minerals under it, and the waters and forests in the country in which the joint-venture enterprise is headquartered may be assigned for use by the enterprise in return for a fee.

The valuation of the fixed capital contributed by the participants in a joint-venture enterprise to its statutory fund is based on foreign-trade prices determined according to the principles and methodology of price formation mandatory within the CEMA and according to recommendations of CEMA bodies, in terms of the currency of the country in which the joint-venture enterprise is headquartered. In the event of the absence of such prices, the valuation of the contributed capital is subject to an agreement among the participants.

The valuation of the statutory fund is based on transfer rubles and on the currency of the country in which the joint-venture is headquartered.

Article 12. The capital fund of a joint-venture organization is formed from contributions by participants which, in accordance with agreements among participants, may be made in the currency of the countries-Parties to the Agreement and in convertible currencies.

The valuation of the capital fund is based on transfer rubles and in the currency of the country in which the managing body of the joint-venture organization is headquartered.

The assets of the participants in the joint-venture organization remain the property of the concerned country, except that the assets of those participants who are cooperatives or other public organizations remain the property of these organizations.



Article 13. The profits earned by the joint-venture enterprise are, after deductions for the taxes due and also for such purposes, determined by the managing body of the enterprise, as the formation or complementation of enterprise funds, divided among the participants proportionately to their share in the statutory fund, unless otherwise specified in the founding charter.

Article 14. The property rights of the joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations are safeguarded by the laws of the countries in which they are headquartered, insofar as these laws apply to state organizations.

The assets of joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations are not subject to sequestration or confiscation by administrative proceedings.

The assets of joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations are subject to mandatory insurance by the insurance institutions of the country in which they are headquartered.

Article 15. Joint-venture enterprises are exempt, in the countries-Parties to the Agreement, from customs duties on their imports and exports of equipment, materials, and other facilities intended to implement their statutory operations, for a period of 3 years starting with the date of acceptance (confirmation) of an enterprise's statute or of the registration of the enterprise.

Article 16. Joint-venture enterprises which perform foreign-trade transactions related to their operations have the right to agree upon the prices of their products and conclude contracts in accordance with the laws of the country in which they are headquartered, independently or through the mediation of foreign-trade organizations.

When determining the prices of the goods and services they provide to the countries-Parties to the Agreement, the enterprises shall guide themselves by the prices binding on trade among member-countries of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.

Article 17. The joint-venture enterprise has the right to:

a) transmit, upon the recommendation of any participant from a country in which the joint-venture enterprise is not headquartered, to the country in which it is headquartered, an unrestricted amount of funds (including funds in convertible currencies) due the enterprise as a result of a division of profits, as well as in connection with the shutdown of or withdrawal from the joint-venture enterprise;

b) transmit to its branches or branch offices located outside the country in which it is headquartered its own funds with the object of establishing or promoting the operations of the branch or branch office.

Branches of the joint-venture enterprise located outside the country in which it is headquartered have the right to transmit to the enterprise funds consonant with its financial plans.

Article 18. Deliveries of goods and provision of services ensuing from the operational plans of joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations are taken into consideration during the coordination of plans and included in the longrange agreements on trade turnover and payments between the Parties to the Agreement and in annual trade protocols, as well as, if the need arises, in other agreements for economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the Parties to the Agreement.

Article 19. Joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations may be subject to disbanding in cases envisaged in the founding charter or statute. In the event of the liquidation of a joint-venture enterprise, the participant from the country in which it is headquartered has priority in acquiring the assets of the joint-venture enterprise, unless otherwise specified in the founding charter.

Article 20. Joint-venture enterprises are subject to taxation in accordance with the laws of the country in which they are headquartered or, in isolated, necessary cases, according to the principles and procedure agreed upon between the concerned agencies of the Polish People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 21. The working conditions, wage system, and benefits of the employees of joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations and their branches or branch offices are defined in their founding charters in accordance with the laws of the country in which the joint-venture enterprise, joint-venture organization, or its branch or branch office, is sited.

The working conditions, wage system, and benefits of the employees of joint-venture enterprises, joint-venture organizations, and their branches or branch offices whose headquarters are not sited in the same country will be defined in the founding charters pursuant to the principles and regulations agreed upon between the appropriate agencies of the Parties to the Agreement.

Article 22. The Parties to the Agreement provide for establishing, pursuant to the provisions of Article 3 of this Agreement, joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations according to the appended list.

In the future, joint-venture enterprises and joint-venture organizations will be established on the basis of agreements between concerned organizations of the Polish People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concluded pursuant to the present Agreement.

Article 23. The present Agreement is subject to acceptance pursuant to the laws of the countries-Parties to the Agreement.

The present agreement remains in force until 31 December 1990. It is subject to automatic extension for 5-year periods unless either Party present a notice of intent to withdraw from further participation in the Agreement 1 year prior to the expiration of the period for which it applies.

The present Agreement may be modified or amended on the basis of an understanding between the Parties to the Agreement.

Article 24. The present Agreement may, upon the consent of the Parties to the Agreement, be joined by the governments of other countries upon their notification of the Parties to the Agreement by means of a written proposal.

The terms for such participation will be defined in the form of a Protocol appended to the present Agreement and prepared on the basis of an agreement between the Parties to the Agreement and the government of the state presenting the proposal to participate.

Prepared in Warsaw on 15 October 1986, in two original copies, each in the Polish and Russian languages, with both texts being equally binding.

1386

CSO: 2600/646

## LEGISLATIVE GAPS REMAIN IN USSR JOINT VENTURES AGREEMENT

Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish No 20, 17 May 87 p 9

[Article by Krystyna Pawlowicz: "Polish-Soviet Joint-Venture Enterprises"]

[Excerpt] Formative Principles and Kinds

The Agreement of October 1986 specifies certain uniform rules for the establishment and operation of Polish-Soviet enterprises. It adopts the principle of a close linkage of the activities of joint-venture enterprises to the legal system of the country in which they are headquartered. This means that the enterprises established on Polish territory and, in accordance with that Agreement, headquartered here, are to operate within the framework of the regulations binding in Poland, unless "otherwise specified in the international agreements and intergovernmental understandings on their establishment" (Article 3 of the Agreement). By the same token, these enterprises should pattern their operations on the organizational and operating principles legally safeguarded in this country, which essentially reduce to the autonomy, self-management, and self-financing of enterprises. These principles should be respected with regard to a Polish enterprise founding a joint-venture enterprise as well as with regard to the joint-venture enterprise itself, established jointly with a foreign organization. There will be some constraints on the activities of the joint-venture enterprise as regards the principle of autonomy within the scope allowed by the regulations governing the operations of joint-stock companies with foreign participation, the commercial law code, and, of course, the text of the Agreement.

The Agreement distinguishes between two kinds of joint-venture enterprises: the international enterprise and the joint-stock company with foreign participation. They can be established through either of two procedures: on the basis of an international agreement (that is, administratively, as it were) or, in cases envisaged by Polish law, also on the basis of civil-law agreements concluded directly by the concerned economic organizations of both countries (of course, on retaining the provisions of the Agreement of October 1986 -- see Articles 1, 3, and 22 of that Agreement). The statute of the international enterprise will be determined by an international agreement. (Footnote) (The Council of Ministers is drafting a resolution on the principles for the formation and operation of international joint-venture



enterprises.) In its turn, the status of an enterprise established through an agreement between Polish and Soviet enterprises, and which is to operate in the form of a joint-stock company with foreign participation, will ensue, as is believed, from the Decree of 1986 on Joint-Stock Companies With Foreign Participation, the applicable complementing provisions of the Commercial Law Code of 1984, and directly from the enterprise's founding charter.

In this context, some doubts are elicited by the vague language of Article 26 of the Decree on Joint-Stock Companies, basically incompatible with the legislation governing the activities of joint-stock companies, which provides that these companies "participate in trade on the principles and through the procedure established for units of the socialized economy." Such a provision entails major legal and economic consequences relating to e.g., the procedure for making claims, the financial conditions of operation, etc., which are not the same as for joint-stock companies.

Article 2 of the Polish-Soviet Agreement formulates the economic and legal elements of the concept of the "joint-venture enterprise," defining it as a unit engaging in economic activities (that is, not in, e.g., social, administrative, etc., activities) on its own behalf, and operating on the basis of capital owned by the countries which it represents. It has the right to own, use, and dispose of its property in accordance with "its operating plans, plan targets, and the designation of that property." It operates within the economic system of the country in which it is headquartered. It acquires its legal entity "in accordance with the provisions of the country in which it is headquartered" (Article 4). In Poland this will mean the requirement of registering in the Commercial Registry the joint-venture enterprise established in the form of a joint-stock company with foreign participation. As for international enterprises formed on the basis of international agreements, the moment at which they acquire legal entity will be not just the moment at which the international agreement is signed but probably also the moment at which they are entered in the Registry of State Enterprises or in the Commercial Registry, depending on the organizational-legal form in which the enterprise will operate.

In view of the first sentence in the aforementioned Article 4 of the Agreement, Article 8 is not too clear in stating, "The joint-venture enterprise acquires legal entity at the moment of acceptance (confirmation) of its statute and, if the laws of the country in which it is headquartered require its registration, at the moment of its registration."

Polish-Soviet joint-venture enterprises are to operate "on the basis of complete cost accounting and self-financing."

#### The Authorization to Participate

The participants on the Polish side in the joint-venture enterprise may be "authorized" state enterprises, cooperatives and their associations, and "other organizations having legal entity." Moreover, in necessary cases, agencies of state administration in both countries also may be participants in joint-venture enterprises (Article 5 of the Agreement).

The question arises: what is the meaning of "authorized" and what causes an enterprise to be "authorized" to participate in a joint-venture organization? And also: who and on what basis would be granting such authorizations?

It appears that separate and special authorizations of this kind are unnecessary, because there already exist legal regulations allowing a state enterprise to establish an enterprise jointly with a foreign organization (Article 14 of the Decree on State Enterprises), while the 1986 Decree on Joint-Stock Companies with Foreign Participation defines the requirements for membership in a joint-stock company (e.g., obtaining the consent of the parent agency, and many others).

The regulations in force grant to state enterprises autonomy of decisionmaking on all matters concerning their own operations. State agencies may take decisions concerning an enterprise only in instances envisaged in "legal provisions" (Article 4 of the Decree on State Enterprises). In view of the principles of the economic reform and in the light of the mandatory legal provisions, the possibility of designating by fiat particular enterprises for participation in joint ventures is to be ruled out, considering that the Decree on State Enterprises does not provide for such a form of administrative intervention into the affairs of autonomous economic organizations. Such a selection by fiat should rather be regarded as a kind of administrative action, a decision of the parent agency (or of another administrative agency). In the event that the enterprise does not consent to such a decision ordering it to cooperate with other organizations, it is free to resort to the courts for a resolution of the dispute by the procedure specified in Article 58 of the Decree on State Enterprises.

It appears that the best way of prompting enterprises to consent to favorable --in the opinion of the parent agencies--economic cooperation [i.e., joint ventures] is by resorting to economic instruments such as the provision of appropriate financial, customs, tax, and other incentives. In my opinion, obligating enterprises to participate in joint ventures with a foreign partner on the basis of Article 54 of the Decree on State Enterprises, which provides that the parent agency has the right to "impose... the obligation of incorporating a target in the enterprise's plan or assigning a plan-exceeding target" if this is needed for the purpose of, among other things, "implementing international obligations," should also be ruled out. This is because Article 54 of the Decree on State Enterprises merely concerns incorporating in an enterprise's plan additional material targets (as ensues from the language of that Article as a whole) and does not provide any foundation for proceeding with such a major change in the enterprise's organizational, capital, and legal status as requiring it to become a partner in a joint-stock company.

It cannot either be argued that the "selection" of an enterprise is due to the need to satisfy an international obligation, because that obligation itself (i.e., the Polish-Soviet Agreement) does not pertain to the fulfillment of specific production, service, transport, etc., targets but merely defines the operating principles of the joint economic structures and relates them to the laws mandatory in the countries concerned.

Enterprises interested in cooperation in the form of a joint-venture enterprise with a foreign (Soviet) partner should therefore, in accordance with the regulations, obtain the consent of their parent agencies (if establishing a joint-venture enterprise in the form of a joint-stock company is concerned; if the form is to be that of an international enterprise, the pertinent intergovernmental agreement specifies the related terms), as well as the consent of its worker council (pursuant to Article 24 of the Decree on Workforce Self-Government), and also other permits required by the 1986 Decree on Joint-Stock Companies. Once all these kinds of consent are obtained, the enterprise should be legally viewed as authorized to undertake the economic cooperation referred to by the Polish-Soviet Agreement analyzed here. A separate problem is the absence of explicit legal criteria which must be met by the enterprise if its parent agency is to consent to its participation in a joint-venture enterprise. This matter has to be settled.

The provision of Article 5 of the Agreement, which admits "in necessary instances the participation of agencies of state administration in a joint-venture enterprise," raises the question of the role of such agencies in the joint-venture enterprise, an enterprise which is after all intended to engage in gainful and efficient economic activity. An administrative agency, which represents the State Exchequer and lacks legal entity, is, to say the least a mysterious kind of "participant" in a joint-stock company, all the more so considering that a regular Polish enterprise already is a participant in that joint-venture enterprise. What role, functions, and tasks would be exercised by an administrative agency participating in a joint-stock company, side by side perhaps with a regular Polish enterprise to which its relationship might be that of the parent agency? What kind of partnership contribution could be made by an administrative agency and what kind of profits will be its share? This question also needs to be resolved, if it is not to elicit mistrust among the economic "candidates" for joint-venture enterprises.

#### Operating Principles

Pursuant to Article 9 of the Agreement, the Polish-Soviet joint-venture enterprise operates "on the basis of the current and longrange plans it prepares and approves." The state agencies of the countries-parties to the Agreement "may not impose on the joint-venture enterprise... mandatory plan targets." "The plans of joint-venture enterprises should be coordinated with the development plans of the corresponding industrial subsectors of the countries-parties to the Agreement."

It can be said that the principle of planning autonomy has also been applied to the regulations governing Polish-Soviet joint-venture enterprises. The adoption of this principle would consequently imply that the "coordination" of the plans of these enterprises with the corresponding state development plans would be accomplished with the aid of instruments analogous to those indicated in Article 6 of the Decree on Socioeconomic Planning and intended to safeguard "the convergence of the directions of action of economic organizations with the goals outlined in central plans."



Hence, plans should be correspondingly coordinated on the basis of: agreements concluded between the agencies of state administration of both countries and the joint-venture enterprise; the application of properly designed economic instruments by administrative agencies and banks; legal safeguards; mutual exchange of information in the plan-drafting stage; and, in exceptional cases, imposition on the joint-venture enterprise of specific tasks in situations and conditions closely detailed by the laws and on terms that are at least as favorable as those specified in the Decree on Enterprises. The duty of plan coordination should be in the nature of not an absolute fiat but information or a recommendation which can be fulfilled primarily through appropriate action by administrative agencies that respect the autonomy of the joint-venture enterprise.

As regards government orders [contracts], with respect to joint-venture enterprises it should be acknowledged that the provisions authorizing the parent agency (the minister) to obligate enterprises to accept such orders will not be applicable in this case, inasmuch as the "parent agencies" of joint-venture enterprises (established by means of civil-law agreements between economic organizations) are the partners themselves and, in principle, it is they alone who decide on the operations of the joint-stock [joint-venture] company. As for the state agency, e.g., a ministry, it can in practice influence the joint-venture enterprise by all kinds of indirect means, e.g., through the directors of the founding enterprises.

The joint-venture enterprise is responsible for its obligations within the limits of the capital it owns, and it bears no responsibility for the obligations of the countries-parties to the agreement [for its founding], and neither does it bear responsibility for the obligations of the participating enterprises. The profits of the joint-venture enterprise are, after deductions for taxes and other regular purposes, divided among the participants in proportion to their shares in the statutory fund, unless otherwise specified in the founding charter (Article 13 of the Agreement).

In Article 4 there is an important provision: "the property rights of joint-venture enterprises are safeguarded by the laws of the country in which they are headquartered."

However, despite the many other important provisions it contains, the Agreement lacks provisions governing the procedure for resolving internal disputes, i.e., disputes between participants in the joint-venture enterprise, as well as disputes between that enterprise and domestic economic organizations. In theory, various solutions are possible (see on this topic J. Jakubowski, "Międzynarodowe organizacje gospodarcze krajów RPWG. Zagadnienia prawne" ["International Economic Organizations of CEMA Countries. Legal Aspects"], Warsaw, 1980, pp 270, ff.). It may be that pertinent special supplements [implementing regulations] are in existence, but it appears that the importance of these issues would warrant including them in the text of the Agreement itself.

Possible solutions include, e.g., the arbitration of civil-law disputes between partners by the courts or eventually by special arbitration commissions under chambers of commerce, or too by specially appointed mixed



commissions. Civil-law disputes between a joint-venture enterprise and domestic economic organizations may be resolved on the basis of principles mandatory in Poland for economic organizations, i.e., as heretofore, by arbitration. The competences of the Supreme Administrative Court and common courts in eventual disputes between a joint-venture enterprise and state administrative agencies cannot be ruled out either. Disputes with entities other than economic organizations will be resolved by common courts. In the former kinds of cases mentioned above, the provisions of the international agreement usually are decisive to the choice of the legal resort. In our case, since these questions are not considered in the text of the Agreement itself, more specific solutions can be only guessed. It is to be hoped that the solutions eventually envisaged in supplements [implementing regulations] will be at least as favorable as they are for participants in joint-stock companies operating on the basis of the 1986 Decree on Joint-Stock Companies with Foreign Participation, and that the Polish-Soviet Agreement does not pose this issue in a markedly different manner but remains in accord with the civil-law nature of the joint-stock company. The manner of resolution of disputes concerning a joint-venture enterprise (by autonomous bodies or by those dependent on the state administration) constitutes a special proof of the nature and economic-legal status of that enterprise.

#### The Managing Body

In the light of the Polish-Soviet Agreement, a single obligatory managing body consisting of representatives of the participants (Article 5, last sentence) operates a joint-venture enterprise. This does not rule out in principle the formation of other bodies of, e.g., consultative and advisory nature, in the agreement to establish the joint-stock company.

The Agreement regulating the activities of joint-venture enterprises does not provide for worker self-government bodies or for endowing employees with any economic competences. Article 21 merely makes a general mention of employee benefits that are to be defined in the founding charter of the enterprise pursuant to the laws in force in the country in which it is headquartered. Hence, worker self-government is not a feature of Polish-Soviet joint-venture enterprises, although the language of the Agreement does not rule out the possibility of the participation of certain forms of employee representation in managing the enterprise. Having the legal status of a joint-stock company, the joint-venture enterprise cannot be identified with a state enterprise as construed in the Decree on Enterprises, and hence the 1981 Decree on Workforce Self-Government in State Enterprises does not apply to it. The joint-venture enterprise is established through a civil-law agreement between two (or more) organizations and is subject (outside of the 1986 International Agreement) to the provisions governing joint-stock companies in the Decree on Joint-Stock Companies with Foreign Participation and additionally to the Commercial Law Code, which do not provide for any worker-representation bodies. The role of co-owners empowered to co-manage or co-decide, such as is exercised by employees of a state enterprise, is not exercised by employees of a joint-venture enterprise. The organizational-legal status of a joint-stock company is, picturesquely speaking, that of a self-government of partners, of shareholders, i.e., of the founding enterprises, which are represented in the joint-stock company by their managing representatives--the directors.

The joint-stock company is an outgrowth of a market economy based on private ownership, and by its genesis it is a form of "pure" economic activity. It is not intended to meet the aspirations of its employees as regards its management, because this is a right naturally reserved for its owners (shareholders). But this does not mean that the structure of the joint-stock company precludes certain forms of employee representation in its management. For a long time now, in the highly developed Western countries, owing to the growing role of labor, the traditional interpretation of corporate law is being gradually abandoned. Labor is gradually becoming a major object of interest to that law. (Footnote) (Cf. P. Sanders, "Dutch Company Law," London, 1977, p 215 (as translated by L. Zalewski in the article, "Problems of the Functioning of Workforce Self-Governments in Commercial Joint-Stock Companies and Enterprises," RPE18, 1, 1984, p 48)).

All the more so, in the socialist community, a joint-venture enterprise of two socialist countries essentially remains a "socialized" organization and therefore it should not be and is not deprived of the influence of employees on its operations. On the one hand, the worker self-government of the parent enterprise has certain opportunities for (indirectly) influencing the activities of the new joint-stock company and controlling them through the mediation of the director representing the parent enterprise or of the person representing it in the "managing body" of the joint-venture enterprise. The director is also dutybound to report to the worker council of his (parent) enterprise on the activities of the joint venture established with the foreign partner. In this sense, the workforce has certain means of influencing the director, including even recalling him from his post.

On the other hand, the participants in the joint-venture enterprise may provide in the founding charter and statute for certain forms of direct influence of employees on the activities of the enterprise. Various related proposals have been offered by Hubert Izdebaki in ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, No 52/53, 1984 ("Joint-Stock Companies Are Better," Insert "Self-Government and Life") and by the aforementioned L. Zalewski. The provisions of the Polish-Soviet Agreement present no obstacles in this respect. But it should be borne in mind that no solution relating to "installing" some participation of the employees of a joint-stock company in the management of its economic activities may result in infringing upon the basic structures and functions of the company. (Footnote) (See L. Zalewski, op. cit., p 88).

In Poland so far the solutions concerning employee participation in the management of commercial joint-stock companies have been neither uniform nor coherent. The 1985 Decree on Joint-Participation Enterprises provides for some limited forms of employee representation with advisory and consultative powers at these enterprises. In its turn, the Decree on Joint-Stock Companies with Foreign Participation contains a trace of the idea of employee co-management in the provisions of Article 18, which permit the employees of joint-stock companies to elect at a general meeting a representative to the company's supervising council. For the joint-venture enterprises formed by state enterprises and operating pursuant to the 1934 Commercial Law Code there exist no legal provisions -- this being natural in view of the time at which that code had been promulgated -- for any organizational form of employee representation in company management. A lucid concept of such management,

reconciling the principle of employee participation in decisions on aspects of the socialized economy with the nature and purpose of a joint-stock company, is yet to be worked out.

The limited existing experience and practice so far should not, however, negate attempts to introduce employee participation in the management of, say, joint-venture Polish-Soviet enterprises. Any enterprise operating with capital based on public property (including joint-participation enterprises, joint-venture state enterprises, joint-stock companies with foreign participation, etc.) should provide for certain forms of participation by its "coproprietors" --employees--in its management (unless the rights of state-owned companies to the capital at their disposal are regulated in a basically different manner).

In addition to certain general questions, many fundamental as well as specific problems relating to the establishment of joint-venture Polish-Soviet enterprises are yet to be clarified. Many questions and proposals are as yet "being settled," and many will be resolved only in the future, on a continuing basis, as it were, depending on the unfolding of the situation. As reported by Stanislaw Dlugosz, vice chairman of the Planning Commission ("Joint Ventures, Joint Benefits," RZECZPOSPOLITA, No 38, 1987), in situations in which the Decree on Companies with Foreign Participation empowers discrete ministers to authorize less stringent operating conditions than normally required, the 1986 Agreement refers to "bilateral settlements" so far as Polish-Soviet joint-venture enterprises are concerned. In this connection, it may be postulated that the operating principles of these enterprises should include only a minimum of aspects of economic and legal enclaves and be as maximally as possible integrated with the system of uniform regulations governing domestic economic organizations.

In addition to the legal problems considered above, there exist many of other nature, directly relating to the conduct of international economic cooperation and the relations between partners, e.g., clearing of accounts, distribution of output, cost-effectiveness calculations, complicated cost and price factors, criteria for currency conversion, etc. Their resolution is the more difficult the more different the economic-legal systems of the countries whose economic organizations participate in joint ventures are. This was discussed in ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE by Krzysztof Plesinski ("The Course 'Zawiercie,'" No 51/52, 1986).

Given the rather understandably generalized nature of the international agreement on the principles for the establishment and organization of joint-venture enterprises, the above comments were logically often made in the form of asking questions and attempting or proposing to answer them by the present writer. The exploration of solutions that would most completely allow for the principles of mutual equality and mutual benefits and for the fundamental, in our conditions, principle of enterprise autonomy, would be desirable.

P. S. The REFORMA GOSPODARCZA Supplement to RZECZPOSPOLITA, No 95, 1987, published a twin set of regulations (Resolution of 13 January 1987 of the USSR Council of Ministers) governing the formation and operation on Soviet territory of joint-venture enterprises formed by the USSR in partnership with other member-countries of CEMA. It ensues from another report that possibilities for concluding intergovernmental agreements for the formation of joint-venture enterprises and organizations, as well as for direct cooperation between Polish and Czechoslovak enterprises also are being explored.



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